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In this thesis I have taken a broad view on international environmental co-operation; What are the 
incentives, obstacles and ways to enhance participation and compliance with international 
environmental agreements. I have also looked at a more specific issue; The implementation of the 
“flexible mechanisms” of the Kyoto Protocol, and particularly joint implementation projects between an 
investor in a developed country and a host in an economy in transition or developing country.   
 
Full co-operation in dealing with international environmental externalities will give the highest sum 
benefit for the countries involved, but countries have the incentive to increase their individual benefit 
by free-riding on the virtuous behaviour of others. As there is no supra-national authority to enforce 
compliance, this can make co-operation break down or keep it from being established.  
 
To enhance co-operation it must be made beneficial for each individual country to join an IEA, and 
free-riding and non-compliance should be deterred. Several mechanisms can promote co-operation, 
like side-transfers, issue-linking and trade-sanctions. Several authors also see countries’ moral 
obligations and commitment as possible important factors in this. 
 
Contrary to basic economics theory, compliance with international environmental agreements (IEAs) is 
the norm. Several explanations to this are possible. An IEA may be seen as the outcome of a non co-
operative game, and hence only reflects each country’s costs and benefits of that underlying game. 
Countries are free to negotiate and join the IEAs they choose, perhaps opting out of costly “deep co-
operation”.  
 
To have mechanisms for efficient implementation of an IEA will make it easier for countries to join and 
comply. However, achieving overall efficiency seem unlikely. It requires both that targets are set 
optimally and the agreed measures must be implemented cost-efficiently. Mechanisms to achieve 
cost-efficiency exist, but have their problems.  
 
The Kyoto Protocol opens up for such flexible mechanisms: International emissions trading (IET) and 
joint implementation (JI). To minimise costs of implementation measures to combat global warming 
must be performed also in economies in transition and developing countries, but the developing 
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countries do not have obligations under the protocol. For JI-projects between an investor in a country 
with obligations and a host in a country without obligations the Kyoto Protocol includes the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM). The detailed rules for all these flexible mechanisms have not yet 
been agreed upon. 
 
For IET possible problems with countries’ market power in the emissions quota market, limited 
participation in trading, high transaction costs, asymmetric information opening up for cheating and the 
trade of “hot air” can reduce the cost-saving, or even lead to higher overall costs of implementation. 
 
For JI (includes the CDM) one fears that high transaction costs, asymmetric information opening up for 
adverse selection of projects and hidden action by the hosts, “paper trades” due to missing emission 
baselines for the developing countries, limited participation and leakages will limit their cost-saving 
ability.  
 
I believe JI-project investors will try to perform several projects with the same host to reduce 
transaction costs of each project. Due to financial constraints hosts in developing countries and 
economies in transition will need to get all or some of the project transfer before performing the 
project. I have developed two models in this thesis to investigate if JI-contracts are possible under 
these assumptions. I find that even if external uncertain factors can cause project failure and the host 
has private information opening up for cheating, contracts can be possible. To increase the chances of 
JI-projects the external factors’ influence should be reduced. A JI-project host should work to reduce a 
host’s private information, to avoid own benefit of the project being eliminated due to contract breach 
by the host. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Public interest for environmental issues became widespread in the 1960s in the advanced economies 
(Baumol and Oates 1988). Local pollution problems (Pigou 1920, Carson 1960) and national losses of 
wildlife (Zappfe 1958, Leopold 1966) were the first environmental concerns. Today international issues 
like acid rain, climate change, thinning of the ozone layer and global losses of biological diversity 
dominate, at least in the Western Hemisphere. 
 
For local/domestic environmental externalities the basic theory on how to resolve them has existed for 
more than 3/4 of a century. The authorities must correct the externalities through the use of taxes 
and/or direct regulations (Pigou 1920). Which instrument is most efficient varies with the amount of 
information available to the authorities and whether uncertainty is present. An important addition to the 
theory on externalities came with Dales' theory on tradable permits in 1968.  
 
The instruments prescribed for domestic environmental externalities can not be used as easily for 
international problems. States are sovereign, and the lack of a supranational authority is the biggest 
obstacle to an efficient elimination of international externalities (Barrett 1990). All the involved states 
must co-operate to resolve an international externality if efficiency shall be achieved. At the same time 
as this highest benefit is an incentive for international environmental co-operation, countries also have 
an incentive to free-ride on the virtuous behaviour of others. Barrett (1994) states that international 
environmental agreements (IEAs) must be self-enforcing, meaning that they must be designed so that 
it is in countries’ interest both to join and comply with them. 
 
International environmental problems are the concern of this thesis. International environmental 
agreements (IEAs) are between states, and aim to prevent, reduce, control or compensate for 
transboundary environmental externalities (Måreng 1996). The agreements can be bilateral, trilateral 
or multilateral, including agreements for the global commons.  
 
Since 1869 more than 300 IEAs have been signed, with approximately 200 of them since 1970 
(Måreng 1996). There are several types and levels of IEAs which countries may negotiate (Ulfstein, 
lecture 14.05.98):  





 Framework conventions state the aim of a co-operation, but not the concrete duties that the 
signatories must perform; 
 By signing Protocols (under conventions) states accept concrete duties, like reductions of 
emissions by a certain percentage compared to a benchmark; 
 Lists may give details of substances which the states may not produce or consume, of species 
which may not be traded, etc; 
 States may agree to create international institutions working for international co-operation on the 
environment. 
 
Of all IEAs set up since 1972, 2/3 deal with shared resources. The IEAs made up to the end of the 
1970’s are called first generation agreements. They were technical agreements, with no or only weak 
built in mechanisms for resolving disputes/dealing with non-compliance. Their goal was often to agree 
on a flat rate reduction on polluting emissions. Second generation agreements, up to the end of the 
1980’s, have provisions on just sharing of the burden, provisions to achieve cost-effectiveness, and 
prescribe measures based on scientific investigations. During the last years we have got third 
generation agreements. In addition to the good features of 2nd generation IEAs, they contain explicit 
provisions on compliance, verification and enforcement of the agreement. (Måreng 1996). 
 
A functioning IEA has four elements according to Måreng (1996): Implementation, compliance, 
verification and enforcement. Implementation is the measures taken at the national level to realise the 
obligations of the agreement. This could for example be altering or making new national laws. 
Compliance is when the implementative measures are respected/performed by the nation’s citizens, 
enterprises, etc, and the state hence fulfils its obligations under the IEA. Verification is the collection 
and evaluation of information about how the states fulfil their obligations in the IEA. Enforcement of an 
agreement is necessary when states do not fulfil their obligations, and can take the shape of “carrots” 
or “sticks”. It could also be putting dispute-resolving mechanisms into effect between two or more 
parties disagreeing about their fulfilment of the IEA. 
 
Carraro (1997a) notes that in the recent history of IEAs, conventions signed by many are rather empty 
in terms of quantitative targets and/or deadlines. Precise commitments are on the other hand signed 
by a small group of “like-minded” countries.  
 
Many different solutions have been proposed and some implemented. For global environmental 
problems, like the decline in biological diversity, one must, through international institutions, create 
mechanisms that will register the preferences and concerns of the global community with the local 
communities from which the externality stems (Swanson1994). Side-transfers are used in some IEAs 
as an instrument to increase the number of signatories (Carraro and Siniscalco 1993). Coercive trade 
measures are potential “sticks” in a few current international agreements to deter free-riding 
(Blackhurst and Subramanian 1992). “Carrots”, like technical assistance and financial transfers, are 
however a lot more common (Jacob Werksman, lecture 15.05.98). Current negotiations are trying to 
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link environmental protection to other types of international co-operation. An example is the 
technological co-operation under the Climate Change Convention. (Carraro 1997a). 
 
That the implementation of a country’s obligations under an IEA is cost-effective is often the 
responsibility of that country. In some cases the design of the IEA can influence the overall cost of 
meeting its target considerably. The Kyoto Protocol under the Framework Convention on Climate 
Change opens up for several mechanisms that can equalise marginal costs internationally. By 
allowing international emissions trading (IET) countries can buy emissions quotas abroad. The seller 
of the quota has a lower marginal cost of reducing emissions than the buyer, and both can make a 
gain. In joint implementation (JI) projects countries (or sectors/firms) makes investments abroad that 
reduce emissions, and the investor can get this credited towards their own obligations. It is a 
requirement that the reductions from the JI-project are additional to what would have taken place in 
the absence of the project. If the host country also has a target under the Kyoto Protocol this is 
unproblematic. However, the majority of the world’s countries – the developing countries – have no 
obligations to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases under the Kyoto Protocol. The Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) is a mechanism that allows JI-projects between investors in countries 
with obligations and hosts in countries without obligations, provided the investments also aids 
development of the host country. 
 
In chapter 2 I discuss the incentives and mechanisms that naturally exists for countries to make and 
fulfil IEAs, and in chapter 3 how the design of IEAs can make it more attractive to join them, and what 
types of mechanisms can ensure or increase compliance with the demands of an IEA. These two 
chapters constitute a background for the discussion on mechanisms and measures to get an efficient 
implementation of countries’ obligations under an IEA (chapter 4). Focus is on the flexible 
mechanisms in the Kyoto Protocol:  
 International emissions trading (IET); 
 Joint Implementation (JI) (including); 
 the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). 
 
The cost-efficiency potential that these mechanisms hold may not be achieved due to problems with 
transaction costs, enforcement, asymmetric information and uncertainty. The detailed rules to govern 
the use of these mechanisms are not yet decided. They might be agreed at the sixth Conference of 
the Parties (COP-6) to the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) in the Hague, in 
November this year (2000). 
 
In chapter 5 I develop two models that investigate repeated international contracts under asymmetric 
information and uncertainty. I argue that the models’ assumptions are relevant for some JI-contracts. 




 To reduce the transaction costs of each individual JI-project the investors will probably limit their 
co-operation to only a few hosts, learn to know them well, and rather perform several JI-projects 
with each. Hence I model a repeated relationship between investor and host of JI-projects. 
 The countries where the cheapest measures to combat global warming are (lowest marginal cost) 
are developing countries and the Economies in transition (former Soviet Union/Eastern Europe). 
Generalising, one can say that these countries are politically and economically unstable, with 
much corruption present. These factors might cause project failure independent of a host’s 
actions. The presence of uncertainty increases the chances of hosts to JI-projects trying to cheat 
in some manner, especially if a host has private information. 
 Some hosts of JI-projects will need to receive the contracted transfer before the project is 
implemented, due to financial constraints. Withholding the transfer to achieve compliance is hence 
not an option for the investor. 
 
These starting point are common for both models. The second model investigates how a host’s ability 
to reduce other factors’ influence on the outcome of a JI-project affects the chances of JI-contracts 
and the actors’ strategies. 
 
In chapter 6 I sum up and conclude. 
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2. NATURAL INCENTIVES 
FOR INTERNATIONAL 
CO-OPERATION 
When international environmental externalities are present there is a potential gain in co-ordinating 
actions (Barrett 1990). This is the basic incentive behind making IEAs. It is common in situations with 
international externalities that no country can gain by unilateral action. The Prisoners’ Dilemma is the 
standard representation of (reciprocal) externalities (Blackhurst and Subramanian 1992), and this was 
also the game used in early analysis of international environmental problems (Carraro and Siniscalco 
1992). It demonstrates the disincentive for unilateral action, but also the incentive to free-ride if others 
try to deal with the externality. No co-operation is the predicted outcome. The incentives for co-
operation can be stronger if the situations are repeated (repeated games), if the countries are highly 
heterogeneous, or if there is “reciprocity” between the players (Blackhurst and Subramanian 1992). If 
there are reinforcement effects between the environmental efforts of the different countries (Heal 
1994), and the more farsighted the countries are (Ecchia and Mariotti 1997), the chances of reaching 
a co-operative solution is also higher. 
 
There is a need for mechanisms/institutions that can make it profitable for individual states to take 
their external effects on other countries into consideration when making decisions (Swanson 1994). 
IEAs are set up to achieve co-operation and to punish free-riding (Barrett 1994). As no sovereign 
country can be forced to join an IEA, nor comply with its obligations, an agreement must be “self-
enforcing”; Each individual country must be better off by joining and complying with an IEA (Barrett 
1994). 
Natural incentives for international co-operation 
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2.1 The potential gains of 
international co-operation 
If countries co-operate to maximise their joint total benefit, there is a gain compared to the situation 
where each country only maximises individual benefit, ignoring the external effects they impose on the 
others. That gain is the potential gain of international co-operation (Barrett 1990). 
 
In many cases the gain is similar to the gain of having efficient provision of a public good, compared to 
private provision of it. This is because some internationally shared resources have public good 
characteristics (Barrett 1994). This is also reflected by the rule used in setting the level of abatement 
when co-operating on pollution control; It is just a restatement of Samuelson’s rule for the optimal 




To illustrate the point Barrett (1990) considers a world of N identical countries, each of which emits a 
pollutant that damages the global environment. Every country’s marginal benefit of abatement 
depends upon global/total abatement level
2
, while its costs naturally only depends on its own 
abatement level. Linear marginal benefits and costs, are assumed. 
 
See Figure 1 below. The non co-operative (Cournot-Nash) outcome of the situation is that each 
country chooses a level of abatement where its own marginal benefits (MBi) equals its own marginal 
costs (MCi). This is level Q0. With a fully co-operative outcome each country abates to the level where 
its own marginal costs equals the sum of marginal benefits of all the countries taken together (MB). 
This is the higher abatement level QC. 
 
                                                    
1
 Samuelson, P 1954:”The pure theory of public expenditure”, Review of Economics and statistics, 36, 387-9, 
quoted in Barrett (1994). 
2
 The benefit of abatement is alternatively viewed as the reduction in damages due to a lower pollution level. 
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Figure 1 - The potential gains of co-operation 
In the non co-operative case, each country has a net benefit given by the area of triangle 1. Moving to 
the co-operative case the area of triangle 2 represents the country’s increased cost by doing so. This 
is more than offset by the increase in the other countries’ benefit, and the total net increase in benefit 
is given by the area of triangle 3. 
 
The difference in abatement levels between the co-operative and the Nash outcome depends on the 
slopes of the individual country’s marginal cost curve and the slope of the global marginal benefit 
curve, and also the total number of countries (Barrett 1994). Barrett (1994) finds that for global 
environmental problems, with the number of countries being large:  
 When cost of abatement is small and benefit is large, abatement is substantial even in the Nash 
outcome. The gains to co-operation is hence relatively small in this case.  
 When cost of abatement is large and benefit is small countries will not abate much, even with full 
co-operation.  
 When cost of abatement is approximately equal to the benefit and both are relatively small, full co-
operation will mean substantially higher abatement levels than in the Nash outcome, but the gains 
of co-operation will nevertheless be small.  
 When cost of abatement is approximately equal to the benefit and both are relatively large, full co-















Natural incentives for international co-operation 
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In the real world countries are not identical. Some countries will then gain and some lose when moving 
from the non-co-operative to the co-operative outcome. This depends on the relative size between the 
benefits of increased overall abatement and the costs of own abatement (Hoel 1992)
3
. 
2.2 Obstacles to co-operation 
Blackhurst and Subramanian (1992) give four reasons why countries may not want to participate in an 
international environmental agreement: 
 Disagreement over scientific evidence. Some countries may consider the problem exaggerated or 
non-existing, or that the proposed remedies will be ineffective. There will always be uncertainty, 
and it is a underlying cause for many types of problems related to international co-operation. 
 A country may give lower priority to a particular environmental problem than the proposers of the 
IEA. This could take the form of a dispute over the relative size of costs and benefits. Differences 
in concern for an environmental issue typically stems from differences in preferences, per capita 
income, environmental endowments or expectations of future technological innovations. 
 A country may disagree with the proposed sharing of responsibility between countries for the 
environmental problem. The allocation of responsibility is linked to the question of property rights. 
At a national level a major distinction is between the polluter pays principle and victim pays 
principle. At a multilateral level this distinction is more complex. Coase (1960) states that, if 
property rights are allocated between parties experiencing externalities, there will be no need for 
intervention by the authorities. Negotiations between the parties, on their own initiative, will ensure 
an economically effective solution, providing these negotiations are not too costly. For 
international externalities the negotiations to agree on property rights may themselves be so 
complex that the associated costs bar an agreement.  
 A country may be trying to free-ride on the efforts of other countries to solve a problem associated 
with international externalities
4
. A situation with private information (asymmetric information) may 
increase the chances of countries cheating. 
 
Potentially high transaction costs can also be a factor that keep countries from involving themselves in 
negotiations (Coase 1960). 
                                                    
3
 Hoel 1992: “International environment conventions: ‘The case of uniform reductions of emissions”, 
Environmental and Resource Economics, 2, 141-160, quoted in Petrakis and Xepapadeas (1996). 
4
 Characterisation of free-riding is also a statement about property rights. What some could call free-riding, others 
could say was legitimate exercise of a right (Blackhurst and Subramanian 1992). 
 Eirik Inge Mikkelsen  
  9 
2.3 Game representation of 
international co-operation 
The game of the Prisoners’ Dilemma is the standard representation of externalities, including public 
goods, where actors in the pursuit of private gains impose costs on each other, (Blackhurst and 
Subramanian 1992). A version of the 2-player Prisoners’ Dilemma for the case of abatement-efforts to 
deal with the pollution of a common resource is given below (from Blackhurst and Subramanian 1992). 
Co-operation means choosing a higher level of abatement than with non-co-operation, just like in 
Barrett’s model above (Barrett 1990), and the reduction in damages outweighs the increase in 
abatement-costs if all countries co-operate. 
Table 1 - The Prisoners’ Dilemma of bilateral co-operation
5
 
With a one-shot Prisoners’ Dilemma, with no authority to enforce co-operation, the countries are stuck 
with the (2,2) payoff of non co-operation. If one country considered unilateral action, meaning a higher 
level of abatement than in the Nash outcome (where own marginal abatement costs equals the 
marginal reduction in pollution damages), it would experience a net loss. It is clear that the countries 
would be better off by co-operating (with the payoff of 3), but also that if they had an agreement to co-
operate both would have a constant incentive to defect, hoping for the higher payoff of 4. The strategy 
of not co-operating is dominant for both countries, meaning that the order of play and the information 
sets are irrelevant for the outcome of the game (Rasmusen 1989). 
 
Barrett (1999) models a N-player prisoners’ dilemma, representing the game of international co-
operation to provide an international public good
6
. The players again choose between co-operation (C) 
or non-co-operation (=defection; D). The payoffs are increasing in the number of players that play co-
operate, z (0 ≤ z ≤ N): 
ΠD(z) = bz 
Equation 1 
and  
ΠC(z) = -c + dz 
Equation 2 
                                                    
5
 The first number in each pair is A’s payoff. 
6
 Climate change and destruction of the ozone layer are good examples of this (Barrett 1999). 
  Country B 
  Co-operate Not co-operate 
Co-operate (3,3) (1,4) 
Country A 
Not co-operate (4,1) (2,2) 
Natural incentives for international co-operation 
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In these equations b, c and d are parameters, and the payoffs are normalised so that ΠD(0) = 0. The 
parameters must be adjusted to fulfil the 3 requirements of the prisoners’ dilemma: 
1. In the one-shot game it is a dominant strategy not to co-operate. 
2. A country’s payoff is increasing in the number of countries that co-operate, independently of 
whether that country co-operates or not. 
3. The Nash-equilibrium of the one-shot game is inefficient, and all countries would prefer a outcome 
where at least some countries co-operate. 
For the first requirement, Barrett (1999) finds: 
bz > -c + d(z+1)     for all z; 0 ≤ z ≤ N-1 
Equation 3 
For the second: 
b> 0 ,     d > 0     and     c > d 
Equation 4 
If one assumes that the aggregate payoffs are strictly increasing in the number of co-operating 
countries (z), the third requirement gives: 
-c + 2dz > b(2z – N)     for all z; 0 ≤ z ≤ N-1 
Equation 5 
The internal relationship between b and d can be d > b or d = b. This depends i.a. on whether co-
operation has increasing returns. Barrett (1999) allows for both and assumes  
d ≥ b 
Equation 6 
Hence  
c > d ≥ b > 0 
Equation 7 
In the one-shot game, everybody will defect. All countries prefer full co-operation to this outcome. Full 
co-operation gives the highest aggregate welfare. Barrett (1999) defines the problem of international 
co-operation (in this context) as how to sustain the full co-operative outcome as an equilibrium of a 
repeated game with strategies of reciprocity. 
 
If the prisoners’ dilemma is played repeatedly it is possible to sustain co-operation with several types 
of strategies (Barrett 1999). 
 Grim strategy: All agree to co-operate the first period, and as long as no-one has defected. If 
someone defects, everybody plays defect forever after. 
 Tit-for-tat: The players play the strategy this period that the others played last period. 
 Getting-Even: A player co-operates this period unless it has defected less often than any of the 
other players in the past. 
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Grim is both individually rational and sub-game perfect. Individually rational means that no player can 
do any better on his own than to play the strategy, given that everybody else also play that strategy. 
But Grim is grossly unforgiving, and “the punishment does not fit the crime”. Countries also have 
incentive to collectively deviate from the strategy. Grim is not a collectively rational strategy. (Barrett 
1999). 
 
With Tit-for-tat the punishment better fits the crime. But if the first player to deviate returns to co-
operation and Tit-for-tat the next period, and the others stay with it, we will have an unending echo of 
alternating defections. Hence the players could do better by deviating from the strategy after the one-
off deviation. Tit-for-tat is not sub-game perfect, and it is not an individually rational strategy. (Barrett 
1999). 
 
Getting-Even in a 2-player game mean that if one player deviates for 20 periods and then reverts to 
co-operation, the other player will not revert to co-operation for another 20 periods. This strategy can 
be both individually and collectively rational, Barrett (1999) demonstrates. Getting-Even will be 
collectively rational if the players have no incentive to renegotiate the agreement after one country has 
deviated. By comparing each country’s payoffs in the punishment-phase of Getting-Even (=b), with 









Agreements that satisfy this requirement are renegotiation proof, and the threats to sustain full co-
operation are credible. This means Getting-Even can sustain a self-enforcing agreement when 
Equation 8 holds. More on self-enforcing agreements in the next chapter.  
 
The chances of co-operation are, in addition to repetition, changed with (Blackhurst and Subramanian 
1992): 
• Non-identical players; 
• Allowing for reciprocity, including issue-linking. 
 
As the number of potential members in an IEA grows, the free-rider problem becomes bigger. Both the 
individual country’s need to participate and the incentive for punishing individual free-riders becomes 
smaller (Blackhurst and Subramanian 1992).  
 
However, the number of countries needed to reach an acceptable solution can be reduced as the 
differences between countries likely also become bigger with higher numbers. In a very asymmetric 
situation a few key players can solve most of the problem through co-operation, tolerating free-riding 
from non-key countries. The Kyoto-agreement is to a degree an example of this, with developing 
Natural incentives for international co-operation 
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countries having no obligations (at this stage?) and the industrialised countries paying the full cost 
(Jacob Werksman, lecture 15.05.98). 
 
Blackhurst and Subramanian (1992) refer to two different types of reciprocity, from the work of 
Keohane
7
, that may help the situation. Reciprocity refers there to the exchanges of roughly equivalent 
values in which the actions of each party are contingent on the prior actions of other parties, such that 
good are returned for good, and bad for bad.  
 
Specific reciprocity is when partners exchange items of equivalent value. This can be a useful concept 
and strategy in situations with few actors and private goods. For cases with large numbers of 
countries, public goods, and hence probably free-riders, it is less useful. This is due to free-riders’ 
access to the public good regardless of their and others’ efforts, and also that individual countries 
have little incentive to police an agreement. (Blackhurst and Subramanian 1992) 
 
Diffuse reciprocity is a broader concept, relating to a sense of obligation between players; “If others 
are contributing so should I”. With this approach free-riding can be overcome even in one-shot games 
(Blackhurst and Subramanian 1992). In families and in small communities diffuse reciprocity is 
common. With relationships on a larger scale it gets more difficult, but not impossible. In debates in 
the House of Commons in Great Britain it have been urged, on the grounds of fairness, that Great 
Britain should contribute to the resolution of international environmental problems, provided others do 
the same (Barrett 1990). Barrett (1990) refers to this as “morality” in international relations. Hoel 
(1994) believes that social norms and conventions may play an important role in sustaining 
agreements between governments. 
 
The emergence of an international society with many overlapping interest and concerns also 
strengthens this view of diffuse reciprocity (Carraro and Siniscalco 1998). Co-operation in a multitude 
of areas are linked in an informal and complex way, and what was earlier considered as an individual 
“Prisoners’ Dilemma” now becomes embedded in a broader social context; Countries fear that lack of 
co-operation in one area may spread to others, they prefer to co-operate, and hence add to the sense 
of diffuse reciprocity between countries (Snidal 1985
8
). Formal issue-linking in IEAs is investigated in 
section 3.3. 
 
Heal (1994) shows that if there are “reinforcement effects” between the environmental efforts of 
countries, individual countries’ optimal effort may be shifted from zero to a positive level. 
Reinforcement effects are present when a country’s benefit, for example of own abatement levels, 
                                                    
7
 Keohane 1986: “Reciprocity in international relations”, International Organisation, 40: 1-27. 
8
 Snidal 1985: “Co-ordination versus Prisoners’ Dilemma: Implications for international co-operation and regimes”, 
The American Political Science Review, 79:923-42, quoted in Blackhurst and Subramanian (1992). 
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rises with increasing abatement levels of other countries, or the costs of own abatement is reduced 
with increasing abatement efforts of other countries. 
 





Bi is i’s benefit of the environmental efforts (e.g. abatement) Xj of all n countries,  
Ci is i’s cost of own environmental effort, also depending upon the Xj of all n countries, 
 
























If environmental efforts are complementary across countries, the levels of effort in the Nash 
equilibrium will be positive. Heal (1994) claims that such a coalition, where every member’s level of 
effort is positive (when they maximise net benefits), given the choices of others, is immune to the 
problems of free-riding, and the Prisoners’ Dilemma paradigm is not applicable. Intuitively it seems 
wrong that positive complementarity will necessarily eliminate the problems of free-riding, but it will 
alleviate them. 
 
Ecchia and Mariotti (1997) consider how farsightedness can affect international co-operation. They 
distinguish between two main cases of international environmental problems. One fits the Prisoners’ 
Dilemma described above, the other has the features of the Chicken game. In the Chicken game the 
consequences of no co-operation at all will be an environmental disaster, and individual countries 
would prefer unilateral action from that outcome. In the Prisoners’ Dilemma it is always a dominant 
strategy for a myopic country to pollute, and the incentives to free-ride are the strongest in this game. 
From the collective point of view an agreement is however better than no co-operation. In the Chicken 
game there are also incentives to free-ride on the efforts of others, but there is also an incentive to 
unilaterally leave the position which is the most damaging for the environment. 
 
Ecchia and Mariotti (1997) assume that the countries consider different outcomes, and then have the 
possibility to change their position, or to propose to other countries to make up a (temporary) coalition 
Natural incentives for international co-operation 
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which will jointly deviate from the present position. Countries negotiate until they end up at a position 
which no single country, and no coalition of countries, wants to deviate from. Then, and only then, are 
the payoffs given to the countries. Their idea of strategic farsightedness is captured by payoffs being 
distributed only when countries have agreed on a permanent position.  
 
Ecchia and Mariotti (1997) considers a model with 3 countries. They consider for each type of game 2 
sub-versions. In the Strong Prisoners’ Dilemma the strategy of one country has been fixed, and in the 
2-player subgame the co-operative outcome is Pareto-dominated by the fully non co-operative 
outcome
9
. In the Weak Prisoners’ Dilemma the co-operative outcome of the 2-player subgame Pareto-
dominates the fully non co-operative one.  
 
In the Strong Chicken game each of the 3 countries only have an incentive to free-ride when both 
other countries co-operate. In the weak version a country will free-ride if one of the other countries 
have the co-operative level of environmental efforts. In the Strong Chicken game the environmental 
disaster will occur even if only one single country free-rides. In the weak version two countries must 
play the non co-operative level of environmental effort for the disaster to occur. 
 
A conclusion of Ecchia and Mariotti (1997) is that farsightedness can lead to a high degree of 
international co-operation. Full co-operation is always a possible outcome, and in no case is there a 
majority of free-riders. This can be contrasted to the findings of for example Barrett (1994) and Carraro 
and Siniscalco (1993) in the next section. 
2.4 Self-enforcing agreements 
In international law there is no authority to define what is right and what is wrong. It is also impossible 
to enforce obligations states undertake by signing international agreements unless one resorts to 
military or economical coercion (Ulfstein, lecture 15.05.98).  
 
This means international environmental agreements (like other international agreements) must be 
profitable to join and to fulfil the obligations of, for individual countries (Barrett 1994). Such IEAs are 
called self-enforcing. The self-enforcing IEA should ideally result in the fully co-operative outcome, 
maximising the sum net benefit of all countries. 
 
That it is profitable to sign an IEA is a necessary but not sufficient condition for it to be self-enforcing. 
Free-riding must also be avoided. The coalition of signatories must hence be stable (Carraro 1997a).  
 
                                                    
9
 The basic feature of the Prisoners’ Dilemma is most clearly present in the strong version, hence the terminology. 
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Barrett (1990) was the first to use the term self-enforcement, at least in this context. The benefit of 
participating in an agreement, or alternatively free-riding on it, depend on the number of signatories to 
the agreement, and the commitments they make. Commonly, when the number of co-operating 
countries grows above a certain limit, the benefits of free-riding becomes larger than the benefits of 
joining the agreement. Then no more countries will join. That limit defines the maximum size of a self-
sustained, stable coalition, and hence the self-enforcing agreement (Barrett 1990). 
 
Heal (1994) introduces a concept related to Barrett’s concept of self-enforced coalitions. Heal states 
that a critical coalition is a coalition of countries where each individual country have larger benefits 
than costs from the environmental effort. A minimum critical coalition is a critical coalition where no 
subset of the coalition is also a critical coalition. Heal (1994) considers critical coalitions both with and 
without side-payments between their members. 
 
Barrett (1994) models a situation with transboundary pollution, where the signatories to an agreement 
optimise their joint emissions-strategy. The signatories accept that others will free-ride, and optimise 
their joint emissions taking this into account. The non-signatories play Nash, maximising their own 
individual benefit. The model is used to investigate the relationship between the total number of 
countries and the size of the self-enforced coalition, and the difference in net benefits between full co-
operation, the self-enforced agreement and the Nash outcome. All countries are assumed identical. 
 
As the number of signatories increases the abatement effort of each signatory goes up, rewarding the 
newcomer, but also making free-riding even more profitable. When Barrett looks at individual benefits 
for signatories and non-signatories as a function of the number of signatories, he gets a figure like the 
one below. P(n) and Q(n) is the individual benefit of signatories and non-signatories respectively, 
when n countries have joined the agreement. n* is the number of signatories to the self-enforcing 
agreement. 
Natural incentives for international co-operation 
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Figure 2 - The size of a self-enforced coalition (SEC) 
Where the two curves meet the benefits for signatories and non-signatories is such that there is both 
internal and external stability to the agreement
10
;  
• No signatory can increase her benefit by unilaterally leaving the agreement; 
 Internal stability: P(n*) > Q(n*-1); 
• No non-signatory can increase her benefit by unilaterally joining; 
 External stability: Q(n*) > P(n*+1). 
 
Barrett’s results are not general, but based on specific abatement cost and benefit-functions
11
. The 
different specifications give somewhat different conclusions, but are consistent in one respect: No self-
enforcing agreement can achieve a substantial total emission reduction compared to the total 
emission level in the non co-operative outcome. The gain that can be achieved through a self-
enforcing agreement is hence small. 
 
                                                    
10
 This concept of stability comes from literature on cartels, D’Aspremont et al 1983: “On the stability of collusive 
price leadership”, Canadian Journal of Economics, 16, 17-25, quoted in Barrett (1994). 
11
 Barrett uses four different sets of cost/benefit-functions: 1) Linear marginal benefits and costs; 2) Constant 
marginal benefits and linear marginal costs; 3) Constant marginal benefits and logarithmic marginal costs; 4) 
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It is a weakness that all countries are assumed identical in Barrett (1994). One thing is that we can not 
tell which countries will join. We have a co-ordination problem that might be a source of instability. 
Real countries are also different. In Barrett (1997) the case with heterogeneous countries is 
investigated. Real countries are far from identical and it is conceivable that a self-enforcing IEA 
between a few key countries could raise global benefits substantially. As an example, the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the USA and the EU together account for about 50% of 
the global CO2 emissions. (Barrett 1997) 
 
The analysis for the non-symmetric case is however more complex. In addition to devising credible 
punishments that will deter free-riding, which also must be resolved in the symmetric case, the 
countries must agree on the obligations each country shall undertake. This means setting a target for 
the co-operation, and also agreeing on burden-sharing (Barrett 1997). In the symmetric case, with 
identical countries, the Nash bargaining solution require that countries undertake identical obligations 
(Barrett 1994). When countries are different, burden-sharing can however be immensely complicated 
to resolve (Barrett 1997).  
 
Blackhurst and Subramanian (1992) exemplifies this problem; Should Brazil be compensated by the 
rest of the world for saving the Amazon forest, which gives environmental services to the whole world, 
or should the world be compensated by Brazil for the burning and cutting of parts of the forest?; 
Should a country’s quota for carbon-emissions, in the case of an IEA to limit global warming, be 
calculated on a per capita basis, should the IEA aim at inter temporal equity between countries by 
relating the quota inversely to cumulative emissions of the last 100+ years, or should one go for an 
equal percentage reduction in emissions from all countries, accepting a “first-come - first served” 
principle? These questions have no clear-cut answers. 
 
Two previous papers have explored self-enforcing agreements between heterogeneous countries. 
Hoel (1992) finds that a self-enforcing IEA consists of at most 3 countries, and Bauer (1992) finds that 
it has at most 2 member countries
12
. Both findings are limited by the specifications on benefit and cost 
functions for the countries.  
 
Barrett (1997) finds that in a model with constant marginal benefits and linear costs of abatement, 
independent of the values of the parameters in the countries’ benefit and cost functions, a self-
enforcing agreement, if it exists, consists of at most 3 countries. If one allows for side payments 
between the countries in the self-enforcing IEA, it is found that a self-enforcing agreement exists but 
has maximum 3 members. 
                                                    
12
 Hoel, M 1992: “International environment conventions: The case of uniform reductions of emmisions”, 
Environmental and Resource Economics, 2, 141-159; Bauer, A 1992: “International Co-operation over 
Environmental goods”, mimeo, Volkwirtschaftligches Institut, University of Munich. Both papers are quoted in 
Barrett (1997). 
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Barrett (1997) also investigates the more realistic case of decreasing marginal benefits from global 
abatement (but still linear marginal costs of abatement). He finds it necessary to limit the 
heterogeneity of countries to only two types, to get analytically manageable specifications. He finds 
that a self-enforcing IEA can have a large number of signatories, but that the increase in net benefits 
compared to the non co-operative outcome is negligible. This result is the same as with identical 
countries (Barrett 1994). 
 
The reason for the result is however different between the cases with identical and heterogeneous 
countries (Barrett 1997). In the symmetric case, the conditions that must hold to get a large number of 
signatories to the self-enforcing IEA, are the same conditions that must hold for countries to want to 
abate almost as much in the Nash as in the full co-operative outcome. When countries are identical 
each individual country will abate more in the full co-operative outcome than in the Nash outcome. 
When countries differ, some will abate less in the fully co-operative case than when there is no co-
operation, others will abate more. The self-enforcing IEA for heterogeneous countries does not 
improve much upon the global abatement level compared to the non co-operative outcome, but it 
redistributes abatement between countries. If global abatement should be substantial in a full co-
operative outcome, countries with a large share of global emission should abate much even in the 
non-co-operative outcome (Barrett 1997). 
 
Barrett (1997) also verifies this finding for the case of 3 big countries which together have about 50% 
of global emissions of some pollutant, with the rest of the countries being very small
13
. These 3 big 
countries can not reach a self-enforcing agreement among themselves that raise their abatement 
levels much above the non co-operative level. Barrett (1997) states that this is not as gloomy a result 
as it may first seem. Rather, if costs and benefits of abatement are so that the global abatement level 
should be high in the fully co-operative outcome, the countries that have a large share of global 
emissions should abate much even in the non co-operative outcome. 
 
Barrett (1994, 1997) describes the process leading to a self-enforcing IEA as a two stage game, with 
countries first simultaneously deciding to co-operate or not, and then setting their emission levels. This 
is not realistic, Hoel (1994) claims. In Bauer (1993) the decision of one country on whether to co-
operate or not may affect the same decision with other countries
14
. With Bauer’s modelling of the 
process leading to an IEA, it is possible to get equilibria with many countries co-operating. 
 
                                                    
13
 The specific example is based on the empirical fact that USA, CIS and EU account for more than 50% of the 
world’s total CO2-emissions (Barrett 1997). 
14
 Bauer A 1993: “International co-operation over environmental goods”, mimeo, University of Munich, quoted in 
Hoel 1994 (presumably the same paper as Barrett (1997) has quoted). 
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It is also possible to model the process as a repeated game. From game theory it is well known that 
tacit co-operation may be sustained as a perfect equilibrium of a non co-operative (infinitely) repeated 
game. Hoel (1994) thinks this may solve the free-rider problem. Repeated games can however have 
multiple equilibria. Co-ordination to reach the Pareto optimal equilibrium may be difficult, and gets 
worse as the number of countries goes up. This aspect probably limits the number of co-operating 
countries again (Hoel 1994).  
 
A repeated game analysis is only interesting if appropriate trigger or stick/carrot strategies can lead to 
co-operation. Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) comments that countries’ increasing their emission levels 
as a strategic response to other countries defection can hardly be conceived. Hence they don’t 
approve of employing the repeated game analysis for cases of transboundary pollution. 
 
Barrett (1994) considers the formation of a self-enforced coalition also as a repeated game. When 
only renegotiation proof equilibria are accepted, this modelling confirms the earlier find; The number of 
countries to such a coalition will be small. A renegotiation proof equilibrium is one which is preferred 
by all countries to any other feasible equilibrium, and in which all countries would want to punish a 
defector according to the equilibrium strategy (Barrett 1994, 1999). 
 
Ecchia and Mariotti (1997) criticises the previous literature on self-enforcing agreements (i.a. Barrett 
1994, Carraro and Siniscalco 1993, Heal 1994) on two accounts. Ecchia and Mariotti think that the 
definition of stability employed in the previous literature assumes a myopia on behalf of the countries; 
The countries calculate their own net benefit looking only one step ahead, ignoring the possible 
reactions by other countries to their choice of joining or defecting from a coalition.  
 
The problem of joint deviations has not been considered in the previous literature, Ecchia and Mariotti 
wrote in 1997. As we live in a world where communication is possible and agreements may be signed, 
it would be reasonable to allow for the group defection (or joining) of several countries from a coalition 




Barrett (1999) fills the gap that Ecchia and Mariotti (1997) point out. He shows that the strategy of 
Getting-Even can sustain a self-enforcing agreement under certain conditions (see section 2.3 and 
particularly Equation 8). It then fulfils the requirements of both individual and collective rationality. 
Equation 8 tells that the maximum number of countries that can sustain full co-operation as a self-
enforcing agreement depends on the parameter values for how the gains of co-operating and of free-
riding on the agreement depends with the number of countries co-operating. Analysis of these 
relations reveals that full co-operation can only be sustained among many countries (globally) when 
the gains to co-operation are relatively small; 
The aggregate gains to co-operation are (from Equation 1 and Equation 2): 
                                                    
15
 These agreements would of course also need to be self-enforcing (Ecchia and Mariotti 1997). 
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N [ΠC(N) - ΠD(0)] = N (-c + dN) 
Equation 11 
The gains are hence increasing in d and decreasing in c. Equation 8 tells us that the number of 
countries that can sustain full co-operation as a self-enforcing agreement is increasing in c and 







The Montreal Protocol has nearly global participation. Barrett (1999b) has shown that the gains of this 
co-operation are rather small. 
 
Botteon and Carraro (1997) investigates how the burden sharing rule may affect the formation and 
stability of self-enforcing coalition. For the case of identical countries they confirm the findings from 
previous literature that the maximum size of a self-enforcing coalition is 3, regardless of the burden 
sharing rule. When countries are different the situation is different (see section 3.1). 
2.5 Summary 
In this chapter I have looked into the incentives and mechanisms that naturally exists for countries to 
make and fulfil international environmental agreements. The potential gain of co-ordinated actions to 
deal with international externalities is the basic incentive for international environmental agreements 
(Barrett 1990).  
 
Blackhurst and Subramanian (1992) have given four reasons why countries may not want to co-
operate in solving an international environmental problem:  
 Countries may disagree over the scientific evidence, either on the existence/seriousness of the 
problem, or on the efficiency of the proposed measures;  
 Countries may put priority on dealing with other problems, internationally or nationally;  
 Countries may disagree with the proposed cost-sharing; 
 Countries may be trying to free-ride on other's efforts to deal with the problem. 
 
Potentially high costs of negotiating agreements may also be a factor keeping countries from getting 
involved in many cases. Unknown, but possibly high transactions costs will enhance, especially taken 
together with some of the factors  
 
Disagreement over the scientific evidence is common. During the 1972 UN Conference on 
Environment and Development in Stockholm, countries disagreed whether long-range transported 
acid rain was a serious problem. There is still some disagreement on how serious a threat global 
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warming is. It is possible that some of the scientific disagreement is instrumental, as dealing with the 
actual problem may be politically very difficult in some countries. Countries with a population lacking 
food, adequate housing, health-services and education can hardly be expected to prioritise combating 
global environmental problems. Burden-sharing can however be adjusted through transfers. Side-
transfers are investigated further in section 3.1. 
 
Two types of games are used in this chapter to illustrate some possible features of international 
environmental problems. The Prisoners' Dilemma fits the situation where countries can get the highest 
total benefit by co-operating, but where each country can increase individual benefit by playing non 
co-operatively, independently of the others' actions. If own net costs of playing the co-operative 
strategy are lower than own net benefits, this model is often relevant. The Chicken Game is similar to 
the Prisoners' Dilemma in the respect that there are incentives to free-ride when others' play their co-
operative strategy. However, if many enough tries to free-ride, individual countries have an incentive 
to play the co-operative strategy, to avoid "environmental disaster". The higher the number of 
countries contributing to the international environmental problem, the more likely is it that the situation 
fits the Prisoners' Dilemma, as individual countries' relative contribution to the problem is smaller. The 
standard Prisoners' Dilemma predicts no co-operation.  
 
Several authors have investigated the potential of self-enforcing agreements. With such an 
agreement, no country wants to join nor withdraw from the agreement, given the other countries' 
position. Carraro and Siniscalco (1992) describes the game leading to self-enforcing agreements as a 
"chicken game, in which each country has an incentive to commit itself to non co-operation". A 
problem with the concept of self-enforcing agreements is that either the number of signatories is very 
low, or the environmental efforts/benefits are not significantly higher than in the fully non co-operative 
outcome. This conclusion is found both based on numerical analysis (Barrett 1994, 1997) and 
theoretical considerations (Carraro and Siniscalco 1993, 1995). Bauer (1993) (see footnote 14) have 
modelled the process leading to a self-enforcing agreement differently than Barrett (1994, 1997) and 
Carraro and Siniscalco (1993, 1995), and gets equilibria with many countries co-operating. Bauer has 
a sequential process for joining the agreement. This is how real IEAs are joined. Hoel (1991) and 
Barrett (1990) indicate that some countries will be leaders, for moral reasons. 
 
The chance of co-operation is improved when the Prisoners' Dilemma is played repetitively. The joint 
management and seasonal use of shared marine resources may be real-world examples of this 
(although some situations may well fit the Chicken Game better). 
 
The concept of diffuse reciprocity also brings hope of more international co-operation. Countries co-
operate on many issues and on many different arenas, and the interdependence is only growing 
(Carraro and Siniscalco 1998). With time it will be even harder for countries to free-ride on others' 
efforts. 
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Ecchia and Mariotti (1997) bring with their model of strategic farsightedness some hope of many 
countries joining IEAs. Countries will however still have an incentive to free-ride, meaning here that 
they can avoid fulfilling their obligations under the IEA, despite having signed it. 
 
A great deal of heterogeneity among the countries responsible for the environmental problem may 
make a partial solution more likely, but will not lead to its elimination (Barrett 1997). 
 
Barrett (1999) presents “a coherent theory of international co-operation relying on the twin 
assumptions of individual and collective rationality”. Individual rationality implies that if all players play 
the equilibrium strategy, no one can do any better than to play this strategy. This is the type of 
rationality behind the Prisoners’ Dilemma. Collective rationality, as Barrett (1999) defines it, is that 
there exists no other equilibrium that all players prefer to the current equilibrium. According to this type 
of rationality a player reverting from the collectively preferred equilibrium would be credibly punished 
by the other players, back into the preferred equilibrium (Barrett 1999). Joining these two types of 
rationality into one type of strategy for a N-player repeated prisoners’ dilemma, leads to the conclusion 
that full co-operation is possible with either few countries involved, or with many countries and 
relatively small aggregate gains from the co-operation. 
 
In summary one can say that generally there are natural incentives for countries to take part in 
international environmental co-operation, but that the natural incentives to free-ride on others' efforts 
are stronger, especially due to spillovers and the absence of clear property rights. Some possible 
features with the countries in question (moral?, "farsightedness"?), the historical situation (diffuse 
reciprocity between countries?), the type of environmental problem (repeated situation?) and the 
process of joining an actual IEA (sequential?) will influence on the chances for international co-
operation. Barrett (1999) has conclusions that are rather depressing, but he points out that trade 
sanctions, side-payments and issue-linking, which are not part of his model, may increase co-
operation. These possibilities for creating incentives for international environmental co-operation are 
examined in the next chapter. 
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In this chapter I investigate how international co-operation can be promoted. That means both how 
countries’ entrance into international environmental co-operation can be promoted, and how 
compliance with the obligations they then take on can be promoted. Issues regarding the detection of 
non-compliance are a natural part of this. 
 
Chayes and Chayes (1995) show that compliance with international agreements is the norm. 
International law is created by the potential violators, and hence a high coincidence between 
signatories’ interests and “the law” is likely, Enders and Porges (1992) claim. They add that most 
parties can be expected to comply with the commitments in an IEA, designed by them in a co-
operative game exercise, since these reflect the underlying costs and benefits of the non-co-operative 
game which preceded the agreement.  
 
Blackhurst and Subramanian (1992) have pointed at four reasons why countries might not want to 
participate in an IEA (see section 2.2). To promote co-operation they see two basic strategies. The 
first is to try to “eliminate” the same reasons: Get better scientific evidence; persuade countries to 
change order of priority; make new proposals for burden sharing; and if a country is inclined to free-
ride, try to persuade its co-operation by stressing the advantages of diffuse reciprocity. 
 
The second basic strategy Blackhurst and Subramanian see is to create special incentives for 
participation in IEAs. The incentives can be either positive or negative, meaning that countries can be 
rewarded for participating or punished for not participating. Werksman (lecture 15.05.98) notes that “a 
carrot withheld is a stick”, and hence the distinction may not always be relevant. 
 
In this chapter I discuss some possible mechanisms and effects on international environmental co-
operation of: 
 side-transfers and burden-sharing rules 
 “commitment” by one or more countries 
 issue-linking 
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 trade-provisions and sanctions 
 minimum participation clauses and limited participation in IEAs 
 detecting non-compliance 
 dealing with non-compliance and disputes. 
 
The established theory of international co-operation has two pillars (major findings), which are 
incommensurable according to Barrett (1999): 
 co-operation can be sustained by any number of countries as an equilibrium in a non co-operative 
repeated game with reciprocal strategies (if discount rates are not too high); 
 co-operation can only be sustained by a “small” number of countries. 
 
The “folk theorem” tell us that in an infinitely repeated game (where the players have a low enough 
discount rate) strategies to deter a unilateral defection are credible in the sense of individual rationality 
(Barrett 1999). Individual rationality imply that if all players play the equilibrium strategy, no one can do 
any better than to play this strategy. Collective rationality, as Barrett (1999) defines it, is that there can 
not exist another equilibrium that all players prefer to the current equilibrium. Hence, a collective 
rational agreement is renegotiation proof. Further, if a country defected, all the other countries would 
want to punish the defector rather than renegotiate or overlook the defection, provided all the other 
countries also did so. A credible punishment strategy requires that the countries responsible for 
punishing a unilateral deviation must not be able to do better, individually or collectively, by not 
carrying out the punishment specified in their agreement (Barrett 1999). 
3.1 Side-transfers 
Transfers between signatories of an IEA are in many cases necessary to achieve participation by 
those with costs of fulfilling their obligations higher than their total benefit, less the transfers (Carraro 
1997a). Such transfers can come in many different forms, like access to funding of work related to the 
IEA, access to natural resources being protected by the agreement (e.g. marine fish), access to 
environmental technology (Blackhurst and Subramanian 1992), or through an international franchise 
agreement (Swanson 1994). The transfers could be lump-sum or flows.  
 
Based on co-operative game theory Chander and Tulkens (1995) and Chander et al. (1999) present 
an IEA with side-transfers that they claim no country will be in a position to reject. With the agreement 
the optimal joint emissions policy is reached, and their side-transfer formula makes sure everybody is 
better off than in the non-co-operative outcome, and in any alternative arrangement that a sub-group 
of countries could adopt. 
 
The formula for the side-transfer Pi
*
 country i pays in the co-operative outcome is: 
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*E is the emissions strategy in the co-operative outcome; { }*N*i* E,...,EE = ; 
 E is the emissions strategy in the non-co-operative outcome; { }N1 E,...,EE = ; 
 Ci(Ei) is country i’s cost of restricting emissions to the level Ei 
 
'
iD  is country i’s marginal damages in going from non-co-operative to co-operative outcome; 
 ∑= )D,..,D(D 'n'1'N , the sum of the marginal damages for all countries in going from non-co-
operative to co-operative outcome;  
 There are N countries in total. 
 
Each individual transfer consists of two parts:  
 A payment to (from) each country that equals its cost –increase (-reduction) in going from the 
Nash equilibrium to the co-operative outcome (first term);  
 A payment by each country as a share of the total increase in abatement costs in going from the 
Nash to the co-operative outcome, where its share is determined by the relative magnitude of its 
marginal damage compared to the total marginal damage. 
The sum of all the transfers is zero. The transfer-scheme makes marginal abatement costs equal in all 
countries. Chander and Tulkens propose that an international agency is set up to administrate the 
transfers. 
 
If a single country or group of countries reject the proposed IEA, Chander and Tulkens assume that 
the other countries play Nash against the potential free-riders. This will lead to a lower benefit for each 
country than co-operation by all can give. Hence co-operation by all will be preferred, they conclude. 
The alternative to the outcome of the IEA proposed is, as Chander and Tulkens (1995) see it, not a 
large free-riding benefit for some countries, but the payoff of the non-co-operative outcome. Carraro 
and Siniscalco (1998) think that increasing emissions in response to free-riding is “hardly a credible 
threat”.  
 
Carraro (1997) comments that Chander and Tulkens have demonstrated how all signatories to an IEA 
can have net benefits from the agreement through the use of side-transfers. This is a necessary 
requirement to achieve full co-operation. It is not sufficient, as also the incentive to free-ride must be 
deterred. Each country can increase their benefit beyond the full co-operative solution if they free-ride 
and all others fulfil their obligations (Barrett 1994)
16
. However, Chander et al (1999) demonstrate that 
                                                    
16
 Carraro and Siniscalco (1998) discuss briefly different models of coalitional behaviour. Nash conjecture implies 
that countries assume their decision will not affect the remaining coalition. Coalition unanimity is when the 
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with the transfer-scheme presented in Chander and Tulkens (1995), any country and any coalition of 
countries is best off with full co-operation. 
 
Botteon and Carraro (1997) investigate how the burden sharing rule may affect the formation and 
stability of a self-enforcing coalition. They base their analysis on a world with 5 regions, each with 
explicit and measurable environmental features
17
. When countries are different it is possible to expand 
the size of the self-enforcing coalition by a system of transfers without commitment, using the Shapley 
value as the basis for the burden sharing rule in an IEA (rather than the Nash bargaining concept)
18
. In 
their special case with 5 regions making up the whole world, they also find that with a minimum 
amount of commitment (one country/region out of five), it is possible to stabilise the grand coalition 
even when the burden sharing is based on the Nash bargaining rule.  
 
Employing the Shapley value in this manner means countries will get very different net benefits from 
co-operation, dependent on what time they joined. This possibly gives rise to a game between the 
countries of when to join (and when not to join), which may make it difficult to actually expand the co-
operating coalition. Secondly, a coalition established with the aid of such transfers will be unstable, as 
the countries that have ended up with a relatively low net benefit will want to renegotiate. 
 
International side-transfers might seem to be counter to the polluter pays principle (PPP), but in many 
cases the opposite is true. Under the Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Biodiversity 
Convention the industrialised countries have to bear most of the costs, including measures in the 
developing countries and technology transfers to these countries (Barrett 1994b). With transfers from 
the first world to the (second and) third the industrialised countries are now paying for their historical 
use of these resources. This use has been paramount for the development and welfare in the first 
world, at least in the case of CO2-emissions. (Blackhurst and Subramanian 1992) 
 
From an ethical viewpoint one wants to follow the PPP. The use of transfers, with the victim paying, 
are however often necessary to achieve participation in IEAs. Enders and Porges (1992, p 136) state 
that “….co-operation evolves from incentives for present and future actions. A notion of entitlement 
based on harm wrought by past actions is not relevant”. International side-payments in IEAs does not 
                                                                                                                                                                 
whole coalition breaks down if one country breaks out (The Maastricht Treaty has such a clause). The 
countries in a coalition may consider the ultimate consequences of their possible breaking out (farsighted 
strategies in Ecchia and Mariotti 1998). The fourth model Carraro and Siniscalco (1998) mention is one of 
coalition rational conjecture, where the stated response by a coalition to a defection always equals the actual 
ex-post response. 
17
 Based on statistical material about the real world, from P Musgrave 1994: “Pure Global Externalities: 
International Efficiency and Equity”, paper presented at the 50
th
 IIPF Conference, Harvard, 2-5 August 1994. 
18
 The Shapley value is the sum total incremental benefit of all countries when a new country joins an agreement. 
Hence, with the Shapley value as the basis for the burden sharing rule, the newcomer gets this sum total as a 
transfer from the other countries. 
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come from some historical obligations, but has their basis in the incentives they make up for potential 
signatories to an IEA. With national environmental problems, where there is an authority to define and 
enforce who has the right to use a resource, it is possible to use the PPP principle. It then gives the 
right incentives for avoiding unnecessary pollution. The issue of efficiency is independent of whether 
one follows the polluter or victim pays principle.  
3.2 Commitment and side-
transfers 
Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) aims to explain the emergence of environmental co-operation without 
the help of trigger or stick/carrot mechanisms through the framework of self-enforcing agreements. 
They note that pollution has never been used as a triggering variable, partial co-operation is a 
common feature of many IEAs and the use of transfers in some form is also common. 
 
Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) investigates if some sub-group of the countries could commit to co-
operate, and induce further co-operation through side-transfers to the remaining countries. The 
transfers must be self-financed through the increased net benefit, so that improvements are Pareto-
improvements.  
 
Commitment could stem from the diffuse reciprocity which Keohane (1986) and Snidal (1985) have 
discussed (see footnotes 7 and 8 in section 2.3). At the individual level a lot of behaviour is best 
explained through the mechanisms of social norms and conventions. Hoel (1994) believes that social 
norms and conventions may play an important role also in sustaining IEAs between governments. A 
government may “…feel uncomfortable if it breaks the social norm of sticking to an agreement [..], 
even if it, in strict economic terms, may benefit from being a free rider” (Hoel 1994). A government’s 
cost of breaking such a social norm probably goes up with the number of co-operating countries (Hoel 
1994). Fankhauser and Kverndokk (1992) have suggested that the OECD countries could be 
committed to internal co-operation on reducing CO2 emissions
19
. Barrett (1998b) doubts whether 
countries really are willing to make costly commitments, pointing to the fact that a number of countries 
pledged voluntarily to reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases after the IPCC’s 1990 report was 
published. None of the countries fulfilled their pledge. 
 
Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) look at four different types of commitment in a model with identical 
countries: 
                                                    
19
 Fankhauser and Kverndokk 1992: The Global warming game – Simulations of a CO2 reduction agreement, 
Memo no. 13, Dept of Economics, University of Oslo, Quoted in Petrakis and Xepapadeas (1996). 
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1. Only the members of the self-enforced coalition commit to co-operation (“stable coalition 
commitment”); 
2. Any new signatory in addition to the members of the self-enforced coalition must also commit to co-
operation (“sequential co-operation”); 
3. The number of committed countries is such that the transfers needed for full co-operation are 
achieved (“full co-operation minimum commitment”); 
4. A subset of the non-co-operating countries give side transfers to the rest of the non-co-operating 
countries to induce co-operation (based on the increased free-rider benefit) (“external 
commitment”).  
 
The various forms of commitment proposed above are all less demanding than commitment by all 
countries, yet some of them can lead to co-operation by all
20
. How many countries that can be bribed 
into co-operation depends on the slope of the best-reply functions of the countries. With (near) 
orthogonal best-reply functions the chances for co-operative agreements are best. Then countries will 
not alter own emissions much due to changes in other countries emission-levels (Carraro and 
Siniscalco 1993). 
 
Barrett (1994) notes that each of the original committed members to a coalition expanded in this 
manner, will have an incentive to withdraw from it. In other words, the new agreement is not self-
enforcing. Barrett’s comment does perhaps reflect his view on co-operative game-theory in general. 
Rasmusen (1989) also seems to hold some of the same attitudes: 
“Co-operative game theory may be useful for ethical decisions, but its attractive 
features are inappropriate for most economic situations, and the spirit of the 
axiomatic approach is very different from the utility maximisation of current 
economic theory.” 
 
Botteon and Carraro (1997) look at the case of heterogeneous countries, and conclude that when the 
Nash bargaining rule is used for deciding burden sharing, commitment by only a small fraction of the 
countries may be sufficient to induce co-operation by all. 
 
Hoel and Schneider (1997) investigates whether a system of side-payments from committed countries 
to non co-operating countries reduces the incentives for commitment. A system of “joint 
implementation”, as in the Kyoto protocol, where committed countries pay “not committed countries” to 
increase their environmental efforts, will give a Pareto improvement compared to no side-payments, 
as long as the number of committed countries is given. The possibility of receiving a side-payment if 
one does not co-operate, is a disincentive to commitment that may reduce the overall environmental 
effort. Hoel and Schneider (1997) finds that very likely, fewer countries commit themselves if such joint 
implementation is allowed for. Whether the total amount of environmental effort is lower with side-
                                                    
20
 Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) have not considered repeated games. 
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payments, can not be determined based on Hoel and Schneider’s general model, although examples 
in their article suggest so.  
3.3 Issue-linking 
While side-transfers can be used to ensure profitability for all signatories to an IEA, issue-linking can 
be used to stabilise the coalition of signatories. As most unresolved international environmental issues 
deals with some sort of public good, the way to avoid free-riding is to link these issues with co-
operation on something that have an excludable positive externality for the coalition members. The 
incentive to free-ride on the environmental agreement is then offset by the incentive to get the 
excludable benefits from the other agreement. (Carraro 1997a). 
 
Carraro and Siniscalco (1997) and Katsoulacos (1997) both investigate international linking of 
environmental issues with research and development (R&D) issues. Both papers show that issue-
linking can be very effective for stabilising international agreements (Carraro 1997a). 
 
Carraro and Siniscalco (1997) uses a standard model of industrial organisation. There are partial 
innovation spillovers, and environmental externalities. Countries that co-operate on R&D are assumed 
to have a larger degree of innovative spillovers than others. Firms get lower production costs with 
more innovative spillovers, and consumer surpluses also increase. Abatement costs may also go 
down with more innovative spillovers. The environmental damages depend on the global emission-
level.  
 
The sequence of decisions in the model is as follows: 
1. Governments, which maximise their country’s welfare, decide whether to take part in the joint 
environmental and R&D agreement.  
2. The level of environmental effort is then decided, either jointly between the co-operating countries, 
or independently for all the others. 
3. All firms decide simultaneously and non co-operatively on R&D expenditure and production levels. 
 
Carraro and Siniscalco (1997) study the profitability and stability of this linked agreement. The 
environmental coalition is profitable but unstable, while the R&D co-operation is both profitable and 
stable. The linked agreement is hence more profitable than each of the two single agreements, and 
more stable than the environmental co-operation taken separately. 
 
Katsoulacos (1997) comments on an earlier paper by Carraro and Siniscalco (1995) where the same 
model has been presented, that it is assumed governments decide whether to co-operate on R&D, 
while in fact individual firms make this decision. Katsoulacos (1997) further ask why, if there are 
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benefits from R&D co-operation, why won’t it take place independently of any environmental co-
operation? Governments can, however, decide to jointly subsidise Research Joint Ventures (RJV’s), 
and they can make such arrangements contingent on countries’ environmental policy. Katsoulacos 
(1997) sets up a model for this, where firms freely choose their level of R&D and R&D information 
spillovers. For both these two areas the social optimum is normally higher than the actual level. It is 
shown that environmental co-operation can be achieved through such RJV-agreements with clauses 
for environmental policy.  
3.4 Trade-provisions in IEAs  
17 of the 127 environmental agreements that existed in 1992 had trade provisions of some kind 
(Mæstad 1998). The primary purpose of such trade-provisions is to avoid that trade among non-
participants undermines the effectiveness of an IEA (Blackhurst and Subramanian 1992). Mæstad 
(1998) finds that when countries fail to implement environmental regulations, efficiency in the global 
economy will not be achieved unless the other countries supplement their domestic environmental 
regulations with trade regulations. 
 
The use of so-called “Green trade policy” has been claimed illegitimate firstly because trade measures 
for environmental purposes seem to violate GATT rules
21
. It has also been claimed illegitimate since in 
most cases trade is not a direct source of environmental problems (Subramanian 1992); Measures 
should instead be aimed directly at the consumption or production activities that cause environmental 
degradation. Mæstad (1998) points out that countries don’t always have the will or power to implement 
that first best policy. “…in such a second best world, where […] environmental agreements are 
incomplete, there are efficiency arguments for implementing trade provisions along with domestic 
environmental policies” (Mæstad 1998).  
 
An example of such a situation is an agreement with limited participation to combat global warming, 
where domestic taxation of polluting consumption gives “leakage” effects. Hagem (1996) gives three 
reasons for leakages in the case of a climate agreement. One is the reduction in world prices of fuel 
due to reduced demand in the participating countries. This will lead to higher demand other places. 
Export goods produced in the participating countries with fossil fuels as factors will increase in price, 
leading to a shift of production to other countries. Thirdly, if limited or unilateral actions actually reduce 
greenhouse gases the incentive for other countries to reduce their emissions of such gases will be 
reduced. In principle the same three reasons for leakages will also be present for dealing with most 
other types of international environmental problems. 
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 Sorsa, P (1992), “GATT and the Environment”, The World Economy, 15, 115-133, quoted in Mæstad (1998). 
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Often it is claimed that if an environmentally motivated (domestic) tax will give leakage effects, 
unilateral taxes should be set below their first-best levels. Mæstad (1998) shows that for global 
efficiency leakage problems should be handled through supplementing trade provisions. The efficiency 
of such trade provisions crucially depends upon them not leading to a trade war (Mæstad 1998). 
 
Hoel (1999) suggests that with given groups of signatories and non-signatories to an IEA to combat 
global warming, the best way to handle carbon leakage is to combine the domestic environmental 
policy with transfers to induce non-signatories to limit their carbon emissions. Hoel (1999) repeats the 
finding from Hoel and Schneider, that if today’s non-signatories are potential signatories for the future, 
the use of transfers may not be the best policy. 
 
The Montreal protocol is an example of an IEA with trade-provisions for products directly related to the 
environmental problem which it tries to alleviate. Signatories have to stop both import and export of 
ozone-depleting substances with non-signatories, and have also to ban imports of products from a list 
of CFC-containing products from non-signatories (Enders and Porges 1992). The Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) is another example (Barbier 1993). 
 
In many instances the trade-provisions have the side effect of treating signatories more favourably 
than non-signatories, and are hence also an incentive for joining the IEA (Blackhurst and 
Subramanian 1992). Once all countries currently being major producers and consumers of the 
substances controlled under the Montreal Protocol seem likely to join it, a country wanting access to 
such substances would have to join the Protocol to get it
22
. Likewise, if a producing country wants its 
industry to have access to the large market for such substances it must join the Protocol. Hence the 
trade-provisions in the Montreal Protocol was a sufficient inducement for developing countries to join 
(Edgers and Porges 1992). 
 
By creating a market for some desirable good into one with controlled participation, like the Montreal 
Protocol does, or totally prohibiting trade of some goods, like the CITES does, one of course also 
tempts people into illegal trade of these goods. The final outcome of this can sometimes be the 
opposite of the desired effect. Barbier (1993) investigates the illegal trade in ivory from the African 
elephant following the CITES ban on ordinary trade. He concluded that the ban was “at best 
ineffective and at worst counter-productive”. Agricultural conversion of elephant habitats (or i.a. 
tropical forests) following low profitability of the “old use” of the area due to international sanctions is 
also a possibility.  
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 But note that the signatories have agreed to eliminate their production and consumption of the substances by 
year 2000 (year 2010 for low-income developing countries with a low consumption during the whole period to 
2010) (Enders and Porges 1992), meaning that supplies also inside the Montreal Protocol has a clear end. 
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Barrett (1997a) investigates the effect credible threats of trade sanctions may have on countries’ 
participation in international co-operation. Sanctions viewed in isolation is globally welfare-reducing, 
but if their use increases the supply of a public good, the overall effect may be welfare-increasing. 
Barrett (1997a) uses a model with stage games, where governments first make an agreement about 
co-ordinating their abatement levels and possible use of trade sanctions to non-signatories. 
Governments then decide whether they will be signatories or non-signatories to the agreement
23
, and 
this determines their abatement levels. The countries’ firms, competing in a homogenous product 
relevant for the environmental agreement, then set their outputs. With trade sanctions the global 
market will be segmented.  
 
Barrett (1997a) finds through his model that full co-operation can be sustained for a large range of 
realistic parameter values, and that in equilibrium trade is not actually restricted as the threat of the 
sanctions is enough to assure full co-operation. A minimum participation clause is however required 
for the international agreement with the trade sanctions possibility. The Montreal Protocol is an 
example of an environmental agreement with trade provisions regarding products that are relevant for 
the environmental problem. It also has a minimum participation clause for the use of trade sanctions. 
Barrett (1997a) writes that “While the trade sanctions in the Montreal Protocol almost certainly violate 
the multilateral trading rules, no country has complained officially about them. This hints that […] 
support for the trade sanctions in this agreement has been universal”.  
 
Subramanian (1992) states that the most important difference between the transfer and the sanctions 
approach is the welfare effects. Naturally, with compensation for co-operation a country is better off 
than with the sanctions approach. Mcmillan (1990) has shown that in a bargaining game a player’s 
payoff is higher, ceteris paribus, the worse the opponent’s payoff is in the case of bargaining 
breakdown. Hence the threat of sanctions in case of non co-operation makes the opponent weaker in 
the bargaining game. If unilateral threats of sanctions are possible, Mcmillan (1990) fears that it could 
significantly affect the flow of resources, especially to those developing countries which necessarily 
must be members of IEAs if the agreements are to be efficient. Mcmillan is also surprised that in the 
environmental literature it is mostly taken for granted that compensation of offenders is necessary to 
achieve international co-operation. In the recent history of trade policy, sanctions have been 
successful in promoting co-operation, according to Mcmillan (1990). Barrett (1998b) and Werksman 
(1996) support this view. 
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3.5 Minimum and limited 
participation 
One would ideally like all countries that contribute to and that are affected by an international 
externality to participate in an IEA concerning that externality. However, typically not all participants 
gain directly, and side-payments, which in theory could alleviate this, have their problems. There can 
be substantial dead-weight losses with their administration, and countries may not be able to find a 
scheme of side-payments which they all consider fair (Black et al, 1993). Some countries may be 
trying to exploit the possibilities for free-riding that exist, as is argued within the framework of self-
enforcing IEAs. Black et al (1993) state that it is then better to go for limited participation, increase the 
chances of reaching an IEA, and at least alleviate the problem. 
 
Most international agreements don’t come into effect before they are ratified by a minimum number of 
countries. This number could either be an absolute number of countries, and/or a number of countries 
representing somehow a certain fraction of the problem
24
. “It is clear that it would not be in the 
interests of a state to be bound by the obligations of an IEA unless enough other states, and in some 
cases particular other states, were bound by the same obligations”, Barrett (1998) states. Most states 
are, for example, not interested in exposing own industry to an unilateral carbon-tax. Barrett (1998) 
also says that “Typically, the actual number of signatories exceeds the minimum needed to bring an 
IEA into force, and this suggests that the minimum participation clause may serve as a co-ordinating 
device”. Hence, when many enough states have ratified an IEA, the cost of fulfilling its obligations falls 
for the remaining states. This means that a sensible minimum participation clause promotes 
international co-operation. 
 
Black et al (1993) calculates the optimum threshold ratification level to maximise global benefits of an 
IEA on greenhouse gases (or a similar environmental problem). They assume that the terms of the 
IEA already have been negotiated and are enforceable
25
. All countries are then to say whether they 
will participate (without knowing what others have decided). When n out of N countries participate the 
agreement goes into effect. Only the ratifiers are committed to act. Each country knows its own benefit 
(b) and costs (c) of unilaterally fulfilling the terms of the agreement. For all countries b<c, but they 
expect that they will benefit from the other countries’ actions. With identical countries, and r other 
countries participating, each country’s expected benefit of not signing is rb, and the expected benefit 
of signing is (r+1)b-c, if the agreement comes into force. 
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 The Kyoto agreement will come into action when at least 55 industrialised countries, also representing at least 
55% of the industrialised countries’ total CO2-emissions have ratified it (Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, Article 25). 
25
 To optimise global benefits the terms of the IEA, and the optimum ratification level with its expected global 
benefit, must be decided jointly (Black et al 1993). 
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The countries assume they will get the same benefit from each of the other participating countries, as 
from their own participation. A country’s expected net benefit before signing depends on the belief 
about other countries’ probability of signing. With a probability of r other countries signing equal to 
Pr[r|N-1], a country’s expected benefit of signing is: 










The first term is the expected benefit of participating in an IEA that comes into effect, the second term 
is the expected benefit of not participating in an IEA that nevertheless comes into effect, and the third 
term is the expected cost of being willing to participate. The country will naturally take part if the 
expected benefit is positive (∆ ≥ 0). The optimal threshold ratification level n* is the one that maximises 
global net benefit, given the values of the other variables. As the expression in Equation 13 is 
increasing in b, at some critical b-value the country will decide to sign.  
 
Black et al (1993) find in their model that for global problems, like global warming, free riding is less of 
a problem as the total number of countries increases. This is a counter-intuitive result, depending on 
the assumption that costs and benefits of participation are constant for each country. As all countries 
gain from the others’ efforts, with more countries the increased gain more than offsets the reduced 
probability of a country being pivotal for the agreement to come into force. 
 
Black et al (1993) also notes that countries, depending on their expected benefit of measures, may 
want a different number of minimum participants for the agreement to come into effect than n*. Hence 
they may be unwilling to let an international agency decide n*. Countries with a high benefit from an 
international agreement will want a higher n than n*, and are also likely to ratify themselves. But if they 
revealed their wish of a higher n, they would also signal that they were likely to sign, hence reducing 
other countries’ probability of signing. Black et al (1993) concludes that countries often have little to 
lose from letting an international agency setting the n-rule, rather having their own preferred n-rule 
adopted.  
  
A problem with Black et al’s model is that there is assumed only one chance for reaching agreement. 
In reality countries would get at least a second chance of ratifying an IEA which did not come into 
effect in the first round. As ratifying means costs many countries will wait with ratification. Signalling a 
low benefit also increases the probability that other countries will sign. 
 
On the opposite side of free-riding is unilateral action. It is sometimes asserted that countries should 
do more on their own than the non-co-operative solution demands. Morality has been used as one 
reason for this, and the possibility of inspiring other countries into taking responsibility by setting an 
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example as a second (Barrett 1990). The latter idea is known as “leadership”. As an example both 
Finland, Sweden, the Netherlands and Norway have adopted carbon-taxes unilaterally (Hagem 1996).  
 
Barrett (1990) asks the question of how leadership will effect the environment when international 
treaties are negotiated. In a two-country analysis Hoel (1991) shows that this depends on whether 
unilateral actions are taken before a treaty is reached and are independent of that treaty, or if it is a 
matter of doing more than one is committed to through an already negotiated agreement. In the first 
case, Hoel claims, unilateral actions may compromise negotiations and lead to greater emissions. 
Over-fulfilling one’s commitment to a treaty will on the other hand reduce total emissions. Hoel (1999) 
finds that with given groups of participants and non-participants, the best way to reduce leakage is for 
the participating countries to combine their domestic environmental policies with transfers inducing 




 compares the costs for Norway of a domestic tax on consumption or a domestic tax 
on production of fossil fuels, both giving the same effects on global carbon emissions. Norway is a 
small country, but not an insignificant supplier of fossil fuels to the world market. She finds that 
reducing global CO2 emissions through reducing the production of fossil fuels can for Norway be a 
cheaper way to reach her target for emissions reductions than limiting domestic consumption only. 
 
With unilateral action or limited participation in an international agreement the efforts of these 
countries may to a degree be counteracted by other countries’ actions. Reductions of this kind are 
sometimes referred to as “leakages”. In section 3.4 I refer to Mæstad (1998). He shows that for global 
efficiency leakage effects of an IEA with limited participation should be handled through 
supplementing trade provisions. 
3.6 Detecting non-compliance 
As compliance is usually costly there is a continuous incentive for signatories not to comply. If non-
compliance is easy to detect for the other signatories, and the potential reaction severe enough, 
countries will comply as long as they are able. In situations with more asymmetric information, higher 
costs of revealing non-compliance, and less clear or less severe punishment the chances for non-
compliance are higher. (Hagem 1996).  
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Russell (1996) gives a taxonomy of monitoring and enforcement problems. His article mainly focuses 
on monitoring and enforcement at the national level, but most points are also relevant in the 
international dimension. The taxonomy is based upon three main considerations: 
• What is the assumed motivation of the source of the externality for complying with the regulation 
(read as: complying with the provisions of the IEA)? 
• What kind of discharge situation (externality) is present? 
• What is the character of the regulation to be enforced? 
 
For the first of these considerations: Are most countries voluntarily complying to the best of their 
ability, or will most cheat in the absence of vigorous monitoring and swift and painful enforcement 
action? Voluntarily compliance is very much against a fundamental assumption in economics, as it 
seems to downplay self-interest. For individual enterprises Russell think they might fear the public 
relations costs of being singled out as environmentally unfriendly enough to voluntarily comply also in 
the absence of potential government enforcement.  
 
Hagem (1996) points out that it in the case of an IEA it may be very costly to deviate when all other 
countries in a well-defined group, like the EU or OECD, are participating. Many countries want to be 
part of IEAs and other international agreements in order to be attractive for investments and aid-
transfers, and for products made in their country to be acceptable for conscious consumers
27
. We 
have earlier pointed to diffuse reciprocity and issue-linking as reasons for being part of IEAs and 
complying to them (Blackhurst and Subramanian 1992). For all these it is the case that a rather more 
subtle system of sanctions are feared than a straightforward enforcement by some well defined 
institution, just as Russell (1996) points out for the individual enterprise. 
 
Russell (1996) has some limited data on voluntarily compliance in the US. Plants’ self-reporting 
reveals a wide-spread lack of compliance (between 16% and 32% report of “significant violations”). 
Russell interprets these results as against the voluntary compliance picture. The fact that self-
reporting tells of such high non-compliance could be taken as the opposite, namely that plants 
voluntarily comply to the best of their ability. It seems reasonable to assume that self-reporting of 
serious violations are correct, but without independently verified data for the enterprises which did not 
report of violations, the total picture is unclear. 
 
To decide whether countries are complying with the provisions of an IEA three different mechanisms 
can be used, partly in conjunction. They are self-reporting, independent verification and monitoring. 
Self-reporting is the procedure of each country making periodic reports to the general assembly (or 
some other body of the IEA) on how the country has fulfilled its obligations during the period. 
Verification is when an agency or other body appointed by the general assembly of the IEA verifies the 
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information given in the national reports. There are IEAs which only use these two types of control. 
Monitoring is when the relevant data to decide whether a country fulfils its obligations under the 
agreement is collected and delivered to the relevant body under the general assembly not by the 
country itself, but by some agency independent of that country, (Måreng 1996). 
 
The choice of method for documenting compliance/non-compliance depends on the amount of 
asymmetric information and the potential cost/value of such asymmetric information. Large penalties 
for non-compliance can be a substitute for tedious monitoring. (Hagem 1996) 
 
For the second and third consideration behind Russell’s taxonomy of monitoring and enforcement one 
must look specifically into whether, or to what degree, monitoring or inspection can detect non-
compliance. Are we looking at a situation where compliance requires the installation of specific 
equipment?; Does the environmental policy set an upper limit on total emissions per unit time?; Is it a 
matter of handling and storage of barrels of highly toxic waste; etc. Most discussions of monitoring and 
enforcement systems have referred to situations where the actions of each single source are of 
independent interest, even though the result for the environment is determined by all sources’ 
collective action. When the limitation is set in regard to the collective action, like nations getting limits 
on total emission-levels in IEAs, monitoring becomes more difficult due to the increasing number of 
sources. For some types of regulations a crude monitoring is possible through the use of materials 
balance (for example sulphur-emissions from fuels) or capacity limitations checks. 
 
For the design of monitoring and enforcement systems Russell (1996) points out four especially 
important dimensions along which the responsible body can make their own choices: 
• the probability of monitoring a source within a given period of time; 
• the extent of pre-monitoring notice given (no notice = surprise monitoring); 
• the definition of a violation; 
• the penalty for a violation. 
 
Together with the characteristics of the source, these factors determine the probability that the source 
will choose to violate its limits rather than comply over any particular time period. Examples of 
characteristics at the source is the attitude towards risk, and to what extent violating behaviour can be 
altered before monitoring starts or is finished. (Russell 1996). 
 
It is usually neither technically nor economically possible to have continuous, precise and tamper-
proof monitoring. Hence monitoring is usually performed by visits to the source by independent 
inspectors. The type of source/environmental externality to be regulated, and the possibility to detect a 
violation during a monitoring event decides how a violation should be defined in an efficient manner. 
 
Russell (1996) notes that surprise monitoring, at the national level, may involve legal or even 
constitutional questions about inspectors’ right to enter premises unannounced. In the case of surprise 
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monitoring of events inside sovereign states by inspectors from outside that country, it would require 
that the sovereign state opened up for the possibility of such surprise visits through signing an IEA. 
For efficient monitoring and enforcement system design, the amount of notice given should be less 
than the time it would take the source to correct a violation. 
 
Several elements need to be considered when a violation is defined. If the claim of good intentions 
foiled by some event more or less outside the source’s control is a valid defence, moral hazards are 
created. Rigidly punishing every violation could on the other hand encourage concealment (if 
concealment is possible). (Russel 1996). 
 
Penalties may be related to costs saved by the source by violation, to damages caused by violation, or 
to what one thinks it takes to encourage compliance. At the national level in the US and in Europe 
average penalty per conviction have been notably low. If penalties are cost-related, they must be 
significantly greater than one to be a good incentive, since probability of detection usually is a lot less 
than one. One expects rising marginal penalties (penalty for one more violation or one more unit of 
violation) to be part of an optimal system. (Russell 1996). 
 
Ideally both the definition of non-compliance and penalty type and size should by given in the text of 
the IEA (Werksmann, lecture 15.05.98).  
3.7 Dealing with free-riding, non-
compliance and disputes 
There may be disputes between members of an IEA about compliance, and signatories to an IEA of 
course regards non-signatories’ free-riding as a problem.  
 
Barrett (1998) refers to Ausubel and Victor (1992)
28
 who conclude that compliance with IEAs is fairly 
high, “but much of it may be an artefact of the standards”. Ausubel and Victor's general point is that 
countries comply with their obligations only because the obligations are not very heavy (Barrett 
1998).They illustrate their point by noting that Norway and the Netherlands withdrew from the 
International Whaling Commission (IWC) in the 1950s, in a dispute over quota setting. They rejoined 
in the '60s, when quotas were raised.  
 
                                                    
28
 Ausubel, JH and DG Victor (1992): "Verification of international environmental agreements", Annual Review of 
Energy and the Environment, 17, 1-43, quoted in Barrett (1998) 
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The previous sections have shown that IEAs can be designed with mechanisms that enhance both 
participation and compliance. Werksmann (lecture 15.05.98) notes that a carrot withheld is a stick. 
Side-transfers and positive trade-provisions in an IEA may make a potential free-rider into a signatory. 
The possibility of revoking these positive measures from a signatory which does not comply is of 
course an incentive for compliance. But threats of such revokement, or other measures against free-
riders and those not complying, must be credible (Barrett 1994). Barrett (1999) states that deterring 
free-riding and non-compliance is in practice the same thing. 
 
Can sanctions be used as negative incentives, to force countries to do so and so? Sanctions can 
range from suspension of diplomatic/cultural/scientific contact, restrictions on financial transactions, to 
discriminatory trade measures on products unrelated to the environmental problem at hand. Some 
sanctions can also be privately organised, like a consumer boycott.  
 
Formal game-theoretic models are neutral to the use of positive versus negative incentives. None of 
the existing IEAs opens up for the use of trade sanctions in unrelated products. (Blackhurst and 
Subramanian 1992). Signatories that don’t fulfil their obligations to the Montreal Protocol may be 
excluded from its beneficial trade-provisions concerning related products, or its financial mechanisms 
(Enders and Porges 1992).  
 
According to Werksman (lecture 15.05.98) the general attitude in the international society after the 
Montreal Protocol have been to assume that countries’ non-compliance to IEAs are caused by poor 
ability, and assistance should hence be the remedy, not coercive measures. Russell (1996), contrary 
assumes “that all (or very nearly all) sources need considerable encouragement to comply because 
each is tempted by potential cost savings to violate”; Unless the expected penalty value (probability of 
detection and conviction times the penalty) exceeds the cost savings by not complying, sources will 
not comply. According to Blackhurst and Subramanian (1992) sanctions are in general not accepted 
as dispute resolving mechanisms concerning international agreements; Instead, there is a reliance on 
peer pressure and countries’ willingness to pursue diffuse reciprocity when ensuring compliance with 
IEAs. The most important mechanisms for this are the procedures for dispute settlement (Fauchald, 
lecture 15.05.98).  
 
Dispute settlement mechanisms range from negotiations, inspections, mediation, and conciliation to 
third parties or the International Court of Justice deciding on the matter. Strong mechanisms for 
dispute settlement exists for trade, investment and human rights regimes, but not for the environment. 
For disputes in environmental questions related to trade or investments there is a fear that the 
environment will be losing out, as one resorts to the dispute settlement mechanism and rules in the 
international agreement with the strongest mechanism. (Fauchald, lecture 15.05.98). 
 
In the general assembly of most IEAs, decisions are made through consent. Werksman (1996) points 
however to decisions made by the general assembly of the Montreal Protocol, in response to Russia’s 
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reports of non-compliance, where decisions have been made against Russia’s vote. Werksman thinks 
that the practical definition of consensus have been changed to “consensus minus one”, and that this 
can be the start of a new practice in international law. 
3.8 Summary 
In this chapter I have investigated how international co-operation can be promoted, mainly through the 
design of international agreements. This naturally includes both measures to promote countries’ 
entrance into agreements, and to make them comply with agreements’ obligations. 
 
For countries to join an IEA, it must be profitable for them to do so (Carraro 1997a). This can be done 
by rewarding countries for joining, or punishing them for staying outside (Subramanian 1992). Side-
transfers may make it profitable for countries to join an IEA (Carraro and Siniscalco 1993, Chander 
and Tulkens 1995, Barrett 1997a). It is disputed whether the use of side-transfers can make all 
countries join an IEA. Chander and Tulkens (1995) present a transfer-scheme they claim will make all 
countries best off, and hence full participation in an IEA can be ensured. The scheme will make each 
individual country better off than in the Nash equilibrium, and it will make any coalition of countries 
better off than in any arrangement they can make between themselves. The requirement for this is 
however that the countries of the grand coalition respond to free riding by reverting to play Nash. 
Barrett (1998) states that this strategy is not normally credible. Carraro and Siniscalco (1998) neither 
think that going back to playing Nash, and hence increasing emissions, can be a credible threat. 
Chander, Tulkens et al (1999) repeats the analysis from Chander and Tulkens (1995), but neither they 
investigate the different groups’ benefits if the grand coalition continues to maximise own benefit, 
accepting some free-riders.  
 
Whether committed countries (“environmentally friendly countries”) can bribe other countries to join an 
IEA through self-financed transfers has been investigated by several authors. Carraro and Siniscalco 
(1993) finds that different types of commitment in a sub-group of all (assumed identical) countries 
may, through side-transfers, lead to co-operation by all. Barrett (1994) thinks that the committed 
countries will have incentive to withdraw from the expanded coalition, as it will not be self-enforcing. 
Botteon and Carraro (1997) find that with heterogeneous countries commitment by only a small 
fraction may be sufficient to induce co-operation by all. Hoel and Schneider (1997) investigates the 
effect of side-payments from countries with obligations under an IEA to countries without such 
obligations, as part of a obligations trading scheme. Depending on whether countries without 
obligations may join the IEA in the future, they reach different conclusions on the use of side-transfers. 
 
The opportunity to free-ride on other countries’ environmental efforts stems from the (at least partly) 
public good nature of the environmental resource at hand. Several authors have investigated the 
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opportunity of linking agreements on environmental public goods with agreements concerning 
excludable positive externalities. This way the incentive to free-ride is offset by the incentive to get the 
excludable benefit (Carraro 1997a). Carraro and Siniscalco (1997) and Katsoulacos (1997) find that 
linking environmental issues with research and development issues can stabilise international 
agreements. 
 
When countries implement domestic measures (typically tariffs) to deal with an international 
environmental problem “leakages” often occur, reducing the efficiency of the domestic policy (Hagem 
1996). Mæstad (1998) finds that to achieve efficiency, the domestic measures must be supplemented 
with trade provisions aimed towards the countries which have not implemented such domestic 
environmental measures. Mæstad makes the reservation that the trade provisions must not lead to a 
trade war. As supplementing trade provisions determined through an IEA usually also has the side 
effect of treating signatories better than non-signatories, they also make up an incentive for countries 
to join the IEA (Blackhurst and Subramanian 1992).  
 
Barrett (1997a) finds that credible threats of trade sanctions may sustain full co-operation for a large 
range of realistic parameter values. In his model, in equilibrium trade is not actually restricted, as the 
threat itself is enough to ensure co-operation.  
 
Most IEAs have a minimum participation level for them to come into force. The actual number of 
signatories is typically higher than this minimum level. Barrett (1998) thinks this shows that the 
minimum participation clause may serve as a co-ordinating device, making sure that the countries that 
first ratify an agreement do not have to bear the costs of fulfilling its obligations without also other 
countries doing the same. Black et al (1993) calculates the optimal threshold ratification value for a 
global environmental agreement (like for climate). In their model they find that a country’s expected 
benefit of joining an IEA increases with increasing number of countries totally. In other words, the 
effect of a country benefiting from more countries’ action more than offsets the reduced probability of a 
country being pivotal for the agreement to come into force. Black et al (1993) also find that countries 
usually have little to lose by letting an international agency set the ratification threshold level, rather 
have their own preferred level. 
 
Unilateral actions by countries may in some cases compromise negotiations and reduce international 
co-operation (Hoel 1991). Unilateral actions can also reduce other countries’ incentives to deal with 
the environmental externality in question, Hoel and Schneider (1997) find when analysing the use of 
side-transfers for increased environmental efforts in other countries, like under the Kyoto Protocol’s 
“Clean development mechanism”.  
 
The traditional assumption in economics is that there is a continuous incentive for countries not to fulfil 
their obligations under an IEA, as long as compliance is costly. Hence a need for monitoring and 
severe enough punishment in case of non-compliance is assumed (Hagem 1996, Russell 1996). 
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Today the diffuse costs of not fulfilling the obligations under an IEA may be more feared than a 
straightforward penalty (Blackhurst and Subramanian 1992, Hagem 1996). Examples of such diffuse 
costs can be a boycott of export goods by foreign conscious consumers, or a country being less 
attractive for foreign investments and aid-transfers. 
 
Barrett (1998b) says non-compliance is “extremely rare”. Werksmann (lecture 15.05.98) tells that the 
general attitude in the international society in the last 10+ years have been to assume that countries 
comply as long as they are able. Assistance should hence be the remedy in the case of non-
compliance, not punishment. It is necessary with a close interplay of coercion and assistance 
(Werksmann 1996). Chayes and Chayes (1995) claim that co-operation is sustained by an 
international compliance norm, and not by treaty-based sanctions (as is suggested by the theory of 
repeated games). They state that the authority to impose sanctions is “rarely granted by treaty, rarely 
used if granted, and likely to be ineffective when used” (page 32). Barrett (1998b) asks why countries 
then choose to comply. Is it simply customary by international law?; If compliance could not be 
expected, then what’s the point of international agreements (Barrett 1998b). Another view is the one 
held by Downs et al (1996), that countries avoid “deep co-operation”
29
. Enders and Porges (1992) say 
countries can be expected to comply, as the design of the IEA, which came about in a co-operative 
game exercise, reflect the underlying costs and benefits of the non co-operative game which preceded 
the IEA. If a country should join an IEA with obligations that prove too costly to fulfil (in that country’s 
view), they can even withdraw from it. Barrett’s (1994) concept of self-enforcing IEAs is relevant. 
 
Free-rider deterrence and compliance enforcement are related problems and should be analysed 
jointly. The worst harm a signatory can do if not complying, is to behave as if it was not a signatory. 
Hence, if a signatory is deterred from withdrawing, it is also deterred from non-compliance – One free-
riding can be deterred, compliance can be enforced free of charge. The binding constraint on 
international co-operation is free-rider deterrence, not compliance enforcement. (Barrett 1999).  
 
The Montreal Protocol is seen as one of the great successes of international environmental co-
operation, and a model for future IEAs. Initially it did not include a mechanism to punish non-
compliance, but it had provisions that gave countries an incentive to participate. A trade sanction 
clause make sure signatories only trade substances that deplete the Ozone layer with each other, not 
with non-parties (or non-complying signatories) (Barrett 1998b). When Russia in 1996 announced that 
they would not be able to fulfil their obligations under the Montreal Protocol, the threat of trade 
sanctions, in combination with the promise of financial aid, made Russia change their mind 
(Werksman 1996, Barrett 1998b). 
 
                                                    
29
 Downs, GW, M Rocke and PN Barsoom 1996: “Is the good news about compliance good news about co-
operation?”, International Organization, 50, 379-406 (page 387, referred in Barrett 1998b). 
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Summed up one can say that several of the mechanisms discussed here can increase international 
co-operation. Under favourable conditions some might even sustain full co-operation. To promote 
international co-operation two conditions must be met: It must be profitable for countries to join an IEA, 
and they must be deterred from non-compliance. To make it beneficial to join an IEA can be done both 
by rewarding signatories and punishing non-signatories. There is dispute over whether compliance is 
a norm of international co-operation, or merely a result from lack of “deep co-operation”. Barrett’s 
(1999) theoretical find that for global environmental problems full co-operation can only be sustained 
by self-enforcement if the gains of co-operation are relatively small is somewhat depressing. This is 
particularly because the gravest environmental problems are about the provision of global public 
goods: Climate change and biodiversity conservation. The limitation is to have credible punishment of 
free-riders. Several mechanisms discussed here have the potential to increase participation, not to full 
global co-operation, but perhaps to a level where most of the externality can be dealt with.  
 
If it shall be beneficial to join an IEA, the cost of implementation must be sufficiently low. Mæstad 
(1998) shows that the use of tariffs may be necessary in combination with domestic measures to deal 
with an international externality, if the IEA has limited participation. In the next section I will look more 
at efficient implementation of IEAs, and particularly the Kyoto Protocol and its “flexible mechanisms”. 
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4. EFFICIENCY AND THE 
KYOTO PROTOCOL 
The last two chapters have shown that: 
 There are good reasons for countries to co-operate on eliminating international externalities; 
 The incentives to free ride on others’ efforts are in many cases stronger than the incentives for 
participation: 
 IEAs can be designed so that individual country’s benefit of participation are higher than of free-
riding. 
 
As the design of IEAs have developed over the years, they have become more and more efficient. 
That a country’s obligations can be reached cost-effectively makes it easier for that country both to 
join and to fulfil the obligations. I will in this chapter discuss mechanisms to achieve efficiency in IEAs 
for global externalities, with focus on the mechanisms opened up for in the Kyoto Protocol. 
 
A cost-effective international agreement achieves its goal at the lowest possible cost. An efficient 
agreement implies both that the goal is achieved cost-effectively and that the goal is optimally chosen 
(Hagem 1996).  
 
The first generation IEAs concerning pollution-reductions had identical percent-reductions by all as the 
target. This was not cost-effective, but the information required to set cost-effective targets was not 
available. It was agreed to take a step in the right direction, rather than wait and do nothing. The IEAs 
agreed later, during the 1990s, are aiming at higher efficiency; The second sulphur protocol for Europe 
has specific targets for each individual country (Førsund 1994); The Kyoto protocol has built-in 
mechanisms that aim to achieve cost-efficiency (Barrett 1998b). 
 
Chander et al (1999) define and characterise a global optimum for reductions of climate change 
gases. It is valid for global externalities of the public bad type in general. The first-order conditions are 
equality between marginal global damages due to anthropogenic influence and the marginal cost of 
each party’s measures to reduce their influence. For cost-effectiveness the marginal costs of each 
environmental measure must not be larger than its marginal benefit, and all measures must have the 
same marginal cost. 
 




iii MB MC ∀=  
Equation 14 
where 
MCi is marginal cost of last measure performed in country i; 
MBi is (global) marginal benefit of last measure performed in country i; 
 
For cost-effectiveness: 
iii MB MC ∀≤  
Equation 15 
and 
j,iji MCMC ∀=  
Equation 16 
For externalities of the private bad type, like acid rain in Europe, an optimal level of measures requires 
also that marginal cost equals marginal benefit for all measures. The marginal benefit of each single 
environmental measure can differ, even if they have the same marginal cost. For cost-efficiency, the 
measure with the highest gap between marginal benefit and marginal cost must always be the next to 
be carried out. This is regardless of whether other measures might have lower marginal costs, or 
higher marginal benefit. It is the difference between marginal cost and marginal benefit which is 
interesting (Førsund 1994).  
 
Setting and implementing an optimum is difficult in practice, for several reasons: 
 States must agree on how to calculate costs and benefits of possible measures/obligations 
(Hagem 1996, Chander et al 1999). 
 The states must agree on the baseline (for example the reference emission levels that reductions 
are set in relation to) for the obligations. This affects burden-sharing. (Chander et al 1999). 
 If states could agree on burden-sharing, transfers would most likely be necessary, and then new 
international institutions or mechanisms must be established to implement these (Chander et al 
1999).  
 For obligations that have a very long-term effect, like with the problem of climate change, states 
must agree on how costs and benefits shall be compared between generations. An efficient policy 
must also at each point in time include efforts towards gathering new information, as well as 
adaptive measures and measures to limit greenhouse gases. (Hagem 1996). 
 
 Eirik Inge Mikkelsen  
  47 
To get efficient targets in an IEA requires a very large amount of information. States usually also have 
an incentive to give wrong information about their costs and benefits of measures. It seems that cost-
effectiveness is the best we can hope for now.  
 
I will here consider mechanisms to increase the cost-efficiency in dealing with externalities of the 
public bad type only. The mechanisms I will discuss can be or are all related to the problem of climate 
change: 
 international emissions trading (IET)/tradable quotas 
 joint implementation (JI), including the “Clean Development Mechanism” (CDM). 
 
First I will give a short overview of the Kyoto Protocol. 
4.1 The Kyoto Protocol  
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change was one of the outcomes of the UN 
Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992. The Kyoto Protocol 
was agreed under the 3rd Conference of the Parties (COP-3) to the convention, in December 1997. It 
contains binding targets for the emissions of six major climate change gases not included in the 
Montreal Protocol, for industrialised countries and countries under economic transition (the countries 
and their quotas are defined in Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol). For the commitment period 2008-2012 
the average emissions of defined greenhouse gases shall be at least 5% below the 1990 level (article 
3 of the protocol). For the different countries the obligations range between minimum 8% reductions 
and maximum 10% increases. Carbon sequestration measures, like tree-planting and land use 
changes, can also give credits towards the emission targets (article 3). If a country emits less than its 
quota during the first commitment period, the difference can be added to its emission quota during 
later commitment periods (banking) (article 3). 
 
The protocol opens up for different “flexible” mechanisms that can reduce the overall cost of meeting 
its targets. These mechanisms are tradable quotas (article 17 of the protocol), joint implementation 
(article 6), “bubbles” (article 4) and the Clean Development Mechanism (article 12) (Cicerone 1/98). A 
concrete set of rules for these mechanisms will earliest be agreed on COP-6, in November 2000 (SSB 
1999).  
 
The developing countries have no obligations to reduce emissions under the Kyoto Protocol or the 
Convention, but are obliged to make action plans against climate change (article 10 of the Protocol). 
The industrialised countries have agreed to provide “new and additional” financial resources to cover 
the full costs the developing countries will have in doing so (article 11 of the Protocol). 
Efficiency and the Kyoto Protocol 
48 
4.2 International emissions 
trading 
Most literature use the term emission quotas for national emission limits specified in an IEA. If a 
national government allocates emission limits to domestic enterprises, it is usually called emission 
permits. Emission trading means that emission quotas or permits can be traded for other commodities, 
either between states or between domestic permit holders. Domestic permit holders may also be 
allowed to participate in international trade. (Holtsmark and Hagem 1998).  
 
I will here consider only international emission trade
30
. I will briefly discuss both the basic mechanism 
leading to an efficiency gain, different design possibilities for emission trading, and some possible 
sources of inefficiency. 
 
The concept of tradable emission quotas/permits was invented by Dales (1968). His starting point was 
a domestic pollution control authority trying to achieve cost-efficiency in a situation with asymmetric 
information, where the enterprises to be regulated have incentive to mislead about their costs of 
reducing pollution.  
 
The parties with a relatively high cost of reducing their emissions will be willing to pay a relatively high 
price for an emission quota. The parties with a relatively low cost of reducing emissions will either sell 
their assigned quota, or simply chose not to buy a quota at an auction. For them, it will be cheaper to 
reduce emissions. If the market for the emission quotas is well functioning, the price paid for a quota 
will be equal to the marginal cost of reducing pollution for that party (given that sum of tradable quotas 
is smaller than pre-quota emission level). By allowing parties to trade emission quotas one ensures 
that measures with low marginal costs are performed before more expensive measures. (Holtsmark 
and Hagem 1998). 
 
The Kyoto protocol’s article 17 opens up for emissions trading between its Annex B countries. It states 
that the trade shall be supplemental to domestic actions to reduce emissions. The Conference of the 
Parties (COP) still have to define the rules to govern such trade, in particular for verification, reporting 
and accountability of the trading. Holtsmark and Hagem (1998) see the benefits of international quota 
                                                    
30
 A Norwegian expert group, established by the government in October 1998 to give recommendations about a 
domestic quota trading system for climate gas emissions under the Kyoto Protocol, delivered their report to 
the Ministry of the Environment in November 1999. The expert group states that the most difficult issues have 
been the distribution of quotas between sectors, and also whether quotas should be auctioned or given away 
freely (NOU 2000:1). Several other countries are also considering whether some of their national emissions 
quota under the Kyoto Protocol shall be assigned to domestic industry and a domestic tradable quota system 
established (Holtsmark and Hagem 1998). 
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trade, but also present several arguments for limiting this trade. The cost-saving potential of allowing 
free quota trading among the Annex B countries of the Kyoto Protocol is estimated to be about 95%, 
compared to the countries fulfilling their obligations without trade (Holtsmark and Hagem 1998). 
 
The Kyoto Protocol opens up for IET, but does not state anything about whether countries should 
introduce a domestic emissions trading system. If many countries nevertheless do so, governments 
might allow industries and companies with individual emission limits to take part in the international 
emission trading system (Holtsmark and Hagem 1998). 
 
The non-Annex I countries can not take part in emission trading under the Kyoto Protocol, as a 
prerequisite for participation is an emission limit. When the international quota market is established, it 
could be beneficial for these countries to accept emission caps, and join the market. If a country can 
sell emission quotas for a higher price than the domestic emissions reduction will cost, it pays to join. 
This would reduce the leakage problem of only Annex B countries taking emission reductions. If the 
non-Annex B countries do not get emission limitations in the future, there is also a fear of “dirty 
industries” migrating there, and hence the creation of “pollution havens”. (Holtsmark and Hagem 
1998). 
 
There are six different greenhouse gases whose emissions in the period 2008-2012 should be limited 
through the Kyoto Protocol
31
. In general quotas can vary with regard to emission measurement and 
the time period it is valid for. The uncertainty in measuring the emissions of the different gases has 
made some propose that trading should be restricted to CO2 only. The targets set in the Kyoto 
Protocol is however for the cumulative emissions of “CO2-equivalents” of the 6 gases emitted by each 
country, based on the “Global Warming Potential” of each gas. Monitoring difficulties may increase the 
chances of cheating. The emission quotas set in the Kyoto Protocol is the average for each of the 
years in the period 2008-2012. Other possibilities is to define a quota for a fixed year, for any defined 
length of time, or even repeated emissions over subsequent periods (Holtsmark and Hagem 1998). 
 
I will now turn to some factors that could reduce the efficiency gain from IET, or even lead to lower 
overall efficiency than if the mechanisms were not allowed. 
 
Limited participation in dealing with international public bad externalities will in general prohibit cost-
effectiveness (Hagem 1996). Emissions trading under the Kyoto Protocol is to be “supplemental” to 
domestic measures (article 17). What “supplemental” means is not yet defined. If it will actually limit 
the amount of IET and JI-projects being undertaken it will lead to higher costs of implementing the 
Protocol (Barrett 1998b). 
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 The six gases are: Carbon dioxide (CO2); Methane (CH4); Nitrous oxide (N2O); Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs); 
Perfluorocarbons (PFCs); Sulphur hexafluoride (SF6). 
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If agents have market power in tradable emissions-quotas this can also lead to inefficiency (Hagem 
1996). United States, China and Russia had in 1992 respectively 22%, 12% and 9% of the world’s 
CO2 emissions from industry. These countries can possibly exercise power in the market for tradable 
quotas. (Hagem and Westskog 1996) 
 
There are two ways strategic behaviour by agents with market power in emission quotas can lead to 
inefficiencies (Hagem and Westskog 1996; Hagem 1996): 
 Agents may use their market power to influence the price of emission quotas, hence reducing their 
cost of the climate policy. Depending on the initial allocation of emission quotas, the inefficiency 
from this type of strategic behaviour can increase or decrease (Hahn 1984)
32
; 
 Agents may use their market power to influence the behaviour of rivals in the same industry, 
increasing their own market share and profit. This can be done by using the tradable quotas as 




Note that Hahn’s (1984) finding of the efficiency loss from market power depending on the initial 
allocation of quotas mean that the issues of burden sharing and cost-efficiency are intertwined. 
Hagem and Westskog (1996) discuss design features of a system of tradable quotas valid for two sub-
periods, when an agent has large market power (price setter). A permit holder may either distribute 
emissions freely between the two periods (a “flexible” quota), or the emission level is set for each 
period (a “durable” quota). With durable quotas the price setter’s market power is reduced, but the 
marginal cost of abatement in each period can differ for the price takers. With a flexible quota system 
the price takers will allocate abatement efforts cost-effectively between the periods. There is hence a 
trade off between the price setter having large market power and causing inefficiency in her quest for 
higher individual profit, and a cost-effective distribution of abatement efforts across periods. 
 
If domestic industry-sectors and companies could participate in the international emissions trade 
rather than countries, the number of participants would increase and the problem of market power 
could be reduced. It would probably not eliminate the problem as some companies in the fossil fuel 
sector are large even globally. Further, through the use of fossil fuel taxes it is possible that some 
nations could exercise market power indirectly. (Holtsmark and Hagem 1998). 
 
Holtsmark and Hagem (1998) identify another source that may reduce the cost-effectiveness of 
emission trading; Transaction costs. These are costs related to gathering information about trading 
partners, with trade negotiations and the authorities’ monitoring and enforcement costs. Holtsmark and 
                                                    
32
 Hahn, R W 1984: “Market power and transferable property rights”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 99, 753-
765, quoted by Hagem (1996). 
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 Hagem (1996) refers to Von der Fehr, N 1993: “Tradable emission rights and strategic interaction”, 
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Hagem (1998) think that these costs will be significant in the initial phase of the trading regime, but not 
important later.  
 
Questions of compliance are fundamental to all IEAs. Holtsmark and Hagem (1998) think that the 
option of emission trading increases the potential for cheating, and can increase the possible 
environmental consequences of non-compliance, but it is not possible to say whether cheating will 
increase. Holtsmark and Hagem illustrate this with a quota seller who cheats by not reducing own 
emissions according to the IEA, and a buyer who will follow the rules. Through allowing trade the 
overall level of emissions is increased, with the quotas the buyer gets from the seller. If trade was not 
allowed the would-be seller emit the same level, but the would-be buyer reduces her emissions more. 
Another illustration: A potential buyer of quotas have high costs of compliance. She has a larger 
incentive for non-compliance if trading is not allowed, since trade lowers the cost of compliance. 
 
Holtsmark and Hagem (1998) expect that the “Economies in transition” (EIT) will predominately export 
emission quotas to the traditional OECD countries. Since some of the EIT-countries are in a difficult 
economic situation, this increases the chances of cheating. 
 
When the expected emission levels of greenhouse gases for the different countries in the next 10-20 
years are compared to the countries’ obligations under the Kyoto Protocol, Russia and some of the 
other Economies in Transition probably have been given emission limits above their “business-as-
usual” levels (Barrett 1998b, Holtsmark and Hagem 1998). This mean that they will have emission 
quotas to sell, and they don’t have to introduce measures to stay within their emission targets; The 
increased emissions from the quota buyers will not be met with reduced emissions in the seller 
countries. This is referred to as “hot air” trading, where the hot air is the positive difference between 
the emission limits and the business-as-usual emission levels. “Annex I trading lowers costs partly by 
lowering total abatement” (Barrett 1998b). 
 
For the commitment period 2008-2012 hot air trading means that the emission levels will be higher 
than they would be if trade was not allowed. As the Kyoto Protocol allows banking of emission quotas 
in excess of the emission levels during the commitment period (independent of it being considered 
“hot air” or real emissions reductions), the net effect may not be so bad after all. (Holtsmark and 
Hagem 1998). 
 
The EIT-countries probably have the lowest costs of reducing emissions, and the opportunity of buying 
quotas from them will reduce the Annex II countries’ costs of implementing the Kyoto Protocol. This 
may count when the Annex II countries’ are considering whether to ratify the Protocol
34
. 
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The Economies in transition can likely reduce emissions of greenhouse gases considerably even 
through the use of conventional technology. If countries on the technology frontier have to take most 
of their emission cuts domestically, technological development can be expected
35
. Such developments 
could also bring about emissions reductions in countries without obligations under the Kyoto Protocol. 
On the other hand, the more emission trading is allowed, the cheaper it will be to implement the 
Protocol, and then more resources are available for research on energy efficiency and new renewable 
energy. (Holtsmark and Hagem 1998) 
 
For the obligations the Annex B countries have under the Kyoto Protocol, the benefits of allowing IET 
will vary considerably between countries. It also depends heavily on whether trade is allowed among 
the Annex II countries only, or among all Annex B countries, and if there are other limitations on trade. 
(Holtsmark and Hagem 1998). 
4.3 Joint implementation 
With costs of measures differing between countries, many have pointed out the possibility of improving 
cost-effectiveness by allowing “joint implementation” (JI) (same as “activities implemented jointly” - 
AIJ) (Hagem 1996). The basic mechanism of joint implementation is that someone with an obligation 
to reduce own emissions, makes an investment abroad that leads to emission reductions and gets at 
least some if it accounted towards their own obligations (Torvanger et al 1994). I will in this section 
discuss the mechanism of JI, its advantages, factors that can limit the cost-saving potential of JI, as 
well as some methods to counter those potentially limiting factors. 
 
Joint implementation is included in several variants in the Kyoto Protocol (Janssen 1999, Chander et 
al 1999, Barrett 1998b):  
 Groups of countries can join together and undertake and fulfil commitments collectively, known as 
“bubbles” (article 4). EU has announced that it is a bubble” for the Kyoto Protocol obligations.  
 Countries financing projects that reduce the emissions of greenhouse gases (or establish a sink of 
greenhouse gases) in other countries with obligations under the Kyoto, can get this credited 
                                                                                                                                                                 
Framework Convention on Climate Change; FCCC) is a list of countries approximately equal to Annex B. 
Annex II (of the FCCC) list rich countries with special obligations (approximately OECD and EU). 
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 The possibility of technological development was one of the developing countries’ arguments against plain joint 
implementation that ultimately lead to the creation of the Clean Development Mechanism (Werksman, lecture 
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towards their own emission reduction obligations under certain conditions (article 6). This is the 
most common use of the term “Joint Implementation”.  
 Countries with obligations under the Kyoto Protocol can finance projects that reduce the emissions 
of greenhouse gases in countries without obligations, and get this credited towards their 
obligations, provided that investments aid development of the host country (SSB 1999) (article 
12). This latter is what is defined as the “Clean Development Mechanism” (CDM). It is required 
that this type of JI projects are additional to what the country without obligations otherwise would 
have done (in the absence of the certified project). Whether sink projects should be included as 
part of the CDM is unresolved (Torvanger 1998). 
 
If countries with obligations distribute their national quota to domestic actors (sectors or firms), these 
actors may involve in JI or CDM projects (Torvanger et al 1994). 
 
The concept of “bubbles” will be kept out of the following discussion on JI. It differs from the other 
types of JI (and emissions trading) in that transfers of emission rights need not be followed by a 
compensation the other way. The provision was established by wish of the EU, but is not confined to 
them (Barrett 1998b). As long as only the EU has declared the use of a “bubble”, that mechanism is 
less sensitive to what Janssen (1999) say is the major source of problems with JI-projects in the other 
sense: They are contracted between parties that fall under the jurisdiction of distinct sovereign states. 
The EU is a single judicial zone for many types of issues. 
 
The most important objectives for allowing JI under the FCCC were to identify and initiate cost-
effective greenhouse gas emission reductions, to support sustainable human and economic 
development, and encourage private capital to participate in emission reductions. JI can separate the 
commitment of each country from the implementation of the measures, and this reduces the cost 
differences of the emissions reductions among the countries. In addition to the payment, the host can 
gain from improved local environment, as well as getting access to new technology. (Torvanger et al 
1994). 
 
I will here first consider issues that are general for JI-projects with both Annex I and non-Annex I 
countries. Afterwards I will look into some issues that are special for the CDM. 
 
According to Yamin (1996), establishing a JI system involves two steps: first, establishing a system of 
entitlements to emission rights and second, imposing obligations which can be fulfilled in exchange for 
either (1) a transfer of a tradable emissions permit, issued as part of a global tradable permit system, 
or (2) the implementation of a particular climate gas reducing project in a host state through the 
provision of financial or other assistance by the investor. The essential legal feature is to allow 
transfers and assignments of emissions reductions between states. “In this sense of a project based JI 
system it is simply a type of tradable emission quota system” (Yamin 1996). 
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Torvanger et al (1994) consider JI as an intermediate arrangement for when some countries have 
obligations to reduce emissions and some have not. If all countries in the world have emission targets 
to meet, tradable emission quotas should be used, as they require less control from a third party, and 
emissions monitoring is sufficient. Janssen (1999) draws a fairly clear distinction between JI and IET. 
He states that JI refers to the international production of emission credits involving international 
investments. In that interpretation JI and IET are complementary, as IET is a way to increase the 
liquidity of the emission credits produced through the JI projects. 
 
Fully-fledged JI has never been allowed in an international context (before Kyoto) (Yamin 1996). The 
Montreal Protocol permits a limited form of JI, as the EU member states can operate as a bubble 
(Barrett 1990).  
 
International contracts are in general difficult to enforce due to the sovereignty of the states, and the 
design of JI/CDM contracts must reflect this. They should be designed so that both parties have 
permanent incentives to voluntarily fulfil their obligations. The contracts should be self-enforcing. 
(Janssen 1999). Self-enforcement in international relations is discussed generally in section 2.4. the 
conclusion is that self-enforcement is difficult to achieve. 
 
Janssen (1999) shows that when the investor-host relationship is modelled as a simultaneous one-
shot non-co-operative game, with the participation constraints of both the investor and host fulfilled, it 
is rational for both not to enter nor fulfil such a contract. This is despite the benefit of co-operating 
being larger than the benefit of not co-operating. We have an inefficient prisoners’ dilemma.  
Janssen’s matrix of the JI game is as follows: 
  Investor 
  fulfils defects 
fulfils (F-L, -F+B) (-L, B) 
Host 
defects (F, -F) (0, 0) 
Table 2 – The prisoners’ dilemma of a JI project 
The first number in each pair is the host’s payoffs, the second the investor’s. 
L = the host’s gross incremental cost of the project 
F = the value of the transfer from the investor to the host = the investor’s cost of the investment 
B = the value of the project for the investor (value of emissions reduction) 
 
The participation constraint of the investor is  
B-F ≥ 0 
Equation 17 
The participation constrain of the host is 
F-L ≥ 0 
Equation 18 
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The investor’s cost of the investment must be larger than the host’s cost of the project, and smaller 
than the value of the project for the investor (B ≥ F ≥ L). If the host or investor has risk aversion they 
will need an extra compensation. See section 2.3 for more on game representation of international 
relations. 
 
The incentive problems between investor and host, or between COP and investor/host, can be 
reduced through incentive contracts for the JI projects or through institutional arrangements 
(Torvanger et al 1994, Janssen 1999). Torvanger et al (1994) seem to have made the implicit 
assumption that only the host can breach the contract. Possible remedies they propose against this is 
to let the contract be with a bonus payment to the host contingent of the success of the JI project. 
Another proposal is a “deposit-refund” system where the host pays a fee at the start of the JI project, 
which is returned upon verified success of the project. The contract’s strength as an incentive 
correcting device for the host can be adjusted through the initial fee, the amount paid back and the 
probability of control. A deposit-refund system might be possible when the project host is in a 
developed country. I believe many actors in developing countries face serious financial constraints. 
The transfer will make it possible for them to perform the project. Withholding the transfer will hence 
not be an option for the investor in achieving contract compliance. This possible aspect of JI-contracts 
is one of them investigated in the model I develop in the next chapter. 
 
The basic problem of JI contracts is according to Janssen (1999) to make the parties credibly commit 
to co-operative behaviour. One possible mechanism is to have sequential fulfilment of the contracts, 
similar to Torvanger et al’s (1994) proposal above. Janssen (1999) suggests that the investor could 
function as a Stackelberg leader, making an advanced payment of part of the contracted total transfer.  
 
Janssen (1999) analyses two different ways through which a project host can signal commitment to 
fulfil the international contract. The first is to let national authorities in the host country establish a 
mechanism by which breaches of contracts by the host are punished domestically. The size of the 
punishment must be so high that it allows the host to signal a credible commitment. This means the 
punishment must be so large that it no longer is profitable for the host to breach the contract if the 
investor fulfils her obligations; (from Table 2, with S denoting the punishment):  
F-L > F-S 
Equation 19 
The punishment must be larger than the host’s incremental project cost (S>L). This is however not 
likely to be common knowledge, and the host has incentives to overstate its size. Janssen (1999) 
therefore suggest that the authorities set the punishment equal to the value of the project’s expected 
reduction in emissions (S = B; B from Table 2) (B can be found either as the value of the reduction on 
the IET market, or as a carbon tax reimbursement). 
 
Janssen (1999) also investigates the host’s possibilities of self-commitment through strategic 
delegation. The issue is whether the host can make a credible commitment by making a contract with 
Efficiency and the Kyoto Protocol 
56 
a third party at the national level. The basic idea of strategic delegation is to let the player with 
credibility problems entitle someone to play the game on his behalf. In our context here, the host in the 
JI project becomes a principal on the domestic scene, making a contract with a third party, who 
becomes an agent. This agent is the one who will perform the actual project leading to the emissions 
reduction.  
 
The structure of Janssen’s (1999) proposed mechanism is as follows: 
1. The potential project host makes a legally binding contract with a possible domestic agent, that is 
to implement a not yet agreed JI contract. The potential JI project investors know of the host’s 
contract with the domestic agent. 
2. Investor and host agree on a contract for a JI project. 
3. The investor transfers the investment funds (F in Table 2) to the host. The host pays her agent the 
incremental cost of the project (L), as is agreed in their contract which is subject to domestic law. 
4. The agent performs the project, and receives her payment (denoted Q – see below). The agent’s 
payment is guaranteed by domestic contract law. 
5. The project investor gets the emissions reduction credits transferred. 
 
The participation constraint for the domestic agent is that Q ≥ 0
36
. The participation constraint of the 
project investor is unchanged (see Equation 17), while for the project host it is now 
F-L-Q ≥ 0 
Equation 20 
Both of the mechanisms that Janssen (1999) has proposed require that the authorities in the host 
country can enforce its decisions and the country’s laws, and has the will to do so. For some of the 
economies in transition or the developing countries, this remains an open question. 
 
Different institutional arrangements for JI, apart from direct bilateral agreements between one investor 
and one host, are suggested by Torvanger et al (1994); A “Clearinghouse” can be established to 
collect information on potential JI projects and bring together investors and hosts; A “Credits Bank” for 
investments in JI projects can also be established, where investors make deposits and receive credits 
for climate gas emissions reductions from projects financed by the bank. The different institutional 
arrangements are discussed below, together with other mechanisms to overcome the possible 
problems associated with joint implementation and Clean Development Mechanism projects:  
 asymmetric information between host, investor and third party (awarding emission credits) 
 uncertainty of costs, as well as uncertain impact of JI-projects on overall emissions level 
 transaction costs of JI 
 problems deciding baseline emission levels, and controlling and monitoring JI projects 
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The seriousness of these factors will depend upon (following Torvanger et al 1999): 
 The parties involved: (i) the countries both have obligations under the protocol; or (ii) only the 
investor country have obligations 
 The type of project: (a) Emissions reducing projects (energy efficiency or abatement projects); or 
(b) Carbon sink enhancement projects (forestation or change of agricultural practises) 
 
Investors and hosts of JI projects will likely have private information about the project compared to the 
controlling body of the Kyoto Protocol. They both have incentives to overstate the emissions reduction 
from the project. The host wants the project to look as attractive as possible to get the contract, and 
the investor may get extra credits and hence has a lower cost of (seemingly) reaching her target. 
However, in bilateral contract negotiations with the potential host the investor has an incentive to get 
the emissions reductions as low as possible, to get a better bargaining situation. The Conference of 
the Parties can try to alleviate the situation by strict reporting and verifying procedures involving a third 
party or through specifying criteria for JI contracts that make the host reveal more information. 
(Torvanger et al 1994) 
 
If the COP establish a Clearinghouse institution they create a market for JI projects. This will not in 
itself restrain the potential hosts from overstating the emissions reductions from their projects (as 
Torvanger et al 1994 claims), as larger reductions at identical cost make projects attractive. The 
pressure to document properly the effects of projects should however increase in competition. It is 
also likely that the Clearinghouse will be more competent in evaluating JI projects than any investor 
country of firm, or the COP. If a Credits Bank was established it too could be expected to gain high 
competence. Further, such a Bank could be a monopsonist, forcing the price of JI projects down due 
to its market power. (Torvanger et al 1994) 
 
When the wrong partner or project is chosen, this can be referred to as adverse selection. It is one 
main type of asymmetric information problems in the economics literature. The second main type is 
called hidden action. In relation to JI projects this can be strategic actions by host countries 
(governments) or by enterprises in the host countries. Hagem (1996b, 1996c) and Torvanger et al 





Torvanger et al (1994) give the example of a government which lets its policies be influenced by the 
external funding (or possible external funding) of JI projects. Depending on the size of a particular JI 
project it will have local economic effects and maybe also some national scale effects. Especially for 
the countries without a baseline emissions target under the Kyoto Protocol can this be interesting. 
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Policy changes are very difficult to monitor or control. One possible way around the problem would be 
to demand that national emission targets are set by all countries that want to be eligible for JI 
contracts (Torvanger et al 1994). 
 
Hagem (1996c) analyses the situation where countries with abatement obligations pay a country 
without obligations to reduce emissions, through a “package” of JI projects. The size of the payment 
depends on how much the emissions are cut. Information on the cost of abatement is costly to obtain 
for the investor countries. She analyses both the optimal design of such a “climate contract”, and what 
factors influence the investors’ choice to get more information or not. It is assumed that the host 
country has private information both before and after the contract is signed. The investor can get 
information about the host country’s expected costs of abatement before the contract is signed, or 
design a contract that gives access to the (true) cost information simultaneously with the host, after 
some of the abatement projects are performed. As the agreement is between (sovereign) countries, 
the investor can only influence the host country’s choice of fulfilling the contract through the size of the 
transfer. If the host country finds it beneficial to break the contract, after having discovered the true 
costs of abatement, she will do so, and hence abstain from the transfer. 
 
Hagem (1996c) analyses two different situations differing in when the host country finds out the true 
cost of abatement (alternatively, in the principal – agent terminology: two types of host countries): 
 early, when the sunk cost of the abatement projects is relatively low; 
 late, when the sunk cost of the abatement projects is relatively high. 
If the abatement costs are higher than expected by the host country, she might breach the contract. In 
the first situation the host country’s cost of breaching the contract is relatively low, in the second it is 
high. Hagem assumes that for the first situation, the investor must specially design the contract so that 
the host will not breach it. For the second situation, Hagem assumes the host’s cost of breaching so 
high that the investor does not need to design the contract with that possibility in mind. For both cases 
it is found that the host country will get a profit from having private information about her type. The 
distribution of abatement projects between the countries with and without obligations will not be cost-
effective (not same marginal cost). 
 
If the host country finds out her true abatement costs late, the investor can get a first best contract by 
getting to know the host country’s type before the contract is offered/designed. The distribution of 
abatement projects will then be cost-effective between the host and investor countries, and the 
investor gets all the profit. If the host country is of the type that will discover the true cost of abatement 
early, getting information about the host’s type before the contract is offered will not be sufficient for 
the investor to make a first best contract. Hagem (1996c) concludes that monitoring the true cost of 
abatement for the host will have a higher value for the investor if the host’s cost of breaching the 
contract is low, than when it is high. 
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Torvanger et al (1994) analyse the impact on global emissions if firms consider strategically to not 
invest in no-regrets options now, hoping to host JI projects in the future, that will give them a positive 
rent
38
. If a host has private information she may receive a positive rent. Torvanger et al (1994) use a 
two-period principal-agent model, in which firms in a country without obligations know there is a 
possibility of being chosen as host for a JI project in the second period. They assume there are two 
types of firms, one “efficient” the other “less efficient”. Each of them are considering two alternatives 
for investment. The cheapest investment gives less abatement than the costly one, which is preferred 
by the investor. For the efficient firm the cheap investment is profitable, and a no-regrets option. 
However, if the efficient firm has made this investment in the first period it is not interesting as a host 
for the JI project. This is because it is assumed that only abatement in excess of no-regrets options 
can account against the investor’s own emissions target. The efficient firm will in period one decide 
whether to invest depending on the benefit from the no-regrets option, compared to the discounted 
benefit of hosting the costly JI project multiplied by the probability of getting the contract. This 
probability is taken to be the ratio of efficient firms. Torvanger et al (1994) find that there are three 
possible equilibrium outcomes. Either all the efficient firms invest in the no-regrets option in the first 
period, no-one does, or some does. The increase in global emissions is of course higher when fewer 
countries carry out the no-regrets options. If the number of potential hosts is large, each host’s 
chances of being selected for a JI project are small, and the negative effect on global emissions due to 
strategic behaviour will be less. Hagem (1996b) also investigates the kind of strategic behaviour by a 
host firm of not investing in less polluting technology now, hoping to get profitable JI contracts in the 
future (not necessarily no-regrets options). She too finds that this can lead to an increase in global 
emissions compared to a regime where JI projects are not possible. It can also influence the 
calculation of the baseline emissions level for the host country. 
 
None of the authors have considered the possibility of a host to a JI-project not fulfilling her obligations 
hiding under private information (i.e. the “hidden action” type problem with asymmetric information). 
Holtsmark and Hagem (1998) consider this as a possibility with emissions trading. I believe hidden 
action can be a problem also for joint implementation projects. The model I develop in the next chapter 
includes this aspect. 
 
The cost of a JI project will be uncertain, as can the expected emissions reduction be. A Credits Bank 
with a large portfolio of projects could offer its investors lower uncertainty than the one accruing to 
each single project (Torvanger et al 1994). The opportunity of joint implementation means flexibility as 
more types of greenhouse gas reducing measures will be available. A country can reduce the overall 
uncertainty of measures to combat global warming through diversification of its portfolio of measures. 
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The uncertainty of a specific measure may then actually be attractive if it counters the uncertainty of 




 argues that most JI projects will be relatively large, as the transaction costs of small 
projects will make up a substantial part of the total project cost. Barrett (1998b) thinks that transaction 
costs will be high, especially because it is additional emission reductions or sink enhancement, 
compared to what would otherwise have occurred, that gives credits. This will require costly analysis, 
and be a limit on bilateral trading. The establishment of the “Carbon Fund” under the World Bank is 
one attempt to reduce the transaction costs (St.meld. nr. 33). Norway is participating as an investor, 
with i.a. two Norwegian companies, and the hope is that the Carbon Fund will get a portfolio of 
emissions-reducing projects that the investors hope to account against their own obligations under the 
Kyoto Protocol. I find it likely that investors will establish relations only to a limited number of JI-hosts, 
get much knowledge and expertise with them, and then perform several JI-projects with each 
individual host. This will lower the transaction costs of each JI-project. The more similar an investor’s 
JI-projects are, the lower will the transaction costs for each project be. In the next chapter I argue that 
the potential for many very similar JI-projects between one investor and one host exists, and develop 
a model that assumes a string of identical JI-projects between a host and an investor. 
 
It can be difficult to calculate the emissions reduction in a particular abatement project. If the project’s 
emissions reductions can be calculated, the overall emissions reduction in the host country can 
nevertheless be smaller due to market interactions (Hagem 1996). This is often referred to as 
leakages, and the mechanism behind them were discussed in relation to trade-provisions in IEAs, in 
section 3.4. With many and/or relatively large JI projects in relatively small countries, there could also 
be leakage effects as the projects stimulates the domestic economy, leading to more greenhouse gas 
emissions in the long run (Torvanger et al 1994). What is important to the COP of the FCCC when JI 
projects are accepted, is of course the overall effect of the projects in limiting greenhouse gas levels.  
 
Holtsmark and Hagem (1998) question if emissions trading and joint implementation will have a 
positive effect on levels of greenhouse gases in the long run. The more measures that have to be 
performed in the developed countries, more technological development in emissions abatement and 
less polluting energy sources can be expected. Such new technology will also become available for 
the non Annex I countries (with time), possibly reducing overall levels of greenhouse gases more than 
with emissions trading. It is also possible that the industrialised countries’ reduced costs of 
implementing obligations due to emissions trading means more resources are available for research in 
new technology. 
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The CDM is the only mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol that provides a way of including the non-
Annex I countries into the efforts to reduce greenhouse gas levels, and is hence of potentially huge 
significance (Barrett 1998b). It is required that the emissions reductions from CDM projects are 
additional to what would occur in the absence of the project. This is of course very difficult to ensure 
as no emission limits have been set for the host countries of this type of JI-projects. There is a fear of 
only “paper” emission reductions being made (Barrett 1998b). According to Stavins (1998) it is also 
likely that the CDM projects that will be selected are those that would have been undertaken 
anyway
40
. Part of the reason for this is that these projects can be offered to the Annex I countries at a 
lower cost than other projects.  
 
To avoid adverse selection and paper trades, the Kyoto Protocol demands that emission reductions 
from a CDM project must be “certified by operational entities to be designated by the Conference of 
the Parties”. The details about this is one of the issues one hopes to resolve at COP-6 in The Hague, 
in November 2000. It is however clear already that the parties to a CDM project must pay for this 
certification. This increases the transaction costs of the project (Barrett 1998b). In addition the Kyoto 
Protocol demands that a share of the proceeds from CDM trades shall be used “to assist the 
developing country Parties that are most vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change”. Barrett 
(1998b) thinks this sounds like a tax, and it will also increase the costs of CDM projects, bringing down 
the volume of such projects being performed.  
4.4 Summary 
I have in this chapter distinguished between efficient and cost-effective IEAs, and looked at general 
obstacles to achieve either. Further I have looked at the Kyoto Protocol, investigating particularly its 
flexible mechanisms to reduce costs of implementation. 
 
Cost-efficiency requires that an IEA’s targets are met at minimum cost. Overall efficiency requires also 
that the targets are optimally set. Overall optimality is usually difficult to achieve, both due to technical 
and political reasons (Hagem 1996, Chander et al 1999): Costs and benefits of many different 
measures may need to be calculated; Burden sharing must be agreed; Targets may need to be set 
both in relation to uncertainty/future additional information and in relation to future generations. In light 
of this, cost-efficiency is likely the best to hope for.  
 
The Kyoto Protocol opens up for several “flexible mechanisms” to increase cost-efficiency. The “Kyoto 
Mechanisms” are international emissions trading (IET), joint implementation (JI) and the Clean 
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Development Mechanism (CDM). IET is the international trade in emission quotas or credits for some 
other compensation. JI and CDM are processes whereby countries or firms with emission 
quotas/permits invest in foreign projects that reduce the amount of greenhouse gases. Both reduced 
emissions and enhancement of sinks are possible. The investors get all or some of the reduction in 
greenhouse gases due to the project credited towards their own obligations. The hosts for the projects 
receive financial and/or technological transfers. It is a requirement of CDM projects that they aid local 
development. Countries may also fulfil their obligations jointly, as a “bubble”, meaning that the total 
emissions reduction must equal the sum of their individual obligations. 
 
The rationale behind all these mechanisms is that reducing greenhouse gas levels will have different 
marginal costs in different firms and areas. By separating the obligations and their implementation, 
marginal costs can be equalled between projects. This enhances the cost efficiency (Hagem 1996). 
According to calculations done by the Clinton administration, the opportunity of emissions trading 
between the industrialised countries will lower the marginal cost of implementing the obligations under 
the Kyoto Protocol with 72%, and the total cost with 57% (Barrett 1998b). It is estimated that the total 
costs for Norway, of fulfilling the obligations under the Kyoto Protocol, can be reduced by 2/3 through 
joint implementation (St.meld. nr. 29)
41
. According to St.meld. nr. 33 the Kyoto mechanisms can lead 
to a common price on emissions of greenhouse gases in the industrialised countries, and that 
measures with the same cost-level will be accomplished in the developing countries.  
 
The rules for the use of the Kyoto Mechanisms have not been agreed upon. In Buenos Aires (COP-4 
1998) the parties agreed a “work programme on mechanisms” containing 142 issues. This should, 
according to Torvanger (1998), resolve “Everything you ever wanted to know about the flexibility 
mechanisms”. Norway hopes that the rules will be decided during COP-6, in Hague in November 2000 
(St.meld nr. 33). 
 
There are several factors that can limit the cost-reducing potential of the Kyoto mechanisms, or even 
lead to lower cost-efficiency than if the flexible mechanisms were not allowed. 
 
Hagem (1996) and Hagem and Westskog (1996) have analysed the possible effect of actors having 
power in the market for tradable quotas. They may influence the price of emission quotas to their own 
benefit, or use tradable quotas as an instrument for monopolisation. Actors’ market power can be 
influenced by the initial allocation of quotas, and hence the issues of efficiency and burden sharing are 
not separate (Hahn 1984). Transaction costs will probably reduce the efficiency in an initial phase of 
an emissions trading regime, but not when it is well established (Holtsmark and Hagem 1998). Bohm 
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 “Norway have entered climate-related projects in China, Mexico, Poland, Burkina Faso and Costa Rica, and will 
probably sign similar agreements on projects in India, Slovakia and Barbados” (Aftenposten interaktiv, 21 
January 1998). Norway has specifically financed a 35 million NOK investment in modernising and renovating a 
coal power plant in China, hoping to be able to credit the CO2-emissions reduction towards their Kyoto 
obligations (SSB 1999). 
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(1994) and Barrett (1998b) think that the transaction costs of joint implementation projects will be high. 
I assume investors to JI-projects will establish solid relationships with a very limited number of hosts, 
get much competence on co-operation with these, perform several JI-projects with each, and hence 
reduce the transaction costs of each individual JI-project. 
 
Different views exist on whether joint implementation is an intermediate tool, only interesting until all 
countries have obligations under the Kyoto Protocol, or as a permanent complement to emissions 
trading. Janssen (1999) defines joint implementation to be the production of emission credits through 
international investments, and international emissions trading as a means of efficient liquidation of 
these credits. 
 
Contracts on JI and CDM-projects will be between parties under different jurisdictions. Janssen (1999) 
states that hence they should be self-enforcing. The basic problem with such contracts is to make the 
parties credibly commit to co-operation, and he suggests two ways it can be achieved for the project 
host. One is to have national authorities establish a (domestic) mechanism to punish contract-
breaches. The other is to use strategic delegation. It involves to make a contract with a domestic third 
party, which will perform the actual investment project. The contract must be known to potential 
investors, and set up before the JI-contract itself is made. 
 
Torvanger et al. (1994) also propose mechanisms to make the host comply with the JI-contract, 
involving that some or all of the transfer to the host is withheld. This can be directly, or trough a 
deposit-refund system where the host pays an initial fee to be refunded together with the transfer if the 
contract is fulfilled. For many JI-hosts in developing countries I believe the transfer from the investor is 
necessary to make a host able to perform the project. Withholding the transfer to achieve compliance 
will of course not be an option if the host already has received it. 
 
Private information held by the host of a JI project can be used advantageous for her (Torvanger et al 
1994). Both “hidden action” and “adverse selection” type problems are possible. Holtsmark and 
Hagem (1998) think that the potential for cheating increases with emissions trading, considering the 
case of a quota seller that will not actually reduce own emissions in accordance with the sales of 
emission quotas (hidden action).  
 
Hagem (1996b, 1996c) analyses some situations with asymmetric information between host and 
investor of JI-projects. Hagem (1996b) looks at the case of a potential host abstaining from 
investments today, hoping for profitable JI-projects in the future. This may lead to overall levels of 
greenhouse gases being higher than if joint implementation is not allowed. Hagem (1996c) considers 
a case with one investor and several hosts. If a host finds her cost-level to be high, she may breach 
the contract and abstain from the transfer. A host’s expected cost-level (before the contract is made) is 
private information, as well as her true cost-level (which is revealed during the project-period). At a 
cost the investor can reveal this private information. Hagem (1996c) investigates how the contract 
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should be designed, and when paying for additional information is beneficial to the investor, depending 
on the type of host (high or low cost). 
 
None of the authors cited here have considered hidden action problems in established JI-contracts. I 
believe this type of problem is likely to occur, and the model I develop in the next chapter includes this 
aspect. 
 
The overall effect of a JI-project is often uncertain, as it can be reduced due to leakages (market 
interactions) (Hagem 1996). There are also other sources of uncertainties, but they can be averaged 
out for investors through the use of a Credits Bank engaging in a portfolio of projects. Creating a 
market for JI-projects by establishing a Clearinghouse institution will also reduce some of the above 
mentioned difficulties (Torvanger et al 1994). 
 
Holtsmark and Hagem (1998) ask if enough technological development will take place if the use of the 
flexible mechanisms is extensive. Less flexibility means more measures must be performed in the 
industrialised countries, driving technological innovation. New technology can have a positive long-run 
effect on the levels of greenhouse gases that outweighs the current savings of emissions trading. 
 
In 1990 the OECD countries contributed to 38% of global CO2 emissions. According to IPCC’s mid-
range scenario
42
 it will shrink to 30% by 2025 and 22% by 2100. The developing countries must 
therefore be induced to limit also their emissions in the future, if significant global emissions reductions 
shall be achieved. However, the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) and the “Berlin 
Mandate” (from COP-1 in Berlin) state that the developing countries shall not carry any of the cost of 
the measures to combat climate change. (Hagem 1996).  
 
The Kyoto Protocol has not yet been ratified by enough countries to enter into effect. It is expected 
that the developing countries must accept some obligations to get enough industrialised countries 
(especially USA) to ratify the Kyoto Protocol (Barrett 1999 and St.meld. nr. 33). Major developing 
countries like China and India are against this, and they also want to limit the use of the flexible 
mechanisms (Torvanger 1998). The use of the flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol are required 
to be “supplemental” to domestic actions to reduce the levels of greenhouse gases (article 6 of the 
Protocol). Barrett (1998b) find this requirement “a twisted logic”; A restriction on emissions trading will 
harm the environment by elevating between-country differences in marginal abatement costs and 
magnify the leakage problem (Barrett 1998b). What “supplemental” means is however not yet defined. 
The EU supports a quantitative ceiling on the use of flexible mechanisms “to ensure that the majority 
of emissions reductions are met domestically” (Barrett 1998b’s quote of EU parliament resolution from 
September 1998). EU want to limit the use of the flexible mechanisms to force technological progress, 
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 IPCC = UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 1995: The Second Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge University Press. 
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and also to limit “hot air trading” with Russia/Eastern Europe (Torvanger 1998). “Hot air” is the popular 
term for the part of these countries’ emissions quota which are above their business-as-usual 
prognosis, and hence probably can be traded without being met by additional domestic measures. 
Emission levels below the quotas set in the Kyoto Protocol will however be allowed transferred to the 
next commitment period, meaning that hot air is a choice of trade now or “free credit” later. (Holtsmark 
and Hagem 1998). Barrett (1998b) thinks that if the “hot air” provision had not been created for the 
Economies in Transition, it is likely that the other Annex I countries would have insisted on smaller 
reductions in their emission levels, due to higher implementation cost. 
 
Some developing countries see a potential benefit in selling emission quotas and in getting access to 
new technology through JI-projects. Then they need a baseline emissions target. As long as they don’t 
have obligations under the Kyoto Protocol, one alternative is to take on voluntary commitments. 
Argentina and Kazakhstan have announced that they will take on voluntary commitments for the first 
target period (2008-2012) (Torvanger 1998). When Annex I countries impose measures to reduce 
their emissions of greenhouse gases, comparative advantage in such industries shift towards the non-
Annex I countries. The reduced demand for fossil fuels in Annex I countries will also make the world 
price lower, which additionally stimulates the greenhouse gas intensive industries in the developing 
countries (Barrett 1998b). In addition to leakages, this could even lead to “pollution havens” (French 
1993, Hagem 1996). It is important to set emission limits for the developing countries to avoid these 
effects. 
 
The emission limits in the Kyoto Protocol are for the period 2008-2012. How future limits will be is not 
yet decided. As many of the possible investments to reduce emission levels for the current 
commitment period can have very long lifetimes, investors’ beliefs about future emission limits matters 
a lot (Barrett 1998b); If they expect low limits, long-term carbon-saving investments are more attractive 
than if the opposite is expected. However, even if banking of excess emission reductions this 
commitment period are allowed by the Kyoto Protocol, states will probably be reluctant to overshoot 
their targets (Barrett 1998b); Once the investments leading to overshooting of the targets were done, 
the cost is sunk, and the country’s bargaining position about next periods’ targets will be weakened. 
 
For the overall level of abatement prescribed by the Kyoto Protocol to be achieved cost-effectively 
abatement must be undertaken in the non-Annex I countries. This can potentially be achieved by the 
Clean Development Mechanism, but only under the most favourable of assumptions. It seems more 
likely that emission caps will have to be negotiated for the developing countries. This does not imply 
that they need to pay for this abatement themselves (Barrett 1998b). Also Chander et al. (1999) and 
Helms (1999) heavily stress the need to include all countries when combating global warming. The 
reason for broadening participation is not so much to redistribute costs, as to lower the total bill 
(Barrett 1998b). 
 
Efficiency and the Kyoto Protocol 
66 
It is perhaps unrealistic to get emission caps for the developing countries within this commitment 
period. For the next commitment period it is important that the emissions reduction target involves 
reductions in the non-Annex I countries. It will reduce the problems with the flexible mechanisms of the 
Kyoto Protocol. These problems are particularly big when countries without targets are involved. For 
this commitment period it is important that the rules for the use of the Kyoto mechanisms reduce the 
problems due to asymmetric information and sovereignty of states as much as possible.  
 
It is clear that the Kyoto mechanisms have a potential to lower the costs of measures to combat 
climate change by equalising marginal costs across countries. Major obstacles to achieve this cost-
saving potential are, apart from the parties to a contract being under different jurisdictions: 
 
Emissions trading Joint implementation / CDM 
 Market power 
 Transaction costs 
 Asymmetric information opening up for 
hidden action 
 Limited participation in trading 
 “Hot air”-trading 
 Transactions costs  
 Asymmetric information opening up for 
adverse selection and hidden action 
 “Paper trades” due to no emission-level 
baselines for developing countries 
 Limited participation 
 Leakages 
Table 3 – Obstacles to realise the cost-reducing potential of the Kyoto mechanisms 
For many JI-projects in developing countries, I expect that the host must receive (most of) the transfer 
before project-measures are performed, due to the host’s lack of financial resources. Threatening to 
withhold the transfer if the JI-project fails will then not be a possible way for the investor to force 
compliance. In the next chapter I develop a model that includes this assumption. Further it is assumed 
that a string of very similar JI-projects are possible between one single host and one investor. This 
should cut the transaction costs of each single project considerably. The third major assumption is that 
hidden action by the host is possible; She has private information and there can be other sources to 
project failure. 
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In the 3 previous chapters I have looked into existing literature concerning three main themes. The 
first was what natural incentives that exist for countries to engage in international environmental co-
operation, and the second how such co-operation can be improved/supported. The third theme was 
mechanisms to facilitate efficient implementation of countries’ obligations under an IEA, with emphasis 
on the flexible mechanisms in the Kyoto Protocol. International emissions trading and Joint 
implementation can potentially lower the overall cost of combating global warming, but there are 
several obstacles in the way.  
 
In this chapter I develop two models of possible joint implementation relationship between a host and 
an investor, that I think will be appropriate for some cases. It has the following starting points: 
 High transaction costs will be an obstacle to JI-projects. Investors will try to reduce these. One 
possible method is to concentrate on few potential hosts, get much knowledge and competence in 
dealing with these, and performs several JI-projects with each of them. My model is therefore of a 
Repeated International Contracts under Asymmetric Information and Uncertainty 
68 
repeated relationship between a host and an investor. The JI-projects in each period are assumed 
identical for simplicity, but that assumption may also fit some cases fairly good. As an example, 
Russia today rely on inefficient coal or diesel/oil power plants for electricity supply in many areas. 
Most of these plants are probably quite similar, and it might be possible to get a contract with the 
national authority responsible for (most of) them. 
 The projects with the lowest marginal cost of reducing climate gases will be in developing 
countries and the “Economies in transition” (former Soviet Union/Eastern Europe). These regions 
are in general politically and economically unstable, and with much corruption and crime. I believe 
(like Holtsmark and Hagem (1998) does for IET-contracts) that this increases the potential for 
cheating by the project host. My model therefore includes private information on the part of the 
host, as well as other possible sources of project failure, opening up for hidden action by the host. 
In “the model with control possibilities” I assume that the host can reduce the chances of project 
failure due to uncertain external sources, but at a cost. 
 JI-project hosts in developing country likely face severe financial constraints. They may therefore 
need the transfer from the investor to be able to perform the JI-project. My model assumes that 
the host receives the transfer at the start of a JI-project. While this makes the host able to perform 
the project, it takes away the single most powerful measure the investor has to ensure compliance 
with the agreed contract: Withholding the transfer in case of breaching. In my model this leaves 
the investor with only one tool to influence the host’s compliance: The threat of not offering new JI-
projects in the future. 
 
Formally, the models are of infinitely repeated principal-agent relationships. The principal and the 
agent can be countries, industry-sectors, firms or others. My starting point is to investigate JI-
contracts, but other interpretations are possible. IET is another, particularly when the traders delegate 
quotas down. Another example  might be where the agent is a national park administration, and the 
principal wants changed management of the area or of certain animal species in the area. The basic 
point is that the principal can not directly affect the situation in the agent country, but the agent can. 
What the principal wants I denote as a change in the state of a natural resource in the agent country. 
For this to happen a change in the agent’s behaviour is required. Changing the behaviour has a cost 
for the agent. If the agent does not change behaviour, the principal observes what she considers as 
misuse (project failure). The principal may offer a one-period contract, involving that the agent 
changes her behaviour in the period, and the principal will compensate by making some sort of 
transfer to the agent
43
. If the agent accepts, she receives the transfer from the principal at the start of 
the agreement-period. The transfer may be viewed necessary for the agent to be able to change her 
behaviour. 
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 The transfer in a JI-contract may in principle be of any form, including technology transfer, grants, debt 
reductions, or giving the agent the status of most-favoured trading partner. 
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The principal can not directly observe whether the agent does change her behaviour, but only the 
state of the resource. There is hence asymmetric information. In addition to, and independent of the 
agent’s behaviour, something or someone else may also influence the state of the resource which the 
principal is interested in. This is modelled as a certain probability of misuse, regardless of the agent’s 
actions. Uncertainty is hence present. At the end of one period the principal will decide whether the 
agent shall be offered a new contract for the coming period. Due to the information asymmetry the 
agent may be tempted to cheat, stating willingness to change behaviour, but not actually altering it. 
The possible payoffs from one period to another are assumed constant, and the transfer to the agent 
is made at the beginning of a contract period. The principal can therefore only try to give the agent the 
right incentives through the choice of how often a contract is offered. 
 
The strategies the actors employ are assumed to be Markov strategies. A Markov strategy is a history-
dependent strategy. Behind the use of Markov strategies lies the assumption that the most recent 
action will have the greatest impact on current action (see Maskin and Tirole 1988
44
). The state of the 
economic system is summarised in a state-variable, and the current state is assumed only dependent 
on what happened in the last period. Hence it is made explicitly state-dependent. The models are 
based on Clark (1992), and his model of the relationship between banks and sovereign borrowers in 
the international credit market. The basic model here is an application of his model to a new issue, 
while the model with control possibilities is an extension of his model. 
 
In addition to the basic model described above, a version is included in which the agent can influence 
the frequency or probability with which other elements influence the state of the natural resource. In 
many real situations the possibility of exerting control is indeed present. Efficiency and the cost of 
control may vary a lot though. How the use, cost and efficiency of such measures influence the 
agent’s behaviour towards the principal in our setting is interesting. This is investigated in the “model 
with control possibilities”. 
 
Several states may be identified in the models. The expected payoff in each state does not change 
through time, no learning takes place, and none of the players builds a reputation. There is hence no 
structural or informational dynamics. The state of the system in the next period will only depend on the 
current state and the current actions (given by the strategies’ state-dependence). Due to this, and the 
element of uncertainty introduced earlier
45
, the game can be described as an infinitely repeated 
stochastic game constrained to follow a first-order Markov process (Clark 1992). We assume that both 
players are rational, and that they seek to maximise the present value of their expected payoffs. 
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 Maskin and Tirole 1988: “A theory of dynamic oligopoly I: Overview and quantity competition with large fixed 
costs”, Econometrica, 56, 549-569, quoted in Clark 1992. 
 45
 The probability for other elements in the agent country to cause misuse of the natural resource must be 
different from 0 and 1 for uncertainty to be present, and the problem to be interesting. 
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I give comments on “internal” aspects of the models within each section dealing with that model 
(section 5.2 for the basic model and section 5.3 for the model with control possibilities). In section 5.4 I 
discuss how the models can be relevant for the implementation of the flexible mechanisms in the 
Kyoto Protocol. I sum up the chapter in section 5.5. 
5.1.1 Definition of strategies 
Let p represent the probability that the principal offers the agent a contract, and let i denote the 
possible states of the system. A Markov strategy for the principal is a state dependent rule pi∈[0,1] 
which selects a probability for offering a contract to the agent for each of the states. A Markov strategy 
for the agent is likewise a state dependent probability of acting in accordance with the principal’s 
wishes; ai∈[0,1].  
5.1.2 Definition of an equilibrium 
A stationary equilibrium consists of a set of strategies for each state (ai, pi), such that pi maximises the 
principal’s discounted expected payoff, given ai and the current state, while ai maximises the agent’s 
discounted expected payoff, given pi and the current state. 
 
If both players do the best they can, given optimal actions of the other player, we have a Nash-
equilibrium. Neither player needs to know what the other person will do, but they will have a subjective 
expectation of it. In a Nash equilibrium the beliefs are correct, and each player employs a strategy 
(pure or mixed) to maximise expected payoff. 
5.2 Basic model 
 
5.2.1 The game 
The game is between two players, the principal (P) and the agent (A). The players are assumed to be 
risk-neutral
46
, and the economic environment is taken to be stable. The principal wants the agent to 
change her behaviour, and may to this purpose offer a one-period contract to her. If the agent 
promises to change her behaviour in the period, the principal will compensate her through some sort 
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 Risk-neutrality implies that the actors maximise expected payoff. Risk-sharing will hence not be a feature of the 
equilibrium. 
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of transfer. The agent will always accept the contract and immediately receives the transfer. The agent 
then decides whether or not to change her behaviour in that period. In either case other elements in 
the agent country, beyond the control of the agent, will (in the principal’s view) cause misuse of the 
resource with a probability γ∈[0,1]. This probability is common knowledge to both the agent and the 
principal. The principal can not observe actions in the agent country, but only whether misuse of the 
resource has taken place. The agent makes her decision to break or keep the contract before any 
misuse have had a chance to occur. If the agent does not change her behaviour, the principal will find 
the resource misused, regardless of other factors. When the period is over, the principal again 
considers whether to offer the agent a one-period contract, and the game is repeated.  
 
The principal’s benefit from proper use of the resource outweighs the costs associated with the 
transfer decided in the contract. The benefit of the transfer is larger for the agent than the costs of 
changing behaviour. There is an incentive for the agent not to change behaviour and hence increase 
the one-period net benefit. As elements in the agent country will cause misuse of the resource in some 
periods anyway (assuming the probability is larger than zero), the agent can blame misuse upon them. 
How often the agent chooses not to keep her part of a contract will clearly depend upon the frequency 
by which the other elements cause misuse of the resource. 
5.2.1.1 States and Strategies 
All relevant information concerning the past history of the system is summed up in the state variables. 
There are three different states here: 
State 1)  Contract was offered, and the environmental resource was not misused (according to 
the principal’s definition of misuse). 
State 2)  Contract was offered, but the agent did not change behaviour, or alternatively the 




State 3) No contract was offered. The agent will not change behaviour as it would mean an 
economic loss to her. 
5.2.1.2 Expected payoffs 
The one-period payoff in state (3) is taken to be a reference value of zero for both players. The 
expressions are written in such a manner that all variables have a positive value. The amount of 
misuse of the environmental resource is ignored. Hence costs or benefits are fixed sizes. The 
assumptions we have made so far lead to the following expression for the present discounted value of 
the expected payoffs in each state for the principal (denoted Gi): 
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 The principal cannot distinguish the two alternative situations described, and hence they can neither constitute 
separate states. 
Repeated International Contracts under Asymmetric Information and Uncertainty 
72 
[ ] [ ]{ }2i21ii3ii GF)a1()GF()GFB)(1(apG)p1(G δδγδγδ +−−++−++−−+−=  
Equation 21 
where i=1,2,3. 
As this state-dependent expected payoff for the principal is independent of which period it concerns 
there is no need to pay attention to period number or time in any other notation. 
 
δ is the principal's discount factor (δ∈〈0,1〉).  
γ is the probability that someone in the agent country will cause misuse of the resource independent of 
the agent’s behaviour (γ∈〈0,1〉). 
B is the benefit to the principal if the resource is not misused. 
F is the principal’s cost of making a transfer to the agent.  
It is assumed that (B-F)>0. 
 
δG3 is the principal's expected discounted payoff (the continuation payoff) from not offering a contract, 
while the term in braces in Equation 21 is the expected discounted payoff from offering a trade 
contract. The relative magnitudes of these two terms determine the principal's policy regarding offering 
contracts to the agent. The two terms themselves are also affected by the principal's policy since they 




The present value of the expected payoff for the agent is given by 
[ ] [ ]{ }2i21ii3ii HT)a1()HLT()HLT)(1(apH)p1(H µµγµγµ +−++−++−−+−=  
Equation 22 
where µ is the agent's discount factor (µ∈〈0,1〉); 
T is the benefit to the agent of receiving the transfer from the principal
48
; 
L is the cost (Loss) to the agent of changing behaviour; 
It is assumed that (T-L)>0. 
 
The relative magnitudes of the two terms in square brackets in Equation 22 determine the agent's 
strategy as to whether use the environmental resource in the usual manner or not. 
 
A representative round in the game can also be described in a game tree. In the figure below the 
players’ expected payoffs are in parentheses (P, A). 
                                                    
48
 The principal’s cost of making the transfer is F. If the transfer is a lump sum, and there are no transaction costs, 
F and T are equal. If the transfer comes in another form, they could well be different. 
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Agreement offered by the principal?
(-F+δG2, T+µH2)
Others in the agent country cause
misuse of the resource?
1-γ γ
(B-F+δG1, T-L+µH1) (-F+δG2, T-L+µH2)
 
Figure 3 - Game tree excerpt for the basic model, with continuation payoffs (P, A). 
5.2.2 Solution to the game 
For the game to potentially have an equilibrium other than “no contract”, it must have a probability for 
continuing larger than zero in each period. This is easily verified by backwards unravelling. Here we 
have assumed infinite repetition. There are two possible Markov Perfect Equilibria for this model; One 
in pure strategies where there is no contract, and one in mixed strategies with contracts at least in 
some periods. The proof of the solution is left to the appendix, section 7.1.1. 
5.2.2.1 Equilibrium (1): 























the strategy of the agent will satisfy 








The strategy of the principal will satisfy 
[ ] 0)p1(LLT)1(pT)1(p 321 =+−−−−− µγµγµ  
Equation 27 
5.2.2.2 Equilibrium (2): 
If any of the conditions (a-c) in Equilibrium (1) are not fulfilled,  
pi=0 and ai=0 for ∀i. 
5.2.3 Comments to the basic model 
The game-theoretic model presented here can give two possible types of equilibria. In Equilibrium (2) 
the principal offers no contract, and the agent will not change behaviour. Equilibrium (1) depicts the 
type of equilibria where a contract may be offered at least in some periods, and the use of the 
resource may be compatible with the principal's wishes at least in some periods.  
 
Notice that Equilibrium (1) permits multiple equilibria, since many combinations of values of p1, p2 and 
p3 can satisfy Equilibrium (1)'s requirements. With this type of equilibrium there may be several 
periods in which contracts are offered, and several periods with no contract offered, all within the 
same equilibrium. The sequence of periods with and without contracts is determined endogenously in 
the model, based on the players’ strategy decisions. 
5.2.3.1 Comments to the conditions of Equilibrium (1) 
Equilibrium (1) only exists if the three conditions (a-c) are fulfilled.  
 
Condition (a) states that the principal's expected one-period payoff when the agent changes behaviour 
to accord with the principal's wishes must be non-negative. If it is less than zero, for example due to 
others in the agent country causing misusing of the resource too frequently, the principal will not offer 
a contract to the agent.  
 
Condition (b) states that the transfer the agent receives in a period with a contract must be larger than 
the cost of keeping the contract, given that no-one else has misused the resource. If the condition is 
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not fulfilled, the agent will have a negative expected payoff, even when the principal uses the strategy 
where she is most willing to excuse possible misuse by the agent.  
Also, γ has to be low enough for the principal to know that the agent will not always cheat. The 
possibility of cheating increases as γ increases, and when γ is too large the principal is not willing to 
offer a contract as it knows that the temptation to cheat becomes too big. 
 
Condition (c) states that the agent must have sufficient regard for the future. If future income is valued 
less by the agent than indicated by (c), her expected payoff will be negative even with the highest 
frequency of offered contracts fulfilling Equilibrium (1). The higher the loss of not using the resource, 
the higher the probability of other groups misusing the resource, or the lower the benefit from the 
transfer is for the agent, ceteris paribus, the higher it must value future gains for Equilibrium (1) to 
exist. 
 
The principal has an expected payoff of zero in all states in Equilibrium (1). This is the reason why the 
conditions and equilibria are independent of the principal’s discount rate (δ). 
5.2.3.2 Comments on the agent’s strategy in Equilibrium (1) 
Let us now turn to the implications of the agent’s strategy in Equilibrium (1). The agent’s strategy is 





=  ∀i 
It is the same in all states, as the agent in all states faces the same horizon of possibilities, given that 
a contract has been offered. If no contract is offered, the agent will use the resource in the traditional 
manner, and ai=0 ∀i. Equation 26 is hence the strategy conditioned upon a contract. 
 
The costlier it is for the principal to make the transfer to the agent, or the less the principal values the 
environmental resource, the more often must the agent keep her part of the contract. The more likely 
the other groups in the agent country are to exploit the environmental resource, the more often must 
the agent keep the contract. This behaviour by the agent is necessary for the principal’s benefit to be 
non-negative when playing the strategy where contracts are offered. 
 
In the periods when the principal does not offer a contract, the agent will always misuse the resource. 
The total probability of misuse is reduced in the periods when contracts are offered. It is given by 





We see that the total probability of misuse is independent of the probability of misuse by elements in 
the agent country other than the agent. One would perhaps expect the opposite, since the principal 
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also knows the value of γ. The principal can however not observe the frequency of misuse from single-
period data, and in the model all periods are assumed identical.  
 
The reduction in the total probability of misuse is F/B compared to the situation without contracts. The 
reduction is hence increasing in F and falling in B. F is the cost the principal has in making the transfer 
to the agent, while B is the principal’s benefit of a properly managed resource.  
  
The agent balances her misuse of the resource so that the principal’s expected payoff is zero, even 
though the misuse of the resource is reduced when contracts are offered.  
5.2.3.3 Comment on the principal’s strategy in Equilibrium (1) 
Many sets of {p1, p2, p3} may satisfy the requirements of Equilibrium (1) / Equation 27. It is not possible 
to say what set the principal will choose, as the principal has an expected payoff of zero for all sets of 
pi’s satisfying Equation 27. 
 
The demands the principal’s strategy must meet in Equilibrium (1) are not very easy to interpret.  






















































































When these partial derivatives are investigated, bearing in mind that all pi’s are probabilities, and 
remembering Equation 27, we find that: 
 
The minimum value for p1 is 
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with p2=p3=0.  
This expression has a value ]1,0〈∈ , and hence p1 is larger than p2 and p3 in this case. We would 
expect p1 to be larger than p2 for all combinations of pi’s satisfying Equilibrium (1). The principal should 
reward the agent higher when she has managed to get state 1 than when she has ended up in state 2.  
 
Should the principal reward the agent higher if state 1 occurred the last period, than if there was no 
contract (state 3)? If there was no contract the last period, perhaps there has never been any 
contracts? I expect the principal’s strategy to be such that it is not optimal for the agent to break a 
contract in one period, thinking she with a high probability will get a new contract in the period 
following the exclusion period. In the appendix, section 7.1.2, I have shown that p1 always is larger 
than p2 in Equilibrium (1) of the basic model, but not necessarily larger than p3. 
 

























































The maximum value for p3∈〈0,1〉, depending on the relative sizes of µ, γ, T and L. 
 




















and p3∈[0,1〉. With p2=0 the agent will never be offered a new contract in the period following possible 
misuse by the agent. 
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 The lower limit of p2 occurs together with the higher limit of p3, and vice versa. 
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This value occurs when p1=1 and p3=0.  
5.2.3.4 The most forgiving strategy of the principal 
The strategy with the maximum value for p2 can be viewed as the “most forgiving strategy of the 
principal”. In this strategy the principal is most willing to offer the agent a new contract even though the 
agent may have broken the contract in the last period. Since (b) and (c) are valid, p2∈[0,1〉 in the 





















Note that a value of zero for p3 means a permanent breakdown occurs if a contract is not offered in 
any period. There is a clear trade-off in this strategy. The agent is not very likely to be denied a new 
contract due to other groups causing misuse, but if the principal does not renew a contract after 
possible misuse by the agent, the agent will never be offered a contract again. p3=0 may also imply a 
start-up problem. 
 
It is difficult to say how the value of T, L, µ, and γ affect the principal’s strategy generally in equilibrium 
(1). 
 
It is however possible to say something about how the most forgiving strategy depends on these 
parameters. 
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This means that in the most forgiving strategy, the higher the agent values the future (higher µ), the 
higher will p2* be. The higher the agent values the future the more important it becomes for her to 
avoid state 3. Ending up in state 3 means that the agent will never again be offered a contract, with a 
loss of a valuable future. The principal can hence be fairly sure that the agent will not renege on a 
contract, and sets p2* high in response. 
 
The higher the agent values the transfer from the principal (higher T), the higher will the principal set 
p2*. When T is large, getting a contract has a high value for the agent, and the principal can be fairly 
sure that any misuse in state 2 is not due to the agent. Hence the principal can set p2* high, and will 
relatively often renew contracts even though misuse occurred in the last period. 
 
The more the agent is forsaking by not using the natural resource in the traditional manner (higher L), 
the lower will the principal set p2*. With higher cost of keeping the contract, the lower incentive the 
agent has to honour the contract, and the more likely is it that any misuse is due to the agent. The 
principal hence sets p2* low. 
 
The lower the probability for misuse by the other groups in the agent country (γ) is, the more often will 
the principal offer a new contract in periods following possible misuse by the agent. When γ has a low 
value, the principal can be pretty sure that any misuse is due to the agent. When γ is high, it is more 
uncertain for the principal whether the agent or the other groups in the agent country is responsible for 
the misuse. The “quality of information” goes down as γ goes up. The principal responds by setting p2* 
low to try to make the agent stick to the contract. 
 
Hence, when γ is high, p2* is low, and as one can see from Equation 26 ai is high (and vice versa); If 
the probability of misuse by other groups in the agent country is relatively high, the agent will relatively 
often keep the contract, and yet the principal will renew a contract relatively seldom after periods of 
possible misuse. This is opposite the pattern for the other parameters (T, L, µ), where a high ai leads 
to a high p2* (and vice versa). As γ increases the “quality of information”-aspect more than outweighs 
the incentive to encourage the agent to often keep the contract. 
Repeated International Contracts under Asymmetric Information and Uncertainty 
80 
5.3 Model with control-
possibilities 
 
5.3.1 The game 
This game is similar to the one described in the basic model variant, with the addition that the agent 
can influence the probability with which other elements in the country cause misuse of the natural 
resource. For simplicity it is assumed that the control is a discrete “on-off” choice, and further, if it is 
exerted, it is always effective. 
 
Exerting control has a cost, of a fixed size C, for the agent. 
C > 0 
Equation 34 
There are assumed no costs associated with having the possibility of exerting control. Hence, in any 
single period where control is not employed, the net benefit to the agent is determined by T and L 
solely. T is again the benefit to the agent of having the transfer-part of the contract, and L the cost of 
changing behaviour. It is assumed that (T-L-C)>0. 
 
Let ci be the agent’s state-dependent strategy for exerting control on the other groups, defined in an 
analogous manner to ai and pi. ci can be viewed as the relative frequency with which the agent exerts 
control over the other elements in the agent country, reducing their tendency to use the environmental 
resource. ci∈[0,1]. 
 
The probability with which the other elements cause misuse of the resource is taken to be a step-
function dependent of whether control is exerted or not. When control is exerted it is γ
c
, and when 
there is no control it is γ. It is of course assumed that the probability is lower with control than without; 




 and γ are ∈〈0,1〉.  
 
Finally, it is assumed that whether the agent exerts control cannot be observed by the principal. If this 
were not the case, we would effectively have the same situation as in the basic model. 
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5.3.1.1 States and strategies 
Six different combinations of events can be identified in this variant of the model: 
 
Combination 1)  Contract was offered, the agent did not exert any control, and no-one in the agent 
country misused the environmental resource. 
Combination 2)  Contract was offered, the agent did not exert any control, and only other elements 
caused misuse of the environmental resource. 
Combination 3) No contract was offered. The agent misused the environmental resource, and the 
agent did not exert any control. 
Combination 4)  Contract was offered, the agent exerted control, and the natural resource was not 
misused by any group in the country. 
Combination 5)  Contract was offered, the agent exerted control, and only other elements in the 
agent country caused misuse of the environmental resource. 
Combination 6)  Contract was offered, and the environmental resource was misused by the agent. 




As some of these combinations cannot be distinguished by the principal, there are only 3 states in the 
game. The possible states of the system are combinations 1,2 and 3, indicated by i=1,2,3. 
Combination (4) is incorporated into state (1), and combinations (5) and (6) are incorporated into state 
(2). 
5.3.1.2 Expected payoffs 
The instantaneous payoffs in state (3) are again taken to be a reference value of zero for both players. 
The symbols used here have the same meaning as in the previous model variant. The present 









































 Equation 36 
for i=1,2,3. 
 
The present value of the expected payoff for the agent is given by: 
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 When the agent will use the natural resource in the traditional manner, and the principal can not observe the 
level of misuse, there is no point for the agent to inflict the cost of controlling on herself. If the agent’s benefit 
from the use of the resource was dependent on who/how many exploited it in total, we would have a different 
situation. 










































 Equation 37 
for i=1,2,3. 
The possible states and payoffs are further illustrated in the game-tree below. The continuation 
payoffs at the end of each “combination-branch” are in parentheses (P, A). 




Agreement offered by the principal?
The agent uses control?ci1-ci
(-F+δG2, T+µH2)
Others in the agent










Figure 4 – Game tree excerpt with continuation payoffs (P, A). 
5.3.2 Solution to the game 
A stationary equilibrium consists of a set of strategies for each state (ai, ci, pi), such that pi maximises 
the principal’s discounted expected payoff, given ai, ci and the current state, while ai and ci maximises 
the agent’s discounted expected payoff, given pi and the current state. The difference from the basic 
model is that the agent must decide her strategy in two dimensions in each state; Both ai and ci must 
be set. The principal still has only one strategic variable; pi. The exercise to find the equilibria is left to 
the appendix, section 7.1.3. 
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5.3.2.1 Equilibrium (C1): 



































≥   
Equation 41 
 















and the strategy of the principal satisfies 
[ ] 0)p1(LLT)1(p)1(Tp 321 =+−−−−− µγµγµ  
Equation 43 
5.3.2.2 Equilibrium (C2) 










































≥   
Equation 47 
 















and the strategy of the principal satisfies 
[ ] 0)p1)(LC()LC(T)1(p)1(Tp 3c2c1 =++−+−−−− µγµγµ  
Equation 49 
5.3.2.3 Equilibrium (C3): 
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Equation 52 
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Equation 53 
 








=  ∀i 
Equation 54 
and the strategy of the principal satisfies 
[ ] 0)p1)(LC()LC(T)1(p)1(Tp 3c2c1 =++−+−−−− µγµγµ  
Equation 55 
5.3.2.4 Equilibrium (C4): 
If the set of conditions in Equilibrium (C1) are not fulfilled, and neither the set of conditions to 
Equilibrium (C2) or (C3), we get Equilibrium (C4): 
pi=0, ci=0 and ai=0 for ∀i. 
5.3.3 Comments to the control model 
The control model presented here can give four different types of equilibria. In Equilibrium (C4) the 
principal does not offer contracts to the agent, and the agent does not change behaviour. In the other 
equilibria contracts may be offered at least in some periods, with the agent changing behaviour at 
least in some periods. In Equilibrium (C1) the agent never exerts control, while in Equilibrium (C2) the 
agent always employs control if the principal has offered a contract. In Equilibrium (C3) the agent has 
a mixed strategy in ai and ci simultaneously. Just like in the basic model the strategy ai in equilibrium 
(C1), (C2) and (C3) is contingent upon a contract being offered in that particular period. For each 
period where no contract is offered the agent will use the resource in the traditional manner (ai=0), 
regardless of which equilibrium the game is in. 
 
Conditions (b) and (f) both state that the expected one-period payoff to the principal, when the agent 
holds the contract, must be non-negative
51
. If γ is too large for condition (b) to be fulfilled, but condition 
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 There is no need to comment separately on conditions (j-l) of Equilibrium (C3) as they are equivalent to the 
ones of Equilibrium (C1) and (C2). 
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(f) is valid, using control is necessary (but not sufficient) to get an equilibrium with contracts offered in 
some periods. If condition (f) is not valid, neither can (b) be, and we will have Equilibrium (C4). 
 
Conditions (c) and (g) state that the transfer the agent receives in a period with a contract must be 
larger than the cost of keeping the contract, given that no-one else has misused the resource. If the 
conditions are not fulfilled the agent will have a negative expected payoff, even when the principal 
uses the strategy where she is most willing to excuse possible misuse by the agent. 
 
Conditions (d) and (h) say that the agent must have sufficient regard for the future, to value future 
contracts higher than the benefits given up in this period. In Equilibrium (C2) also the cost of exerting 
control must be accounted for.  
5.3.3.1 The agent’s strategy  
The rationale for the agent to employ control (under certain conditions) is clear. If they lower the 
frequency with which the other groups use the resource, they can themselves utilise the resource 
more often without reducing the chances of being offered contracts in the future. Remember that the 
principal can not observe who is responsible for misuse. Hence the agent can increase her own 
benefit compared to the situation without control possibilities.  
 
It is possible that the set of conditions of Equilibrium (C1) are not fulfilled, but that the conditions of 
Equilibrium (C2) are. In that case, the possibility that the agent can exert control makes contracts 
possible. The control option can thus make the difference, between status quo with continued misuse, 
or contracts in some periods giving reduced misuse. If exerting control makes contracts possible there 
is an obvious (but not here determinable) gain to the agent. 
 
Equilibrium (C1) is basically equivalent to Equilibrium (1) of the basic model. The agent does not 
employ control as the cost of controlling is larger than the expected benefits that can be taken out. If 
the agent had used control, the relative reduction in the other groups’ propensity to exploit the natural 









The agent herself could have taken out the one-period benefit (L) from breaking the contract this more 
often by playing the optimal strategy in ai. In Equilibrium (C1) this expected increased one-period 
benefit from controlling is less than the cost of the control. 
 
In Equilibrium (C2) control is employed, due to condition (e) being fulfilled. The control cost is now 
lower than the expected increase in the one-period benefit from being able to cheat more often in 
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equilibrium. The other conditions and the strategies in this equilibrium are similar to the ones of 
Equilibrium (C1), with L being replaced by (L+C), and γ
c
 replacing γ. 
 





paribus). As multiple equilibria are possible for the principal the total gain to the agent is indeterminate. 
 
In Equilibrium (C3) the agent is indifferent between exerting control or not, due to condition (j) being 
valid. In this equilibrium the conditions concerning the agent’s discount-factor and the probability with 
which other groups in the agent country misuse the resource from both Equilibrium (C1) and (C2), 
must be valid. 
 
The total probability for misuse, in the periods when a contract is offered and the agent does not have 
the option of exerting control, is in Equation 28 shown to be 1-F/B. The equivalent probability is exactly 
the same in Equilibrium (C2). The lower probability of misuse by the other groups in the agent country 
due to the controlling activities, is equalled by increased misuse by the agent.  
5.3.3.2 The principal’s strategy, including the most forgiving 
strategy  
The principal’s strategy in the equilibria with mixed strategies (C1, C2 and C3) have the same 
relationship between the pi’s and the different parameters as the basic model (with (C+L) replacing L 
and γ
c
 replacing γ for Equilibrium (C2)). Interpretations are equally difficult. 
 
In section 5.2.3.4 I defined the most forgiving strategy of the principal as the strategy where the 
principal is most willing to offer the agent a new contract even though the agent may have broken the 
contract in the last period. 
 














































Equilibrium (C1) and (C2) are mutually excluding, due to the nature of conditions (a) and (e). When 
one set of conditions is valid, and not the other, this can be because all the variables have different 
values. To try to compare the most forgiving strategy in the two equilibria I will assume that all 
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parameters except the control cost C are fixed. T, L and µ hence have the same value in both 
equilibria, but γ > γ
c
 of course. 
 
Assume that C is very small, and that the conditions of Equilibrium (C2) are valid. As C increases one 
eventually comes to a point where condition (e) (Equation 44) of Equilibrium (C2) is no longer valid, 
but instead condition (i) (Equation 50) of Equilibrium (C3), and then condition (a) (Equation 38) of 
Equilibrium (C1). 
 














γµ   (<0). 
Equation 58 
p2* in Equilibrium (C2) is monotonically decreasing in control cost C. We want to find out what value 
p2* approaches as the control cost approaches the value where condition (a) becomes valid (and the 





















This is the value of p2* in Equilibrium (C1). It is independent of C. 
 
When C is very low, the principal is relatively likely to renew a contract after a period of possible 
misuse by the agent. As C increases the principal gets less likely to renew a contract following 
possible misuse by the agent. When C is so large that the players switch from Equilibrium (C2) to 
(C1), the value of p2* from Equilibrium (C2) has got so low that it is equal to the p2*-value of 
Equilibrium (C1). Graphically it can be illustrated like below. 
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 Most forgiving strategy’s p2-value
Cost of control
 
Figure 5 – The most forgiving strategy’s dependence on the agent’s control costs 
If the cost of controlling is low, it probably pays for the agent to exert control. However, it only makes 
sense for the agent to exert control if she will not misuse the resource. When C is low, it is more likely 
that misuse is due to other elements in the agent country, than the agent herself, than when C is high. 
The principal responds to this fact by setting p2* as in Figure 5. In Equilibrium (C1) the agent will not 
exert control anyway, and p2* is then independent of the value of C. 
5.4 The models and the Kyoto 
mechanisms 
Here I have presented models of repeated principal-agent relationships with uncertainty and private 
information on the agent’s part. Joint implementation contracts can have a similar setting. A host may 
have private information on:  
 whether the investment actually is made, or if it is carried out in the manner agreed; 
 whether she is performing the right actions after the investment is made (it might be costly to 
operate new equipment or in accordance with emissions-reducing routines); 
 whether the investment is countered elsewhere (perhaps due to the money from the JI-project the 
host liberates funding for expansion elsewhere, leading to more emissions, or a tree-planting 
project is countered with agricultural conversion of forests elsewhere in the country). 
 
There may be many uncertain elements related to JI-projects that the host could utilise when hiding 
own breaching of a contract, for example: 
 there may be uncertainties with the estimated cost of a project, leading to the final investment 
being less in terms of actions or equipment, but unchanged in terms of cost; 
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 uncertainties with monitoring of effects; 
 carbon sink enhancement projects may have their emissions reducing effects altered by 
others/nature; 
 whether under-contractors  cheat. 
 
I also expect that JI project-investors will try to have several projects with the same host, as this 
reduces the average transaction costs for the projects. I have assumed identical projects in each 
period. Although this is a simplifying assumption, it could be possible with  several similar JI-projects 
following each other (e.g. upgrading of a number of similar fossil fuel power plants, all belonging to the 
same JI project-host). 
 
Joint implementation relationships fits well with principal-agent relationship of the economics literature. 
In my models the principal’s tool for affecting the agent’s actions is the frequency with which she offer 
the agent contracts in future periods. If a contract is offered the agent always accepts, receives a 
transfer, and then decides whether to act in accordance with the principal’s wish this period, or to 
cheat. If the agent cheats, the principal will not get a benefit from the contract. Independent of the 
agent’s actions a stochastic element can make it seem as if the agent has not kept the contract/give 
the principal no benefit from the contract. Both agent and principal know about this stochastic element. 
In the second variant of the model the agent can influence the probability with which the stochastic 
element causes what the principal observes as misuse. The principal can not observe the actions of 
the agent nor the stochastic element. 
 
I will comment on the different equilibria, conditions and strategies of the models in relation to JI-
contracts, starting with the basic model. There are two types of equilibria in the basic model. One is in 
pure strategies, and contracts are never offered. The other type of equilibrium is in mixed strategies, 
and contracts may be offered some periods. Multiple equilibria exist within this latter type of 
equilibrium. A sequence of periods with and without contracts is possible in the latter type, and the 
sequence is decided endogenously in the model. The agent (host in a JI project) will use her private 
information to increase own payoff in the periods when contracts are offered (and hence overall), while 
the principal’s payoff is constant. 
 
The conditions necessary to have contracts possible at least in some periods will now be discussed in 
relation to JI-contracts (See Equilibrium (1) of the basic model).  
 
The investor’s expected benefit from offering a one-period contract, given that the host sticks to the 
contract must be non-negative. The investor’s gain of having the investment performed successfully 
must be larger than the cost of the necessary transfer to make the agent perform the investment, by a 
factor depending on the probability with which the stochastic element causes misuse of the resource. 
With increasing probability, the difference between these two must also increase, for the equilibrium to 
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be possible. If the probability is too high in comparison to the difference between the investor’s gain 
and cost the potential host will not be offered a contract. 
 
Also the potential host’s expected one-period compensation must be large enough, compared to the 
cost of making the investment and the probability of the stochastic element eliminating the investor’s 
gain of the investment. The probability must also be so low that the investor knows the host will not 
always cheat. As the probability of other elements causing misuse goes up, the host’s chances of 
cheating goes up, since it becomes easier to “hide” behind the effect of the stochastic element. 
Remember that the investor also knows about the stochastic element. 
 
The third condition states that the host must have sufficient regard for the future to value the gains of 
future contracts more than this period’s benefit of breaching the contract. 
 
The host’s strategy in Equilibrium (1) is such that the higher the cost is for the investor, or the less the 
investor values the effect of a successful investment, the more often must the host keep the contract 
to stay in the equilibrium. Also, the higher the stochastic element’s probability of destroying the 
investor’s benefit from the investment is, the more often must the host stick to the contract. 
 
Assume we have a JI-project planting trees as a carbon sink enhancement, and the stochastic 
element is the probability of forest-fires and farmers illegally burning forests for agricultural conversion. 
The higher this (sum) probability is, the more often must the project host plant trees to stay within the 
equilibrium and be eligible for valuable contracts in future periods. If the probability is too high there 
will be no projects offered. If the host values the future too little compared to the one-period gains, 
there will be no contracts. 
 
The investor’s strategy in Equilibrium (1) is not very easy to interpret.  
 
The harshest or least forgiving strategy is to offer a new JI-contract only after an investment has been 
successful, and then with a frequency equal to or less than 1. If the investor in a period gets no benefit 
from making the transfer, either due to the agent’s actions or the stochastic element, the investor will 
not offer a new contract, and following a period without a contract the investor never offers a contract. 
In practice this means the relationship is ended.  
 
In the strategy where the investor is most forgiving – i.e. most willing too accept that the cause of 
misuse might be the stochastic element and hence offer a new contract – the investor always renews 
a contract that has given a benefit to her. The investor will renew a seemingly broken contract most 
often, but will never offer a contract if there were no contract last period. In this strategy there is a 
clear trade off for the host, between getting a new contract after periods of possible breach and getting 
a permanent breakdown of the JI-relationship. 
 
Repeated International Contracts under Asymmetric Information and Uncertainty 
92 
The investor’s strategy in Equilibrium (1) may also be such that contracts are offered with a positive 
probability if there was a contract last period that gave her a benefit or if there was no contract last 
period, but not if a contract last period gave no benefit. 
 
We see that several types of behaviour by the investor can be explained as an equilibrium in this 
model, with several different sequences of contracts offered and not. 
 
The model with control possibilities has 4 possible equilibria. One is that contracts are never offered. 
There are 3 equilibria in mixed strategies. In all these 3 equilibria the host has a mixed strategy on 
cheating/sticking to the contract. The difference is that the host either never employs control, always 
employs control, or has a mixed strategy in control as well. 
 
The conditions that must be fulfilled to get the mixed equilibria are mostly very similar between the 
basic model and the model with control possibilities. The big difference is in the host’s strategy due to 
the ability to exert some control over the stochastic element. This is modelled as a step function, 
lowering the probability of the stochastic element destroying the investor’s benefit from the JI-
investment. Exerting control is assumed to have a fixed cost for the host, while it is costless to have 
the option of exerting control. 
 
In the equilibrium where control is or might be employed, it is possible that the host breaches the 
contract more often. That way she can save the cost of making the investment and get a higher net 
gain. The condition is that the cost of controlling is sufficiently low compared to the extra one-period 
benefit she can take out.  
 
It is possible that exerting control reduces the probability, with which the stochastic element destroys 
the investor’s gains from the investment, enough to facilitate an equilibrium where contracts can be 
offered. The option of control can hence be the difference between JI-contracts in some periods, or 
not at all. 
 
The total probability of misuse is independent of whether the host employs control or not. If the host 
employs control to reduce the stochastic elements’ probability of apparent contract-breach, she 
exactly equals out this reduction with higher frequency of breaching herself. The host uses her private 
information to get a higher net gain, on the expense of the investor. 
 
I will now briefly argue that my models might also be able to say something about international 
emissions trading under the Kyoto Protocol. This will depend on the rules for the IET. It is possible that 
two quota holders enter a relationship with the aim of selling/buying a quota for several consecutive 
years. IET-contracts could be for several consecutive periods (for example for several sub-periods 
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within a longer commitment period), according to Hagem (1996)
52
. It is possible that a quota seller will 
not match the sale with emission reducing measures, which means the overall level of greenhouse 
gases will be higher than if IET was not possible (Holtsmark and Hagem 1998). The quota seller might 
hide behind asymmetric information and possible other sources of failure to fulfil the contract, similar to 
what I have described for JI-relationships. If countries trade quotas and the quota/emission reduction 
is delegated down to national industries/actors, I expect the possibilities for cheating to be the highest. 
With more actors the feasibility of control in general goes down. The model with control possibilities 
could describe that situation quite well. If it can be verified that a quota sale has not been matched 
with the contracted abatement efforts or carbon sink enhancement, the seller’s chances of trading 
quotas in the future might be affected, depending on how buyers view the seller’s “guilt” in these 
cases. 
5.5 Summary 
In this chapter I have developed two fairly simple models which describe repeated principal-agent 
relationships. The principal tries to influence the agent’s behaviour affecting a natural resource, in a 
period of time, by offering compensation to the agent. The agent always accepts and immediately 
receives the compensation, but may not always change her behaviour. The principal’s carrot or stick is 
that she may or may not offer a contract in the next period, depending on the observed state of the 
natural resource. Stochastic elements in the agent country may also influence the state of the 
resource so that the principal regards it as misused. The principal can not observe the agent’s actions 
or whether misuse is caused by stochastic elements, but only the state of the resource. 
 
There are two basic types of possible equilibria in the models: 
1. One in which contracts are never offered; 
2. One where contracts are possible at least in some periods. 
 
For a potential agent to be offered contracts certain criteria must be met. The probability of misuse by 
others than the agent must not be too high, and the agent must have sufficient regard for the future, in 
relation to the costs and benefits the agent and principal can have with a contract. Even if the criteria 
are fulfilled, an agent can not expect to be offered contracts in every period, as long as there is a 
positive probability for other elements causing misuse of the resource. After periods without contracts 
the agent may again be offered a contract, depending on the principal’s strategy. The sequence of 
periods with and without contracts is determined endogenously in the model, based on the players’ 
strategy decisions. 
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The models show how different basic variables affect the chances of contracts being struck and the 
players’ strategies in the equilibria.  
 
For the periods when contracts are made it can be noted that (in equilibrium, ceteris paribus): 
 The costlier it is for the principal to make the transfer to the agent, the more often will the agent 
manage the resource according to the principal’s wishes. 
 The higher the principal values that the natural resource be unspoilt, the more often will the agent 
misuse the resource when contracts are made. 
 The higher probability there is for misuse of the resource by others than the agent, the more often 
will the agent keep the contract. 
 
The total probability of misuse is lower in the periods when contracts are made, and the agent has a 
higher payoff, than when contracts are not offered. The agent’s overall expected payoff is higher in the 
equilibria where contracts are possible than when they are not. The expected payoff to the principal is 
however equal in all equilibria. In the equilibria where contracts are possible, the agent sets her 
strategy so that the principal is indifferent between never offering contracts, or offering contracts in 
some specific periods. The agent utilises her private information to increase own benefit at the 
expense of the principal. 
 
In the control model, where the agent can influence the probability with which other elements misuse 
the resource, the total probability of misuse is independent of whether control is exercised or not, as 
long as a contract is offered. This is due to the agent’s strategy, where she breaks the contract more 
often when control is used, to the point where total probability of misuse is unchanged. By cheating 
the agent gets a bigger payoff. The choice of whether to use control or not, depends on the cost of 
control compared to the size of the possible gain the agent can take out due to a reduced probability 
of misuse by others. 
 
The possibility of exerting control can reduce the probability of misuse by other groups below the 
threshold where contracts may be offered by the principal. Hence the option of control can facilitate 
contracts. This is an important conclusion. 
 
Many different strategies by the principal can satisfy the requirements for equilibria with contracts 
possible. It is not possible to say which of the strategies the principal will choose. By the same reason 
it is difficult to make general comments on the principal’s strategy. 
 
I have defined “the principal’s most forgiving strategy” as the strategy where the agent has the largest 
probability of being offered a new contract following a period with possible misuse by her (as observed 
by the principal). The principal will in this strategy always renew a contract if no misuse has occurred. 
However, if there were no contract in the last period, the principal will never offer one either. The trade 
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off in this strategy is that if the agent has a large chance of a new contract after a period of possible 
misuse, she may at some point be forever excluded from future contracts.  
 
In this most forgiving strategy of the principal, the following can be stated about the principal’s 
propensity to renew a contract after a period of possible misuse by the agent (in equilibrium): 
 The higher the agent values the transfer from the principal, the more often will the principal offer a 
new contract; 
 The higher benefit the agent has from using the natural resource in the traditional manner, the less 
often will the principal offer a new contract; 
 The higher regard the agent has for the future, the more often will the principal offer a new 
contract; 
 In the equilibrium where the agent will use control, the principal will renew a possibly broken 
contract more often the cheaper it is for the agent to control. 
 
I think the models may suitably describe and explain some types of joint implementation relationships, 
and maybe also some cases of international emissions trading. Both these mechanisms are allowed 
under the Kyoto Protocol to lower the cost of reducing greenhouse gas levels. High transaction costs 
are mentioned as one of the major obstacles to JI-projects. I have assumed repeated relationships 
between host and investor, as a way to lower these costs. For JI-projects with the host in a developing 
or EIT country, I believe the chances of hidden action-problems to be larger than if the host is in a 
developed country. This will be due to general economic and political instability, including corruption. I 
also expect that many hosts in developing countries need to receive the transfer from the investor at 
the start of the project, in part or in full. The transfer will be necessary to free the host from her 
financial constraints, and make her able to perform the project. All these aspects are included in my 
models. The model with control possibilities describes the situation where a host can influence to what 
extent (probability) other factors make it look as if she has breached the contract. That the transfer is 
made before the project has really started takes away the traditionally most powerful tool for a 
principal to influence an agent’s actions – the possibility of withholding payment in case of breach of 
contract. 
 
With the assumptions above, JI-contracts may be offered to the host at least in some periods, given 
that certain conditions are met. The conditions concerns the relationships between costs and benefits 
for the host and investor and the probability of other elements in the host country causing 
misuse/apparent breach of contract. As the investor’s “carrot” to make the host fulfil the contract is the 
possibility of future contracts, it is required that the host values the future sufficiently. The strategies 
the host and investor employs, in the equilibrium where contracts may be offered, are such that a 
sequence of periods with and without contracts are possible, and determined endogenously in the 
model. The host’s strategy is so that the principal gets no net gain from offering the contracts. If the 
chances of others causing misuse is relatively high the agent relatively often sticks to the contract, and 
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vice versa. The private information the host holds provides her with the opportunity to get a benefit at 
the investor’s expense. 
 
Several different strategies by the investor are possible in the equilibria where contracts may be 
offered. The strategies can range from quite “forgiving ”, where possible contract breach is nearly 
always excused due to the presence of uncertainty, to “harsh” ones, where possible contract breach is 
never excused. In the most forgiving strategy the investor will always offer a new contract if the 
contract was fulfilled, nearly always if there was a breach, but never if there was no contract the last 
period. The high probability of being excused is paired with the low probability of being barred from 
new contracts forever. The trade-off is quite clear. 
 
The harshest strategy of the investor involves that possible contract breach is never honoured with a 
new contract the next period, but also that fulfilling the contract will not guarantee a new contract. The 
chances of being offered a contract after a period without one may however be present. Loosely, it 
might be interpreted as a investor who switches from co-operation with one potential host to another, 
although this is not possible within the framework of the models here.  Switching in reality would mean 
higher transaction costs.  An extension of the model, where switching between hosts are possible and 
transaction costs are included, could be interesting, if possible.  
 
An obvious weakness with the models is that the parameters influencing whether a contract will be 
offered, and also the strategies of the actors, are taken as fixed. In real life they will differ from period 
to period. The changes can be dependent of what actions the players take, but also the opposite is 
likely. It is not likely that all JI-contracts are identical. The agent might also affect the principal’s 
valuation of the environmental resource being managed in a specific manner. Advances in the 
technologies to monitor and control misuse of the resource will most likely increase efficiency and 
reduce the costs of controlling. Further, the principal will in practically all cases be able to observe, at 
least to some extent, the actions of the agent and the other elements in the agent country influencing 
the resource. An extension of the model to account for the things mentioned above, will however make 
the solving of the models very complex, if possible at all.   
 
The models I have developed are rather simple, but they are able to point at conditions that must be 
met to get JI (or IET contracts) in a specific setting, specifically where the agent is in a “Economy in 
transition” or developing country. High transaction costs are seen as a major obstacle to JI-contracts. I 
assume JI-relationships where host and investor perform several similar projects will have relatively 
low transaction costs per projects. Several authors have pointed out the need to include projects in the 
developing and EIT countries to reduce greenhouse-gases, to lower overall cost of combating global 
warming. I believe this poses two specific challenges; JI-hosts will need to receive the transfer from 
the host before the project is performed, and the chances of contract breach by the host will be 
relatively high.  
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My conclusion, based on my models, is that JI-contracts between a host and investor can be possible 
under the assumptions above. The models point at how different factors affect the players’ behaviour 
in such a setting. The models can explain (or describe) different sequences of behaviour by investors 
and hosts of repeated JI and IET contracts, all within one type of equilibrium. Reducing the probability 
of external factors causing project failure can facilitate JI-contracts in some cases. The option of 
control can be the difference between having contracts in some periods, or not at all. A JI project-
investor should try to reduce the level of private information on the host’s part, to avoid own benefit 
being reduced due to contract breach by the host. 
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6. SUMMARY AND 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this thesis I have taken a broad view on international environmental co-operation; What are the 
incentives, obstacles and ways to enhance participation and compliance with international 
environmental agreements. I have also looked at a more specific issue; The implementation of the 
“flexible mechanisms” of the Kyoto Protocol, and particularly joint implementation projects between an 
investor in a developed country and a host in an economy in transition or developing country.   
 
Many IEAs exist today. Dominant features of them are that they have limited participation and they are 
only a step on the way to optimality. A usual problem with international externalities is that countries 
only get a fraction of the benefit from their own (costly) efforts to deal with the externality. Co-operation 
by all stakeholders will however lead to the highest total net benefit. This should be a strong incentive 
for co-operation. The distribution of costs and benefits between the co-operators are however rarely 
even, and side-transfers are often required to get participation by all. (Carraro and Siniscalco 1995). 
 
Before an IEA is reached countries must agree that a problem exists and needs to be given priority. In 
addition, and often more difficult, the sharing of responsibility and costs must be agreed upon. 
(Blackhurst and Subramanian 1992). It must be profitable to join agreements, and free-riding must be 
deterred (Carraro 1997a). 
 
The simple game of the Prisoners’ Dilemma helps us to analyse situations where the temptation to 
free-ride on others’ efforts exists. This temptation depends on the gains of such behaviour, the chance 
of being discovered, and the potential punishment. International co-operation is often modelled as 
repeated games, and several types of strategies can sustain co-operation in this framework. 
“Defection” in the theory of repeated games does not distinguish between free-riding and non-
compliance (Barrett 1999).  
 
Barrett’s (1994) and others’ concept of self-enforcing IEAs is based upon the common situation that as 
the number of co-operating countries increase, the benefit of free-riding increases faster than the 
individual benefit of co-operating. Then, at some point the individual benefit of free-riding will be larger 
than of co-operation. This is in spite of the total sum benefit being the largest with co-operation by all. 
For almost all the cases investigated by Barrett (1994) and Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) the size of 
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the self-enforced coalition is relatively small. A self-enforced agreement must fulfil both individual and 
collective rationality (Barrett 1999). It must be profitable for individual countries to join and fulfil the 
obligations of the agreement. At the same time it must be rational to punish a deviator, rather than for 
the remaining countries to renegotiate the agreement. A collectively rational agreement will have 
credible threats of punishment. Barrett (1999) shows that self-enforced full co-operation can only be 
sustained if the gains of co-operation are small; When co-operation is not really needed.  
 
The sum total benefit with co-operation by all is normally larger than with the self-enforced coalition, 
and Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) propose to use the self-enforced coalition as a nucleus to expand 
co-operation by the aid of self-financed side transfers. Barrett (1994) is pessimistic concerning such 
use of side transfers, as that agreement would again not be self-enforcing.  
 
Chander and Tulkens (1995) have the opposite view of Barrett: Side transfers are the key to achieve 
participation by all. They present a formula for cost-sharing in an IEA where all will be better off than 
with the Nash non-co-operative outcome. Chander and Tulkens’ (1995) proposed IEA should be 
presented to all, and if some countries would want to form a free-riding coalition, hoping for a higher 
benefit, the threat of the remaining countries playing Nash against the coalition would be sufficient to 
deter them from that. 
 
The two opposing views held by Barrett (1994) and Chander and Tulkens (1995) differ principally on 
how an IEA comes about, and to what extent free-riding can be avoided. In the limit, do countries join 
one by one until the self-enforced agreement is a fact, or does one negotiate IEAs that require 
participation by all to come into effect? If, in an ideal situation with all countries co-operating, a country 
decided to try to free-ride, would the remaining co-operators accept it, and just adjust their actions, or 
would they actively try to punish the free-rider? Barrett (1998) thinks that the punishment proposed by 
Chander and Tulkens (1995) does not constitute a credible threat. 
 
In reality IEAs concerning externalities between many countries are negotiated by a large number of 
countries, and they come into effect when a certain fraction of the countries have ratified it. Compared 
to the size of the self-enforced coalitions calculated by Barrett (1994) and Carraro and Siniscalco 
(1995) the required fractions seem large. Yet, most of the IEAs that have been negotiated through 
come into effect. A minimum participation clause provides incentives for countries to join, as they then 
are sure not to have to perform measures unilaterally (Barrett 1998). However, for IEAs with static 
targets for its parties (independent of the number and/or size of other parties), they do not provide 
incentive for successive accession beyond the marginal ratification level (Barrett 1998b). The Kyoto 
Protocol has such static targets. A relatively small number of large/important countries are responsible 
for the major part of many different global/international environmental problems. Hence measures by 
these countries can solve most of the problem in question. Once these major players have joined the 
IEA the gains of free-riding are small compared to the benefits of being part of the “good company” 
(Blackhurst and Subramanian 1992).  
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That states may have moral obligations, also in their own view, have been pointed out by several 
authors, including Barrett (1990, 1994), Blackhurst and Subramanian (1992) and Hoel (1994). If 
countries commit themselves to co-operation, a self-enforcing coalition can be expanded by bribing 
other countries to join (Carraro and Siniscalco 1995). Another way to expand international co-
operation on public environmental goods is to link it with co-operation in a field where non-participants 
can be excluded from getting benefits. Both Carraro and Siniscalco (1997) and Katsoulacos (1997) 
show that issue-linking can be very effective in stabilising IEAs. 
 
Incorporating trade provisions into IEAs can be an effective way to deter free-riding. Barrett (1997a) 
finds that full co-operation in an IEA can be sustained through the credible threat of a trade sanction 
for a large range of realistic parameter values. In equilibrium trade is not actually restricted, as the 
threat itself is enough. When a limited number of countries have agreed to introduce domestic 
measures to deal with a global externality (or at least one affecting also countries outside this group), 
efficiency will not be obtained unless the countries supplement their domestic environmental 
measures with trade regulations (Mæstad 1998). 
 
Compliance of IEAs is usually costly, and one expects countries to cheat if they can get away with it 
(Barrett 1994, Russell 1996). IEAs should have good procedures for dealing with non-compliance. If 
the procedures are not good enough there, and the conflict involves other aspects of international 
relations, the parties might revert will use other international agreements dispute-resolving 
mechanisms. If trade is involved the World Trade Organisation and the non-compliance mechanisms 
under GATT can be used. The environment will then not be the winner (Werksman, lecture 15.05.98). 
 
Several authors however conclude that compliance is the norm (Enders and Porges 1992, Chayes 
and Chayes 1995, Werksmann 1996). Barrett (1998b) says non-compliance is “extremely rare”. 
Sovereignty of states mean they are free to choose which agreements to enter. Barrett (1999) 
concludes that free-riding is the constraint on international co-operation, and not compliance 
enforcement. Downs et al (1996)
53
 and Enders and Porges (1992) ask if “deep co-operation” can be 
agreed and sustained; “Compliance can be expected as an agreed IEA only reflects the costs and 
benefits of the underlying non co-operative game”. If countries do not comply it is because they are 
not able (Werksman lecture 15.05.98). Assistance, perhaps in combination with coercive measures, 
should hence be the remedy (Werksman lecture 15.05.98, Barrett 1998b). 
 
The Kyoto Protocol obligations will cost the Annex I countries a significant fraction of their GDP, and 
hence can not be said to be “shallow” (Barrett 1998b). The Kyoto Protocol has no provisions to ensure 
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compliance, and have not entered into force yet, so we can’t choose between the two explanations 
(Barrett 1998b). 
 
The Montreal Protocol has built-in incentives for participation. This works as free rider deterrence 
(Barrett 1998b). Barrett (1998) state that once free-riding can be deterred, compliance comes for free. 
If countries will not comply they are also barred from the positive incentive to participation. “A carrot 
withheld is stick”, as Werksman (lecture 15.05.98) puts it. Barrett (1998b) considers it as a potentially 
large shortcoming of the Kyoto Protocol that it contains no incentives for countries to join it, apart from 
the potential gain of international co-operation. As we have seen, the potential gain of co-operation is 
not enough to avoid free-riding. Barrett (1998b) asks if similar trade sanction provisions like the 
Montreal Protocol’s could be included in the Kyoto Protocol; As greenhouse gas emissions are 
influenced by the production of any good, a complete trade sanction would not be credible. The option 
of trade sanctions in a limited range of products could perhaps be possible, Barrett (1998b) suggests. 
As far as he knows the subject never came up in Kyoto. 
 
Overall efficient IEAs have not yet been possible, both due to technical and political limitations 
(Hagem 1996). For cost-efficient implementation of IEAs the marginal cost of the last measure 
performed in each country must be equal (Chander et al 1999). This marginal cost must also not be 
larger than the marginal benefit. The Kyoto Protocol opens up for “flexible mechanisms” to achieve 
cost-efficiency. These are international emissions trading (IET), joint implementation (JI) and the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM). The detailed rules to govern their use have not yet been decided. It 
may happen at COP-6 in November 2000.  
 
The Kyoto-mechanisms can give cost-efficient implementation of the protocol’s targets, but there are 
several factors that can reduce their potential, or even lead to lower efficiency than if the mechanisms 
were not allowed. 
 
Hagem (1996) and Holtsmark and Hagem (1996) investigate how actors with market power can 
influence the price of quotas, or use tradable quotas as an instrument of monopolisation. As market 
power can be influenced by the allocation of quotas, the issue of burden-sharing and efficiency are not 
separable. Large transactions costs may well be an obstacle to cost-efficiency, but probably only in 
the establishing phase of an IET-regime (Holtsmark and Hagem 1996). 
 
The parties to a contract under the Kyoto mechanisms will be under different jurisdictions, and 
Janssen (1999) would like the contract to be self-enforcing. He investigates the role of national 
authorities, and the possibility of strategic delegation. Both can lead to the parties being credibly 
committed to co-operation.  
 
Private information can be used by parties for their own benefit, at the expense of the other party and 
global cost-efficiency (Torvanger et al 1994, Hagem 1996). Torvanger et al (1994) and Hagem 
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(1996b) model a situation where a potential host of a JI-project abstains from investments today, 
hoping to have them financed with a profit in the future. This can lead to higher overall emissions than 
if JI was not allowed. Hagem (1996c) look at the situation where the host does not know her true cost 
of implementing a JI-project of several sub-projects, until some of these sub-projects have been 
performed. The host may then consider breaching the contract if costs are higher than expected. 
Hagem (1996c) look at contract design and the value of information/monitoring for the investor of the 
project, both before and after the contract is made. 
 
Authors agree that emission limits must be set for the non-Annex I countries in the future (Barrett 
1998b, Chander et al 1999, Helms 1999). This is to lower the overall cost of greenhouse gas 
mitigation. It is important for efficiency because the cheapest emissions-reducing projects are in the 
developing and EIT countries. It is also important as the transaction costs of JI-projects will be high 
due to asymmetric information and uncertainty without emission baselines for these countries. Barrett 
(1998b) underlines that the developing countries need not pay themselves to achieve the reductions, 
but it is important that limits are set and reductions take place there. The wish to reduce the amount of 
flexibility in the implementation of Annex B countries’ obligations is seen as harming the environment 
by Barrett (1998b), since it will raise overall costs of reducing greenhouse-gas levels. The cost of 
implementation must surely matter when countries consider ratifying the Kyoto Protocol. 
 
Efforts to reduce emissions, in countries with obligations under the Kyoto protocol or in specific 
sectors/firms in countries without obligations, may increase the total emissions from countries without 
obligations. Leakages may reduce the overall effect of the JI-projects (Hagem 1996). If most 
emissions reductions can be obtained through cheap JI-projects using old technology, there is a fear 
too little technological development will take place. This might have a negative long-run effect on 
global emissions (Holtsmark and Hagem 1998).  
 
To limit the “hot-air” trading with the Economies in transition has been put forward as an important 
issue by several authors (Barrett 1998b, Torvanger 1998). As emissions-reductions below the target in 
this commitment period is allowed banked into the next commitment period, one might ask where the 
core of concern lies. Whether paper trades will take place now between Annex II countries and the 
Economies in transition, or between now and the future in the Economies in transition might be 
unimportant. It is possible that it can affect the targets to be negotiated for the next period, but I think 
this could affect both Annex II countries and the EITs, and hence the overall effect could go either 
way. 
 
The flexible mechanisms in the Kyoto Protocol can potentially reduce the cost to reduce greenhouse 
gas levels substantially (Barrett 1998, St.meld nr. 29), but there are several obstacles in the way. In 
chapter 5 I develop two models to investigate a joint implementation relationship between an investor 
and a host, that I believe can be appropriate, especially if the host is in a developing country or one of 
the Economies in transition. High transaction costs are expected to be a major obstacle in establishing 
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JI-contracts (Bohm 1994, Barrett 1998b). I believe they will be reduced by potential JI-investors 
concentrating on a few potential project-host, and rather performing several projects with each. I have 
modelled this as an infinitely repeated principal-agent relationship. Hosts to joint implementation 
projects in developing or EIT countries likely face severe financial constraints. Hence they will need 
some or all of the transfer from the investor before the project is completed. I have modelled this as if 
the transfers are made before the project starts. This means taking away the traditionally most 
powerful tool in principal-agent models that a principal has to influence an agent’s actions - the ability 
to withhold the compensation. Developing and EIT countries in general have a higher degree of 
political and economical instability, as well as corruption and crime, compared to the developed 
countries. I believe this increases the chances of cheating on the part of the project host. I have 
assumed in my modelling that there are uncertain factors that can cause project failure, and the 
actions of the host and uncertain factors can not be observed by the investor. The investor can only 
influence the host’s propensity to fulfil the contract by how often she offers the host a new contract. 
These starting points are identical for the two models. In the second model the host can reduce the 
probability of external factors causing project failure, but at a cost. 
 
I find that joint implementation contracts are possible under these assumptions, under certain 
conditions. The probability of external factors causing misuse must not be too large, and the host must 
value the future sufficiently. This is in relation to the investor and host’s expected costs and benefits of 
the project. Even if contracts may be offered to the host, she will likely not be offered contracts every 
period. A sequence of periods with and without contracts can occur, and the sequence is decided 
endogenously in the model. 
 
Numerous strategies by the investor are possible in the equilibria where contracts are offered. They 
range from where the investor is very willing to offer a new contract after possible breach by the host, 
to newer offering a new contract after possible breach. Hence the models allow and describe a fairly 
wide range of behaviour by an investor offering JI-contracts. The investor’s possible strategies have a 
trade-off between excusing possible breach and offering contracts after periods without contracts. 
 
Apart from the finding that JI-contracts are possible under the assumptions I have set, major 
conclusions are that 
 to facilitate JI-contracts under the assumptions of my models potential hosts and investors should 
try to reduce the probability with which external factors cause project failure 
 a  JI-project investor should try to reduce the level of asymmetric information with the host to avoid 
own benefit being  eliminated by contract breach by the host. 
 
The Kyoto Protocol needs to reach its targets cost-efficiently for major industrial countries to ratify it. 
Emissions trading and joint implementation among the Annex I countries will help to achieve this, even 
though several problems must be overcome. It is also required that measures are implemented in the 
developing countries. The Clean Development Mechanism opens up for this, but there are dangers of 
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adverse selection of projects, paper trades and leakages. The majority of non-Annex B countries are 
not willing to accept emission limitations at present. The opportunity to engage in CDM-projects, make 
a benefit on the trade and get access to new technology have already tempted some into announcing 
voluntarily commitments. Even if these commitments do not constitute anything but business-as-usual 
targets, they will lower the transaction costs of CDM-projects considerably. Then it will also be easier 
for the Annex B countries to accept paying for measures in the developing countries. Involving non-
Annex B countries is necessary to lower the total bill of greenhouse gas reductions, not so much to 
share costs between industrialised and developing countries. We have seen that joint implementation 
with hosts in developing countries and economies in transition are possible, but that the rules to 
govern the Kyoto mechanisms must be set carefully. Hopefully the COP-6 in The Hague in November 
2000 will manage to agree on a set of rules that will overcome most of the problems discussed here. 
6.1 Conclusions 
In this thesis we have seen that full co-operation in dealing with international environmental 
externalities will give the highest sum benefit for the countries involved, but that countries have the 
incentive to increase their individual benefit by free-riding on the virtuous behaviour of others. As there 
is no supra-national authority to enforce compliance, this can make co-operation break down or keep it 
from being established.  
 
To enhance co-operation it must be made beneficial for each individual country to join an IEA, and 
free-riding and non-compliance should be deterred. We have seen that several mechanisms can 
promote co-operation, like side-transfers, issue-linking and trade-sanctions. Several authors also see 
countries’ moral obligations and commitment as possible important factors in this. 
 
Contrary to basic economics theory, compliance with international environmental agreements (IEAs) is 
the norm. Several explanations to this are possible. An IEA may be seen as the outcome of a non co-
operative game, and hence only reflects each country’s costs and benefits of that underlying game. 
Countries are free to negotiate and join the IEAs they choose, perhaps opting out of costly “deep co-
operation”.  
 
To have mechanisms for efficient implementation of an IEA will make it easier for countries to join and 
comply. However, achieving overall efficiency seem unlikely. It requires both that targets are set 
optimally and the agreed measures must be implemented cost-efficiently. Mechanisms to achieve 
cost-efficiency exist, but have their problems.  
 
The Kyoto Protocol opens up for such flexible mechanisms: International emissions trading (IET) and 
joint implementation (JI). To minimise costs of implementation measures to combat global warming 
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must be performed also in economies in transition and developing countries, but the developing 
countries do not have obligations under the protocol. For JI-projects between an investor in a country 
with obligations and a host in a country without obligations the Kyoto Protocol includes the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM). The detailed rules for all these flexible mechanisms have not yet 
been agreed upon. 
 
For IET possible problems with countries’ market power in the emissions quota market, limited 
participation in trading, high transaction costs, asymmetric information opening up for cheating and the 
trade of “hot air” can reduce the cost-saving, or even lead to higher overall costs of implementation. 
 
For JI (includes the CDM) one fears that high transaction costs, asymmetric information opening up for 
adverse selection of projects and hidden action by the hosts, “paper trades” due to missing emission 
baselines for the developing countries, limited participation and leakages will limit their cost-saving 
ability.  
 
I believe JI-project investors will try to perform several projects with the same host to reduce 
transaction costs of each project. Due to financial constraints hosts in developing countries and 
economies in transition will need to get all or some of the project transfer before performing the 
project. In have developed two models in this thesis to investigate if JI-contracts are possible under 
these assumptions. I find that even if external uncertain factors can cause project failure and the host 
has private information opening up for cheating, contracts can be possible. To increase the chances of 
JI-projects the external factors’ influence should be reduced. A JI-project host should work to reduce a 
host’s private information, to avoid own benefit of the project being eliminated due to contract breach 
by the host. 
 
That the developing countries have no emission limits under the Kyoto Protocol is a very large 
problem. The protocol’s targets for emission-reductions are not permanent, but only for the period 
2008-2012. What will happen thereafter is yet to negotiate. If emissions reductions obtained this 
period are not permanent, the whole exercise is meaningless. If the set of detailed rules for the Kyoto 
Protocol’s flexible mechanisms, perhaps being decided at COP-6 in The Hague in November 2000, 
can not lead to cost-efficient implementation, it will be a major blow to the whole process of dealing 
with climate change. Then chances are that the protocol’s overall target will not be met. In my view 
there is no point in negotiating targets for later periods before these other issues are resolved. 
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7. APPENDIX 
 
7.1 Model calculations 
 
7.1.1 How to determine the equilibria and conditions of the 
basic model 
Each player can pursue one of the two pure strategies or a mixed strategy. This gives rise to nine 
possible combinations of types of strategies between the principal and the agent. 
 
From Equation 21: 
k) if  
[ ] [ ]{ }2i21i3 GF)a1()GF()GFB)(1(aG δδγδγδ +−−++−++−−<   
then the principal sets pi=1 for all i. 
l) if 
[ ] [ ]{ }2i21i3 GF)a1()GF()GFB)(1(aG δδγδγδ +−−++−++−−>  
then the principal sets pi=0 for all i. 
m) if 
[ ] [ ]{ }2i21i3 GF)a1()GF()GFB)(1(aG δδγδγδ +−−++−++−−=  
then the principal sets pi∈[0,1] for all i. 
 
From Equation 22: 
r) [ ] [ ]221 HT)HLT()HLT)(1( µµγµγ +>+−++−−  ⇒ ai=1 ∀i . 
s) [ ] [ ]221 HT)HLT()HLT)(1( µµγµγ +<+−++−−  ⇒ ai=0 ∀i. 




Earlier it was stated that if the principal does not offer an agreement to the agent, the agent will always 
use the environmental resource in the traditional manner. Two of the initial nine combinations can then 
be eliminated ((l, r) and (l, t)). 
 
When conditions (m) and (t) hold we have the case of Equilibrium (1). When conditions (l) and (s) hold, 
we have the case of Equilibrium (2). 
 
Assume conditions (m) and (t) hold. Randomisation by the principal implies Gi=(1-pi)δG3+piδG3 =δG3 
∀i. Thus Gi=0 ∀i since δ ≠1. Substituting Gi=0 ∀i into the expression for the principal's expected payoff 
(Equation 21) gives ai as in Equilibrium (1). 
 
Condition (a) is needed for ai ≤1 (probabilities must be between 0 and 1) 
 
Condition (t) can be rearranged to give an expression for H1. This can be used to eliminate H1 from the 









TpH)p1(H)p1( 23222 =−−− µµ  
Equation 61 
TpH))p1(1(Hp 33323 =−−−− µµ  
Equation 62 
We now have three equations in two unknowns (H2 and H3). The pi's are strictly also unknowns, but by 
choosing the pi's adequately, the set above can be solved for H2 and H3. The system will only have a 
solution if one of the equations is redundant. Mathematically this is the same as if the expanded 





















Solving this gives Equation 27 (I have used the data-program “Mathematica” for this). 
 
Conditions (b) and (c) are necessary to ensure that 0≤pi≤1 for all states i=1,2,3;  
Equation 27 can be rearranged to give: 
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These two last equations again puts restrictions on p2. These restrictions leads to the necessity of 
conditions (b) and (c). The same restrictions are also necessary for the agent's expected payoff to be 
non-negative in equilibrium. 
 
We have shown that the combination of conditions (m) and (t) gives an equilibrium, namely Equilibrium 
(1). 
 
If the principal assumes the agent will exploit the resource anyway, she can do no better than not offer 
an agreement. With no agreement, the agent will use the resource in the traditional manner. This 
combination is clearly an equilibrium, namely Equilibrium (2). 
 
Assuming the existence of an equilibrium for all other combinations of conditions (k-m) and (r-t) gives 
contradictions. An example will illustrate this: 
 
Assume conditions (k) and (s) hold. Then the principal will always offer a trade agreement, and the 
agent will always break the agreement. Inserting this into the principal's expected payoff equation 




















We see that pi=0 will maximise the expected payoff. This contradicts the initial assumption of pi=1, and 
the combination of condition (k) and (s) is not an equilibrium. Similar contradictions can be found for all 
other combinations except the ones yielding Equilibria (1) and (2). 
7.1.2 Is p1 always larger than p2 and p3? 
Question: 
Is p1 always larger than p2 and p3 in Equilibrium (1) of the basic model? 
 
Investigation: 
Try to set p1 = α p2 in Equation 27, with α<1. This gives 
µ p2[(1-γ)T(α-1)+L] = L (1+µ p3) 
Equation 69 
We must assume that [(1-γ)T(α-1)+L] > 0 else the left hand side would be negative, and p3 would have 
to be negative as well. 
 












  (>0) 
Equation 70 









Since the denominator in Equation 71 is less than L, the value for p2 from this equation is higher than 
1.  
 
Hence we have shown that p2 > p1 is impossible. 
 
Now set p1 = β p3 with β < 1. From Equation 27 we then get 
µp3 (β(1-γ)T - L) = L + µp2(T(1-γ) - L) 
Equation 72 
We must assume that (β(1-γ)T - L) is positive. If not the left-hand side will be negative, and so p2 will 
have to be negative, which is impossible. We see that 
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  (>0) 
Equation 73 



















≥  (higher limit). 
Due to conditions (b) and (c) of Equilibrium (1), this implies that β < 2. Hence p1 is not necessarily 
larger than p3. For p1 to be larger than p3 always in Equilibrium (1) β must be smaller than 1. For this to 









7.1.3 Determining the equilibria and conditions of the 
control model 
In the basic model the two players could choose between 3 different strategies each. Each could 
pursue one of the two pure strategies or a mixed strategy in ai or pi respectively. It gave rise to nine 
possible combinations of strategies between the principal and the agent. In the control model the 
agent also has the three different options for strategy in ci. 
 
















































































































then the principal sets pi∈[0,1] for all i. 
 
From Equation 37: 
If [ ])HLT()HLT)(1( 21 µγµγ +−++−−  
[ ])HCLT()HCLT)(1( 2c1c µγµγ +−−++−−−<  
Equation 78 
⇒ ci=1 ∀i. 
 
If [ ])HLT()HLT)(1( 21 µγµγ +−++−−  
[ ])HCLT()HCLT)(1( 2c1c µγµγ +−−++−−−>  
Equation 79 
⇒ ci=0 ∀i. 
 
If [ ])HLT()HLT)(1( 21 µγµγ +−++−−  
[ ])HCLT()HCLT)(1( 2c1c µγµγ +−−++−−−=  
Equation 80 
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⇒ ai∈[0,1] ∀i. 
 
Some of the possible combinations of strategies can be eliminated because we have assumed that: 
i) If the principal does not offer the agent an agreement, the agent will always use the resource 
in the traditional manner (ai=0, and the principal will observe what she defines as misuse of 
the resource). 
ii) If the agent will misuse the resource anyway, we have assumed there is no point in her 
exerting control, as the principal can only observe whether misuse has taken place, and not 
the amount of it nor who is responsible. 
 
Just like for the basic model we must assume one set of strategies valid, and check whether it will give 
any contradictions. If not, we have an equilibrium. I will here only go through the combinations that 
actually give equilibria.  
 
Assume pi=0 and ai=0 (then ci is assumed to be 0 always) (Equilibrium (C4)): 
If the agent will always misuse the resource, then the principal can do no better than to not offer the 
agent an agreement. If the principal never will offer an agreement to the agent, then the agent can do 
no better than to always misuse the resource. This is clearly an equilibrium. 
 
Assume pi∈[0,1],  ai∈[0,1], and ci=0 (Equilibrium (C1)): 
When pi∈[0,1] then we have from Equation 36 that Gi=δG3 for all i. Since δ ≠ 1 this must imply that 





























Equation 77 can be solved for ai when Gi=0 and ci=0. 
 
The expression in Equation 85 can be used to eliminate H1 from the set of equations given by 
Equation 37 for i=1,2,3. This set of 3 equations in H2 and H3 will only have a solution if one of the 
equations is redundant. This means that the expanded coefficient matrix from the set of equations 
must have determinant zero. This will give the expression that defines the principal’s strategy. In this 
case it is identical to Equation 63, which leads to the principal’s strategy in the basic model. 
 
Assume pi∈[0,1],  ai∈[0,1], and ci=1 (Equilibrium (C2)): 











When ci=1 and Gi=0 ∀i Equation 77 can be solved for ai. 








In he same manner as earlier this can be used to eliminate H1 from the set of 3 equations given by 
Equation 37 for i=1,2,3. The 3 equations in H2 and H3 can again be used to find the principal’s 
strategy. By comparing Equation 88 and Equation 85 we can however easily find the principal’s 
strategy without going through the whole exercise of setting the determinant of the expanded 
coefficient matrix equal to zero and solving for pi. 
 
Assume pi∈[0,1],  ai∈[0,1], and ci∈[0,1] (Equilibrium (C3)): 











With mixed strategies in both ai and ci, we can get ai expressed as a function of ci from Equation 36 
(and vice versa), as it is in Equilibrium (C3). Since both ai and ci are probabilities, condition (j) must be 
valid. 
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From Equation 83 with ci∈[0,1] we can get either the same expression as in Equation 88 or as in 
Equation 85 to eliminate H1 from the set of 3 equations given by i=1,2,3 from Equation 36. We 
understand that the principal’s strategy must satisfy the relevant conditions from both Equilibrium (C1) 
and (C2) (conditions c-d and g-h). Due to condition (i) of Equilibrium (C3) (same as Equation 87), 
condition (c) is equivalent to (g), and (d) to (h).  
7.2 Abbreviations 
In the chapter on International Environmental Agreements: 
Annex B – Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol, listing the countries with obligations to reduce their 
emissions of greenhouse gases, including the target. The countries are roughly the same as in 
Annex I of the FCCC, but with the EU also as a separate party. 
Annex I – Annex I to the Framework Convention on Climate Change, containing roughly a list of the 
developed countries (OECD countries and the economies in transition in Central and Eastern 
Europe, including Russia). 
Annex II – Annex II to the Framework Convention on Climate Change, containing a list of the “rich” 
countries (most of the OECD countries) 
CDM – The Clean Development Mechanism 
COP – Conference of the Parties 
EIT – Economies in transition, referring to Russia and Central and Eastern European states. 
FCCC – The UN’s Framework Convention on Climate Change 
GDP – Gross Domestic Product 
IEA – International Environmental Agreement 
IET – International Emissions Trading  
JI – Joint implementation 
 
In the models: 
ai – the agent’s state-dependent strategy (frequency) to not change behaviour (misuse the resource) 
A – agent (JI-project host) 
B – the benefit to the principal if the resource is not misused/the JI-project is performed successfully 
F –  the principal’s cost of making a transfer to the agent 
Gi – the principal’s expected payoff of being in state i 
Hi – the agent’s expected payoff of being in state i 
i – indicates the state-dependence of a variable  
L – the cost (loss) to the agent of changing behaviour 
pi – the principal’s state-dependent strategy (frequency) to offer the agent a new contract 
P – principal (JI-project investor) 
Appendix 
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T –  the benefit to the agent of receiving the transfer from the principal 
δ – the principal's discount factor 
γ – the probability that factors others than the agent will cause misuse/project failure 
γ
c
 – the probability that factors other than the agent will cause misuse/project failure, when the agent 
exerts control over these factors 
µ – the agent's discount factor 
 
 Eirik Inge Mikkelsen  
  117 
8. LITERATURE 
Anderson and Blackhurst 1992: The Greening of World Trade Issues, Harvester Wheatsheaf, UK. 
Barbier, Ed 1993; “The role of trade interventions in the sustainable management of key resources: 
The cases of African elephant and tropical timber”, Discussion papers in environmental 
economics and environmental management, number 9308, University of York, England. 
Barrett, Scott 1990: “The problem of global environmental protection”, Oxford Review of Economic 
Policy, Vol. 6 No 1, 68-79. 
Barrett, Scott 1994: “Self-enforcing international environmental agreements”, Oxford Economic 
Papers, 46, 878-894. 
Barrett, Scott 1997: "Heterogeneous international environmental agreements", in Carraro 1997. 
Barrett, Scott 1997a: "The strategy of trade sanctions in international environmental agreements", 
Resource and Energy Economics, 19, 345-361. 
Barrett, Scott 1998: "On the theory and Diplomacy of Environmental Treaty-making", Environmental 
and Resource Economics, 11 (3-4), 317-333. 
Barrett, Scott 1998b: “The Political Economy of the Kyoto Protocol”, Oxford Review of Economic 
Policy, Vol. 14, No 4, 20-39. 
Barrett, Scott 1999: “A theory of full international co-operation”, Journal of theoretical politics, 11(4), 
519-541. 
Barrett, Scott 1999b; “Montreal vs. Kyoto: International Co-operation and the Global Environment”, in 
Kaul, Grunberg and Stern (eds.): Global Public Goods: International Co-operation in the 21
st
 
Century, Oxford University Press. 
Baumol, William and Wallace Oates 1988: The theory of environmental policy, 2. edition, Cambridge 
University Press. 
Bhagwati, Jagdish 1993: Trade and the environment: The false conflict?, in Trade and the 
environment, D Zaelke, P Orbuch and RF Houseman (eds.), Island Press, Washington DC. 
Literature 
118 
Black, Jane, Maurice Levi and David de Meza 1993: “Creating a good atmosphere: Minimum 
participation for tackling the greenhouse effect”, Economica, 60, 281-93. 
Blackhurst, Richard and Arvind Subramanian 1992: “Promoting multilateral co-operation”, in Anderson 
and Blackhurst 1992. 
Blackhurst, Richard and Arvind Subramanian 1992: Promoting multilateral co-operation on the 
environment, In The greening of world trade issues, Kym Anderson and Richard Blackhurst 
(eds.), Harvester Wheatsheaf, England. 
Botteon, Michelle and Carlo Carraro 1997: “Burden sharing and coalition stability in environmental 
negotiations with asymmetric countries”, in Carraro 1997. 
Buckley, Ralf 1993: International trade, investment and environmental regulation. An environmental 
management perspective. Journal of World trade, vol. 27, 1993(4), p101-148. 
Carraro, C and D Siniscalco 1992: "The international dimension of environmental policy", European 
Economic Review, 36, 379-387. 
Carraro, C and D Siniscalco 1993: “Strategies for the international protection of the environment”, 
Journal of Public Economics, 52, 309-328. 
Carraro, C and D Siniscalco 1995: “Policy co-ordination for sustainability: Commitments, Transfers 
and Linked negotiations”, in Goldin and Winters (eds.): The Economics of sustainable 
development, Cambridge University Press. 
Carraro, C and D Siniscalco 1997: “R&D co-operation and the stability of international environmental 
agreements”, in Carraro 1997. 
Carraro, C and D Siniscalco 1998: "International environmental agreements: Incentives and political 
economy", European Economic Review 42, 561-572. 
Carraro, Carlo (ed.) 1994: Trade, Innovation, Environment, Kluwer, The Netherlands 
Carraro, Carlo (ed.) 1997: International environmental negotiations: strategic policy issues, Edward 
Elgar, UK 
Carraro, Carlo 1997a: “Introduction”, in Carraro 1997. 
Carson, Rachel 1960: Silent Spring, Penguin books. 
Chander and Tulkens 1995: “A Core-Theoretic Solution for the Design of Co-operative Agreements on 
Transfrontier Pollution”, International Tax and Public Finance, 2:279-293. 
 Eirik Inge Mikkelsen  
  119 
Chander, Parkash, Henry Tulkens, Jean-Pascal van Ypersele and Stephane Willems 1999: “The 
Kyoto Protocol. An economic and game-theoretic interpretation”, Nota di Lavoro 72-99, 
Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei, Milan. 
Chayes A and Chayes AH (1995): The New Sovereignty, Harvard University Press. 
Cicerone 1/98: “Kyotoprotokollen: Offisiell tekst med norske kommentarer” (The Kyoto Protocol: 
Official text with comments in Norwegian), Cicerone magazine 1/98, Centre for International 
Climate and Energy Research – Oslo. 
Clark, DJ 1992: Rent-seeking, learning and the dynamics of reputation in the international credit 
market, PhD thesis, Dept of Economics, University of Warwick, Coventry, England. 
Coase, RH 1960: “The Problem of Social Cost”, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. III, 1-44. 
Dales J H 1968: Pollution, Property and Prices, University of Toronto Press  
Ecchia, Giulio and Marco Mariotti 1997: “The stability of international environmental coalitions with 
farsighted countries: some theoretical observations”, in Carraro 1997. 
Enders, Alice and Amelia Porges 1992: “Successful conventions and conventional success: saving the 
ozone layer”, in Anderson and Blackhurst 1992. 
Fauchald, Ole Kristian (lecture 15.05.98): “Tvistemål” (“Disputes” in Norwegian), at the Norwegian 
Ministry of the Environment’s seminar on International Environmental Law. 
French, Hilary 1993: Costly trade-offs - Reconciling trade and the environment, Worldwatch paper 
113, Worldwatch institute, Washington DC. 
Førsund, Finn 1994: “Transfrontier pollution and the second generation of international agreements”, 
second draft of paper prepared for a seminar under the Nordic Council’s Programme Energy 
and Society, Reykjavik, 18-19 April 1994.  
Førsund, Finn and Steinar Strøm 1994: Miljøøkonomi (in Norwegian) (Environmental Economics), 2. 
edition, Universitetsforlaget AS, Oslo, Norway. 
Golombek, Rolf, Cathrine Hagem and Michael Hoel 1995: “Efficient incomplete international climate 
agreements”, Resource and Energy Economics, 17, 25-46. 
Hagem, Cathrine 1996: Climate Agreements under Limited Participation, Asymmetric Information and 
Market Imperfections – a summary of a Dr. Polit. thesis, Centre for International Climate and 
Environmental Research – Oslo (CICERO). 
Hagem, Cathrine 1996b: “Joint implementation under asymmetric information and strategic 
behaviour”, Environmental and Resource Economics, 8: 431-447.  
Literature 
120 
Hagem, Cathrine 1996c: “The value of information and the design of a climate contract under 
asymmetric information both before and after the contract is signed”, CICERO Working paper, 
no. 1, 1996. Centre for International Climate and Environmental Research – Oslo. 
Hagem, Cathrine and Hege Westskog 1996: “The design of a tradable CO2-quota system under 
market imperfections”, CICERO Working paper 1996:02, Centre for International Climate and 
Environmental Research – Oslo. 
Heal, G 1994: “Formation of International Environmental Agreements”, in Carraro 1994. 
Helms, Carsten 1999: “A mechanism for the Fair Division of Climate Change Protection Burdens”, 
Nota di lavoro 45.99, Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei. 
Hoel (1991): "Global environmental problems: The effect of unilateral actions taken by one country", 
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 20, 55-70. 
Hoel, M (1994): “Efficient climate policy in the presence of free riders”, Journal of Environmental 
Economics and Management, 27, 259-274. 
Hoel, M (1999): “International trade and the environment: How to handle carbon leakage”, mimeo, 
University of Oslo. 
Hoel, M and K Schneider (1997): “Incentives to participate in an international environmental 
agreement”, Environmental and Resource Economics, 9, 153-170. 
Holtsmark, Bjart and Cathrine Hagem 1998: “Emissions trading under the Kyoto Protocol”, CICERO 
Report 1998:1 Centre for International Climate and Environmental Research – Oslo. 
Janssen, Josef 1999: “(Self-) Enforcement of Joint Implementation and Clean Development 
Contracts”, Nota di Lavoro 14.99, Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei. 
Kaitala, V, M Pohjola and O Tahvonen, 1991: An analysis of SO2 negotiations between Finland and 
the Soviet Union, Finnish Economic Papers, 4, p104-112. 
Katsoulacos Y 1997: “R&D spillovers, co-operation, subsidies and international agreements”, in 
Carraro 1997. 
Leopold, Aldo 1966: A sand county almanac, Oxford University Press. 
Mcmillan J 1990: “Strategic bargaining and section 301”, in Aggressive Unilateralism: America’s 301 
Trade policy and the World trading system, JN Bhagwati and HT Patrick (eds.), Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, London. 
Mäler, Karl-Göran 1991: The acid rain game, in Valuation methods and policy making in 
environmental economics by H Folmer and E van Ierland (eds.), Elsevier, Amsterdam. 
 Eirik Inge Mikkelsen  
  121 
Mæstad, Ottar 1992: Trade policy and the environment, SNF-rapport 33/92, Stiftelsen for samfunns- 
og næringslivsforskning, Bergen, Norway. 
Mæstad, Ottar 1998: “On the efficiency of Green Trade Policy”, Environmental and Resource 
Economics 11, p. 1-18. 
Måreng, Ine 1996: Når miljøvirkninger krysser landegrenser. Forebygging av grenseoverskridende 
miljøvirkninger ved mellomstatlig samarbeid om konsekvensutredninger (When environmental 
effects cross borders: Preventing Transboundary Environmental Effects through Bilateral Co-
operation on Environmental Impact Assessments). Master thesis in Geography, University of 
Oslo. 
NOU 2000:1: “Et kvotesystem for klimagasser – Virkemiddel for å møte Norges utslippsforpliktelse 
under Kyotoprotokollen” (A Quota System for Climate gases – Measures to meet Norway’s 
emissions obligations under the Kyoto Protocol), Norwegian Ministry of the Environment. 
Pethig, Rudiger (ed.) 1992: Conflicts and Co-operation in Managing Environmental Resources, 
Springer Verlag. 
Petrakis, E and A Xepapadeas 1996: “Environmental consciousness and moral hazard in international 
agreements to protect the environment”, Journal of Public Economics, 60, 95-110. 
Pigou, AC 1920: The economics of welfare, Macmillian & Co LTD, 1962 (4. ed.), London. 
RAFI Communique September/October 1997: ”Biopiracy update; The inequitable Sharing of Benefits”, 
The Rural Advancement Foundation International. 
Russell, Clifford 1992: “Monitoring and Enforcement of Pollution Control Laws in Europe and the 
United States”, in Pethig 1992. 
Schmidt, Carsten, ”Incentives for International Environmental Co-operation: Theoretic models and 
Economic Instruments”, Nota di Lavoro 56.98, Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei. 
SSB 1998: Naturressurser og miljø 1998 (Natural resources and the Environment 1998), Central 
Bureau of Statistics, Oslo. 
SSB 1999: Naturressurser og miljø 1999 (Natural resources and the Environment 1999), Central 
Bureau of Statistics, Oslo. 
St.meld. nr. 29 (1997-98): Norges oppfølging av Kyotoprotokollen (White Paper to the Parliament on 
Norway’s implementation of the Kyoto Protocol). Norwegian Ministry of the Environment. 
St.meld. nr. 33 (1999-2000): Tilleggsmelding til St.meld. nr. 8 (1999-2000) Regjeringens 
miljøvernpolitikk og rikets miljøtilstand (Supplement to White Paper No 8 (1999-2000) on the 
Literature 
122 
Government’s Environmental Policy and the State’s Environmental Condition). Norwegian 
Ministry of the Environment. 
Subramanian, Arvind 1992: “Trade measures for environment: A nearly empty box?”, World Economy, 
Jan 1992, 135-152. 
Swanson, Timothy 1994: The International Regulation of Extinction, Macmillan Press, London. 
Torvanger, A, JS Fuglestvedt, C Hagem, L Ringius, R Selrod, HA Aaheim 1994: “Joint implementation 
under the climate convention: Phases, options and incentives”, Cicero Report 1994:6. Centre 
for International Climate and Energy Research – Oslo. 
Torvanger, Asbjørn 1998: “The state of the Kyoto Protocol Negotiations – After the fourth UNFCCC 
Conference of the Parties (COP-4) in Buenos Aires 2-13 November 1998”, Cicero Policy Note 
1998:5. Centre for International Climate and Energy Research – Oslo. 
Tulkens, Henry 1997: “Co-operation vs. Free Riding in International Environmental Affairs: Two 
Approaches”, Nota di Lavoro 47-97, Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei, Milan. 
Ulfstein, Geir lecture 14.05.98: “Innføring i folkerettslig metode - Forskjeller, likheter og samspill 
mellom soft law, traktater og sedvanerett” (Introduction to International Law – Differences, 
Similarities and Interplay of Soft Law, Conventions and Prescriptive Law), presentation held at 
The Norwegian Ministry of the Environment’s seminar in International Environmental Law.  
Werksman, Jacob 1996: “Compliance and Transition: Russia’s Non-Compliance Tests the Ozone 
Regime”, Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (Workshop on 
Institution-building in International Environmental Law, Heidelberg, March 20-22, 1996, 750-
773). 
Werksman, lecture 15.05.98: “Financial Resources and Compliance Mechanisms: The Changing 
Climate from Rio to Kyoto”, presentation held at The Norwegian Ministry of the Environment’s 
seminar in International Environmental Law. Werksman is working for the Foundation for 
International Environmental Law and Development (FIELD), University of London. 
Yamin, Farhana 1996: “The use of Joint implementation to increase compliance with the climate 
change convention”, in Cameron, Werksman and Roderick (eds.): Improving compliance with 
international environmental law, Earthscan. 
Zappfe, Peter Wessel 1958: ”Farvel Norge” (”Goodbye Norway”, in Norwegian), Norsk fjellsport 





Ina, Birk og Brage: 
ILU! 
E. 
